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Decision Making and Crisis Management

Research Question What is the relation between planning and decision-making processes in crisis management? Introduction “Once in a lifetime” events are far more common and dangerous than we ever realized (Taleb, 2010). Translating into numbers, the monetary costs of these events have consistently increased over the last decades. “Disasters in 2011 set a new record of $366 billion for economic losses” (UNISDR, 2012). In terms of insurance payouts, two-thirds of the twenty-five most expensive disasters in the last forty years have taken place since 2001 (Kunreuther, 2010). As the global climate changes and more people move to overbuilt and hence more vulnerable cities, the pace of cataclysmic “extreme events” is liable to increase (Kunreuther, 2010). As a result of these economic -- and especially human -- losses, public interest in issues of safety and risk is growing in intensity, legislation in the health and safety area is becoming more extensive and expectations about how decision-makers should perform when confronting a variety of different risks are rising (Turner, 1994). All of these developments serve to give more contemporary prominence to crisis management; a prominence which brings several difficulties in its train (Turner, 1994). In this context and setting a foundation for an answer to the research question above, this paper discusses the definitions of crises, the role of planning in dealing with increased risks, followed by a brief overview of the advantages and disadvantages of decision-making models, and then highlights challenges and opportunities related to decision-making processes in crisis management. The relevance of this paper is not in its conclusion but in advancing a discussion that “unsurprisingly, has developed political and cultural overtones, and the more widely studied it becomes, the more highly is it contested” (Turner, 1994). Crisis Management -- Definitions, Variables, Causes, and Consequences The systematic study of crises started early 1960. Charles McClelland noted five approaches in this study i) definitions, ii) classifications, iii) objectives, iv) decision-making, and v) planning and management (Shlaim, 1983). This paper focuses on the fourth approach -- decision-making under crisis -- by highlighting how crisis is defined in terms of decision-making processes within a state or in terms of the interaction process between states. Oran Young views crisis as a situation which involves change in the normal interaction patterns between states or in the international system as a whole (Shlaim, 1983). Based on these internal and external interactions, Charles Hermann elaborated the most widely accepted definition of crisis: “it is a situation that threatens the high priority goals of the decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response before the situation is transformed, and surprises the members of the decision-makers who are experiencing crisis” (Shlaim, 1983). Along Hermann’s lines, Uriel Rosenthal defines crises as “periods of upheaval and collective storms, disturbing everyday patterns and threatening core values and structures of a social system in unexpected, often unconceivable ways” (Rosenthal, 2001). Arjen Boin agrees with Rosenthal and affirms that “crises are a threat to important values, norms, and structures of society since they create uncertainty and a sense of urgency” (Boin, 2006). In addition to uncertainty, the study of crisis also takes into account the broad definition of “problem” and its related variables. Problem is “any difference between an actual situation and a desired situation” (Shlaim, 1983). Problem is perceived as a deficiency when an outcome is realized as “less than desired” and becomes an opportunity if its desired level is “better than anticipated” (Shlaim, 1983). In the study of “how to solve problems”, the academic challenge has been “identifying the discrepancy between an actual and desired state of affairs” since this identification process requires “the right information being available to the right people at the right times” (Shlaim, 1983). Management is another related variable of “problem solving”. Managerial problems are classified as structured -- straightforward-routine decision --, unstructured -- unexpected non-programmed decision --, and crisis -- unexpected problem that leads to disaster if not resolved quickly (Shlaim, 1983). Finally, risk and uncertainty are problem-solving conditions and environments that managers have to deal with in complex and unstructured problems. Risk is when there is lack of complete information on action alternatives and their consequences but there is some sense of the probabilities associated with their occurrence (Shlaim, 1983). Uncertainty is when information is so poor that managers are unable even to assign probabilities to the likely outcomes of alternatives that are known (Shlaim, 1983). Crisis management is a quite complex issue since its nature varies largely. “Modern crises are increasingly characterized by complexity, interdependence, and politicization” (Rosenthal, 2001). Crises are ever changing phenomena: “tomorrow’s crises will look different from today and yesterday’s crises” (Rosenthal, 2001). Also, people do not perceive crises in the same way: “what is crisis to some, may be opportunity to others” (Rosenthal, 2001). Other conceptual difficulties in the study of crisis management are that “crises cannot be studied in absolute terms”, “the ability of politicians, administrators, and managers to understand what goes on inside or outside the organization at hand is rather limited”, and “the most commanding dimension of uncertainty may be surprise” (Rosenthal, 2001). Idiosyncrasy and vicissitude exacerbate the complexity of crises since “crises are culturally and politically defined events that contain levels of conflict and arouse string emotional responses” and “are, at least partially, the outcome of organizational or societal “sensemaking”” (Rosenthal, 2001). Moreover, crises cannot be studied in isolation as they “are part of a dynamic process that leads a system from one temporary state to another” (Rosenthal, 2001). The causes and consequences of crises add a great deal of complexity to crisis research. The causes of crises are rooted at the microlevel such as i) human errors -- failed judgment, negligence, blunders, or sabotage -- and at the macrolevel -- technical complexity and environmental pressures (Boin, 2006). The general consequences of crises are i) the restoration of the status quo in the short-term and ii) an opportunity for learning in the long-term (Boin, 2006). From an institutional standpoint, crises put structures and existing policies to the test (Boin, 2006). Institutions face a great difficulty to return to normalcy as crises emerge because crises are usually i) endemic, ii) compounded in nature, and iii) self-perpetuating. Because of this vicious circle fed by uncertainty, crises tend to recreate themselves in mutating forms (Boin, 2006). This recreation form happens because crisis management has experienced the following trends i) transnationalization: global scale developments, ii) mediazation: the subjective notion of disaster -- “If CNN defines a situation as a crisis, it will indeed be a crisis in all its consequences” --, iii) technological developments: complexity to fix, and iv) dissipation of state authority: declining role of public authorities (Boin, 2006). The prevention of crises is a challenge. Preventive and preparatory policies are often difficult to pursue because there is i) a widespread tendency to undermine hazard risks and the probability of crisis and ii) uncertainty whether we should put all our money on prevention (Rosenthal, 2001). In the context of prevention, the discussion over resilience -- “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back” -- has become a defining feature of contemporary governance (Boin, 2006). However, policy makers have difficulties to enact preventive policies because in times of crisis, communities and members of organizations tend to minimize the impact of the crisis at hand while critics and bureaucratic competitors try to seize the moment to blame incumbent rulers and their policies for a phenomenon which is the result of multiple interacting causes (Boin, 2006). In spite of the challenges to enact preventive policies, decision makers must somehow establish a sense of normalcy and foster collective learning from crisis experiences (Boin, 2006). This sense of normalcy is re-established by having governments dealing with acute problems despite i) the obvious disparities between the demand for and supply of public resources, ii) an unclear and volatile situation, and iii) the lack of time to think, consult, and make decisions (Boin, 2006). As for collective learning, it happens when crisis decision making involves both key value tradeoffs and political risks. Successful crisis decision making depends on an extraordinary level of interagency, intergovernmental, and intergroup coordination to prevent miscommunication and overlapping activities and to avoid value or organizational conflicts between state, private, and nongovernmental actors (Boin, 2006). A three-step process to re-establish normalcy and collective learning after crises relies on i) "meaning making": when political leaders make sense of the situation and citizens know what is going on by receiving timely and detailed information, ii) termination: when leaders orchestrate a shift from emergency status back to routine life and render an account of what has happened, and iii) learning process: when those involved in crisis management draw lessons from past events and translate them into organizational practices, policies, and laws (Boin, 2006). Contingency plans deal with crises and accelerate the transition of a critical situation to normalcy. Contingency plans are not meant to be complicated, though (Boin, 2005). It should formulate clear principles about aims to be achieved and the core preconditions that apply; in addition to “being flexible and low on details about how the various professionals are supposed to do their jobs” (Boin, 2005). Planning plays an important role in the development of contingency plans. The secret of “the planning process” while working on response issues are i) sensitizing participants to problems that emerge during crisis ii) the development of an understanding for the needs and capacities of other potential crisis management actors, and iii) the support to build social capital that facilitates smooth interactions in the heat of crisis such as simulation exercises which help foster realistic expectations and build mutual trust (Boin, 2005). Planning & Crisis Management -- Contradiction & Contingent Approach “Crises are often best engaged through a combination of strategic choices and concerted action” but leaders have to deal with a paradox since everybody expects leaders to be in charge but circumstances do not allow them to make free choices (Boin, 2005). Government experiences many problems in the implementation of crisis contingency plans because there is a fundamental tension between the idea of planning and the nature of crisis decision making (Boin, 2005). Planning presupposes knowledge of what will happen (Boin, 2005). Crisis disturbs stable environments and creates uncertainty (Boin, 2005). This paradox between planning and crisis presents authorities with unfamiliar challenges that can never fully be dealt with in preconceived plans (Boin, 2005). The immediate consequence of this paradox is that “any crisis response operation necessarily contains elements of improvisation”, which requires i) flexilibility and ii) resilience rather than plans (Boin, 2005). Crisis decision making and coordination are much more effective when they are not dictated by detailed plans and allow for a healthy degree of improvisation (Boin, 2005). In most crises, lives are saved and interests are protected because of alert and decisive individuals and because organizations worked together in innovative ways (Boin, 2005). Crises threaten collective goals, surprise policy-makers, and leave them with short decision time for planning (Shlaim, 1983). This occurs because “shared risk is nonlinear and dynamic in that small differences in initial conditions, are repeated in actions over time, and lead to unpredictable outcomes” (Comfort, 1999). Shared risk appears to be more problems of collective learning, involving multiple groups at different levels of understanding, commitment, and skill, as well as requiring different types of knowledge, authority, and action for effective resolution (Comfort, 1999). The linkage between information technology and organizational management creates a “sociotechnical system” in which the ability to exchange timely and accurate information among multiple participants facilitates a more open, responsive, and creative approach to solving shared problems (Comfort, 1999). “Sociotechnical systems” also facilitate transition and self-organizing processes (Comfort, 1999). “The whole community needs a decision-making system that can hold and exchange information among multiple actors with different levels of responsibility and vulnerability to risk” (Comfort, 1999). Causality, time, distance, and complexity are fundamental to framing courses for collective action in reference to problems of shared risk (Comfort, 1999). The eight conditions that lead to self-organization -- characteristics of nonlinearity, dynamic systems, and interdependent relationships -- are i) community capacity to mobilize collective action, ii) community collective memory influencing choices and behavior, iii) irreversible effects within the system, iv) “feedback loops”, v) irregular clusters of attraction and avoidance, vi) transition to a different state, vii) unpredictable results in social action, and viii) nonlinear systems reproducing self-similar patterns of behavior (Comfort, 1999). The planning challenge is institutionalizing a contingent way of thinking (Rosenthal, 2001). The fear of surprise makes risk aversion loom large in the planning process, which makes crisis planning increasingly relying on various modes of contingency analysis (Rosenthal, 2001). Thinking contingently includes both worst-case and best-case scenarios with emphasis on reconstructive logics, multiple realities, and alternative futures (Rosenthal, 2001). The challenges for contingency plans are that “planning and preparatory measures may fall prey to routinization -- over institutionalization -- or become part of the high politics game -- under institutionalization” (Rosenthal, 2001). A contingency approach to crisis management examines crisis as i) a process: characters and conditions of a studied phenomena, ii) as a facilitator: facilitating desirable change or reform, iii) as a public-private affair: tendency to shift the burden of organizational activities and implementation from the public to the private sector, iv) as an open-minded approach: eliminate preconceived notions, v) an emphatic approach: endogenous drama, turbulences, memory, vi) a multi-disciplinary approach: eliminate the distinction between natural and man-made disasters, policy dynamics and institutional strain, and vii) addressing theoretical challenges: eliminate near-exclusive military planning such as long-range planning capacity, strategic capabilities, high-quality learning, and new ways of policy reasoning (Rosenthal, 2001). Another planning challenge is the study on how individuals and social groups respond to extreme events in nature. Even though the global toll from extreme events of nature is increasing loss in property and life, technology attracts people to hazardous areas (Burton, 1993). “The ways in which humankind deploys its resources and technology in attempts to cope with extreme events of nature are inducing more rather than less damage” (Burton, 1993). People not only locate in areas of high, recurrent natural hazard; they survive and prosper there (Burton, 1993). However, lay people cannot appraise the magnitude and frequency of extreme events with accuracy: “People are rarely aware of all the alternatives open to them” since “they differ greatly in the way they judge the consequences of particular actions even on the rare occasions when the physical outcomes are known accurately” (Burton, 1993). The comparison of many different consequences is a highly complex operation for a decision analyst armed with precise data and a computer, let alone for a farmer choosing a crop as the rainy season approaches (Burton, 1993). Self-organizing processes help planners deal with the paradox of technology and risk and incorporate contingent thinking in planning. The conditions that encourage the emergence of self-organizing processes and enable communities to identify and pursue common interests occur i) when external conditions or factors force consideration of risk and ii) when communities self-organize to reduce risk (Comfort, 1999). In so doing, communities develop the capacity to respond effectively to future disasters (Comfort, 1999). Key for this development is the sharing of information for the emergence of “sociotechnical systems” to support collective actions. However, throughout this process, it should be considered the differences in time perspectives of the actors and the need of information structure that is accessible to all -- national and local groups (Comfort, 1999). In the context of flood plain, for instance, “managers of unprotected bottom land property make use of alternative measures as far as they feel economically justified” and their “attention to flood problems has centered more upon planning engineering work and judging its economic feasibility than upon the effects of that work on public policy” (White, 1964). To counteract the emphasis on engineering planning, local community planners are advised to consider i) arrangements for physical studies, ii) results available in easy language for a large audience, iii) the organization of modern forecasting and warning systems, iv) regulations to preserve physical capacity, v) attention of private and public responsible officials, vi) the benefits of emergency, structural, and insurance adjustments, vii) building code, subdivision regulations, zoning ordinances, and viii) public acquisition of hazardous locations: coordinated within state and federal agencies (White, 1964). Other adjustments that community planners have to make in order to incorporate a contingent way of thinking and combine technology and risk accordingly are i) the perception of the hazard, ii) the perception of the possible adjustments, iii) the technical feasibility of particular adjustments, iv) the economic efficiency of these adjustments, and v) the timing and incidence of decisions by the private and public managers. These incorporation and combination processes require a technical feasibility study since adjustments differ greatly because of frequency, stage, duration, and velocity of a hazard. Once these comprehensive self-organizing processes are concluded, local planners are then able to propose adjustments on i) emergency evacuation, ii) structural changes, and iii) land use changes (White, 1964). The solution to the paradox between planning and crisis management depends on education and communication. “We need greater and more careful efforts at education and communication between government agencies and residents” (White, 1974). These efforts are necessary because of i) the extremely close attachment of the residents’ to locations, ii) residents’ lack of knowledge about what they personally might be able to do or should do to prevent damages other than trivial palliative adjustments, iii) the lack of awareness by residents of the extent to which government agencies, in fact, do assist them in one way or another with hazards, iv) the perceived poor communications of government agencies with the residents, and v) the low regard which many people have for various units of government. The success of these efforts in the long-term depends on i) the amount of resident involvement in the planning process and ii) the amount of communication with the people living in hazardous areas (White, 1974). Decision-Making Models -- Top-down v. Bottom-up Institutional decision-making involves top-down and bottom-up processes. The four models of collective action in response to risk are: i) Command and Control: these are mechanistic models that have been developed in the physical sciences and engineering. The basic assumption underlying these models is that if the problem is well defined and systems can be closed to outside interference and disturbance, they can function without error. Once the system is carefully designed and functioning, considerable effort is placed on the control of error, or any aberrant disruption or behavior. When this system is in command, all other disturbances need to be controlled or eliminated. This is a typical of military model since it includes hierarchical authority structures and tightly-coupled systems. It is focused on planning and training, robust in routine conditions but weakest in uncertain and dynamic situations. This model is also vulnerable to "lock out": omission of relevant information from decision process and its main difficult is to apply a command and control model to social systems, especially democratic ones. ii) Anarchy: it assumes intelligent individuals can recognize opportunities for action and take advantage of them, and so relax behavioral rules and encourage personal choice. Operating under uncertainty, this model is not rational and planned but opportunistic recognition of a match between problem and solution. This process emphasizes flexibility and loosely-coupled systems -- "relax structural controls on attention that allow the spontaneous matching of problems, solutions, and participants in creative response to perceived opportunities or needs". iii) Redundancy: A method of "hardening" the system against disruptions by providing backups to maintain operation even during sudden failure or unexpected demands. An example of its use in fire-fighting is piling on equipment and manpower until the fire is overwhelmed. Redundancy is generally effective, but often prohibitively expensive. iv) Inquiry: instead of permanent laws governing social relationships, the presence of a system organizing action towards a defined goal. An inquiring system is fundamentally a means of organizing information and communication processes in order to solve problems for a specific group. Difficulty of this approach is balancing openness -- continuing broad information search and process -- with focus required to take action. This system needs to operate on micro and macro scales simultaneously and it quickly encounters the limits of human information-processing capacity when addressing large, complex, and social problems (Comfort, 1999). All these models assume cooperation on a shared goal and that divergence of interests can cause the systems to break down. Command and Control deals with divergence through suppression and discipline. Anarchy uses bargaining. Redundancy partitions roles, assigns buffers, and reduces conflict by allocating "slack" resources. Inquiry uses education and discovery based on error over time to reduce conflict (Comfort, 1999). The classical decision model is a typical top-down and problem solving process that i) finds and defines the problem, ii) generates and evaluates alternative solutions, iii) selects preferred solution, iv) implements the solution, and v) evaluates results: recycling process as necessary. Along this process, decision makers i) do information gathering, processing and deliberation: narrowing down problems studied and focusing on causes rather than symptoms, ii) data analysis considering possible alternatives: being careful to not select a particular solution too quickly and end up choosing an alternative that has damaging side effects, iii) criteria establishment: for evaluating alternatives through benefits, costs, timeliness, acceptability, ethical soundness, iv) anticipate difficulties: such as lack of participation and failure to involve those whose support is necessary, and v) evaluate general pros and cons of the decision to be made. This classical model assumes that decision makers have complete information and clear define problems throughout this process (Shlaim, 1983). In a top-down process, decision makers are the government or private owners. The decision maker selects an interdisciplinary team to carry out an unbiased analysis, assigns a team leader, defines the communities to be assessed, and establishes the organization process. This process usually features the following stages i) project identification: decision maker provides framework for analysis and determines purposed questions such as who, what, why, where, when, ii) scoping: interdisciplinary team informs community and asks for comments and suggestions to identify issues and opportunities, iii) data collection and interpretation, iv) alternatives design: “do nothing” is always an alternative, v) mitigation plan to deal with adverse effects, vi) effects evaluation: of each alternative, vii) alternatives comparison in terms of how well they fulfill project’s purposes and goals while addressing issues and opportunities, and viii) project implementation and monitoring: of alternative chosen (Black, 2007). Idiosyncrasy imposes difficulties for top-down decision-making processes since managers make decisions differently. This occurs because managers perceive problems through their own biases and filters, which results in four major decision styles: directive, analytical, conceptual, and behavioral (Shlaim, 1983). The directive style is about clear-cut solutions, quick decisions, not too much information, one or two alternatives, and relies on existing rules and procedures. The analytical one requires complex solutions, much data, consider alternatives carefully as well as objective and rational data, and the best possible decision is based on information available. The conceptual style is about broad amount of information, it is more socially oriented, and usually shares socially, creative solving techniques. The behavioral decision-making style involves deep concern for others, one-on-one discussions, feelings understanding, and decisions that help others achieve their goals (Shlaim, 1983). Another challenge that top-down decision-making processes encounter is cognitive limitations. Administratively, managers have cognitive limitations and often act with incomplete information in uncertain environments (Shlaim, 1983). This limitation is a result of “bounded rationality”, which states that decisions are rational only within the boundaries defined by the available information (Shlaim, 1983). The main flaw caused by “bounded rationality” is that the first alternative that appears to give a satisfactory resolution is likely to be chosen. This tendency is called sacrificing (Shlaim, 1983). The cognitive limitation has also given room to the study of other decision-making models. Behavioral decision model, for instance, includes judgment heuristics -- speculative -- approaches to decision making. Judgmental heuristics approach is often adopted to simplify managerial decision making by relying on decisions highly influenced by information readily available in memory and comparisons with similar circumstances and current situation -- these cognitive limitations are known as anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Availability heuristic is about memory and representative heuristic uses comparisons with similar circumstances as well as anchoring and adjusting heuristics such as assessment of current situation in the process of decision-making under “bounded rationality” (Shlaim, 1983). The limitations of top-down decision-making processes are compounded by the fact that decisions are individual-based. Individuals not only perceive problems differently while interpreting information and data but they also have difficulties i) to appraise the probability and magnitude of extreme events, ii) canvass the range of possible alternative actions, iii) evaluate the consequences of selected actions, and iv) choose one or a combination of actions (Slovic, 1974). These limitations are offset by the implementation of participative decision-making models. Effective participative decision-making processes depend on managers involving the right people in the right ways in helping them solve problems. The main advantage of this approach is that it provides i) a broader perspective for problem definition and analysis, ii) more knowledge, facts, alternatives evaluated, iii) discussion to clarify ambiguous problems, iv) less uncertainty about alternatives, and v) fosters member satisfaction and support for decision. The disadvantages of this approach is that it is i) time consuming, ii) waste resources if used for programmed decisions, iii) compromise decisions may not satisfy no one, iv) groupthink: group norms may reduce dissent and opinion diversity, and v) no clear focus for decision responsibility. Considering these disadvantages, participative decision-making models are improved by stimulating creative thinking and growing use of information technology to share information (Shlaim, 1983). Bottom-up decision-making processes complements and improves top-down models. Self-organization decision-making processes are spontaneous actions based upon informed choice taken to achieve a collective goal. They exemplify citizens acting together, voluntarily, to meet a common need. They represent the fullest type of adaptation in a complex system that engages participants in collective action to reduce risk. They are likely the most efficient means of risk reduction (Comfort, 1999). The examination of self-organizing processes by which communities act in their own interest to mitigate and reduce risk is a type of disaster response system defined as a set of interactions or communications. The relevance of self-organizing systems lies in the fact that “there is not some well-defined organization that does all the responding”. The response to disasters “is a transient event, and whatever configuration of entities participates in the event is what we should regard as the "system"” (Comfort, 1999). Self-organizing systems operate based on the idea that “there is a continuum of behavior from order to chaos and that adaptive systems live "on the edge of chaos"” (Comfort, 1999). Even though these systems are stable and in a steady state, they are not static or at equilibrium (Comfort, 1999). They balance structure and flexibility. This balance makes adaptive systems the best systems to handle the disruption caused by large events (Comfort, 1999). The three community axes that proved to be relevant to disaster resistance and resilience are i) technical structure, ii) organizational flexibility, and iii) cultural openness to new information. These three dimensions -- evaluated into three categories, high, medium, and low --, are grouped into four subsets based on the path they take towards self-organization in a disaster: i) nonadaptive: low on structure and flexibility, and generally on cultural openness as well, ii) emergent adaptive: low structure, high flexibility, and increasing cultural openness, iii) operative adaptive: have medium structure, medium flexibility, and medium openness, and iv) autoadaptive systems: high on structure, flexibility, and openness (Comfort, 1999). Self-organizing systems require few conditions. The transition to a coherent and cooperative state needs i) articulation of commonly understood meanings among participating organizations and key audiences in the wider environment, ii) sufficient trust among leaders, organizations, and citizens to enable them to accept a shared goal, iii) sufficient resonance between the organizations seeking change and their potential sources of support for action, and iv) sufficient capacity and resources to sustain collective action among participating organizations to achieve a shared goal (Comfort, 1999). In this transition, the key stages of the adaptation response are i) information acquisition: assessment, ii) information sharing: communication, and iii) information retention: organizational learning. The establishment of a self-organizing system also requires adaptive behavior, which means changing not only actions, but priorities, so as to match response to new and immediate environmental demands. Adaptive behavior in a community requires coordination because if one organization changes its behavior, the interdependent organizations that support it must change to continue providing support. Change is, therefore, most effective when the community can "self-organize" and reorder its own priorities spontaneously, without externally-imposed controls. Self-organization is most probable when the various components become aware of how their individual needs and responsibilities interlock and participate voluntarily in the response. Sustaining self-organization requires persistent communication between participants to exchange information, store memory, and perform self-analysis and feedback. It is available as a voluntary response but requires technical and organizational infrastructure that engender organizational learning (Comfort, 1999). Challenges for Decision-Making Processes -- Conceptual, Structural, and Cognitive The very nature of unexpectedness in crisis situations imposes a challenge for decision-making processes. Not knowing when a major emergency might hit and the extent of its impact, gives logical basis for emergency planning but increases its complexity (Taleb, 2010). The key question is how much planning and investment should be made in preparing for something that may never happen or not happen according to a predicted time frame and the consequences of its occurrence may indeed be "unexpected" (Taleb, 2010). In this context, it may not be suitable to do conventional "expected return" or similar analyzes that would yield relatively sound quantitative insights (Taleb, 2010). The responsibility to address this challenge created by emergency planning questions and situations lies in the Federal agencies as well as at the State, County, Municipal and individual household levels. Vetting, "strategizing", and rationalizing what could and should be done is warranted and healthy based on the unexpected nature of things (Taleb, 2010). The unexpectedness nature of crisis creates other problems. Probabilistic decision-making models might fail in the real world. Data collection to produce better models limits inference spaces since then catastrophes appear from places "we didn't expect" (Taleb, 2010). Also, the inadequate appreciation of the uncertainty of the environment inevitably leads economic agents to take risks they should avoid (Taleb, 2010). The main features of highly improbable events also known as “black swans” have three principal characteristics i) unpredictability: rarity, ii) massive impact: extreme event, and iii) retrospective predictability: after explanation that make “black swans” seem less random or more predictable (Taleb, 2010). An example of a “black swan” is the terrorist event on September 11th, 2001 in the United States. The phenomenon “black swan” is only acknowledged until after it occurs (Taleb, 2010). This happens because humans are hardwired to learn specifics when we should be focusing on generalities. The methodology, therefore, to reduce the impact of uncertainty is i) to concentrate on things we do not know and ii) to reward those who can imagine the “impossible”. This approach in dealing with “black swans” is backed by the findings that “we do not learn rules, just facts, only facts” and “we do not seem to be good at getting metarules” and is compounded by the fact that “we scorn the abstract; we scorn it with passion” (Taleb, 2007). In seeking the causes of many modern large-scale accidents it is important to consider organizational failings. So-called “organizational accidents” stem from an incubation of latent errors and events which are at odds with the culturally taken for granted, accompanied by a collective failure of organizational intelligence (Turner, 1978). Theoretical models have also moved from purely post hoc descriptions of accidents and their causes in the attempt to specify “safe” cultures and “high-reliability” organizations. Recent research, however, has shown that while effective learning about crises is a common assumption of such attempts, organizations can be very resistant to learning the full lessons from past incidents and mistakes (Turner, 1978). Two common barriers to learning from past crises are i) information difficulties and ii) organizational politics (Turner, 1978). The 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, for instance, depicted the serious problems on the relationship between the quality of decision-making processes in an international crisis and the desirability of its outcome. The main problem to analyze this relationship is to identify a set of criteria to assess the quality of decision-making and wrong decisions based on incomplete information (Welch, 1989). Another shortcoming of crisis decision making is to assume that situations remain static. This means, for instance, that frequency, magnitude, and intensity of natural hazards are the same over time (White, 1975). These assumptions result in little incentive to find out how the adjustments or conditions of choice change and what accounts for those deviations (White, 1975). Three factors that contribute to situational assessments and influence individual choices are i) experience with hazard: more experience, more susceptible to accept risk assessment, ii) material wealth at risk: more wealth, more to lose, more response, and iii) personality: the way to respond to new information. In addition, the sense of efficacy of a public agency in dealing with a hazard strongly affects the choice of corrective and preventive actions (White, 1975). Communication under uncertainty is fundamental to localities exposed to recurring risk. While performance assessment following devastating events call for stronger coordination among agencies, such coordination cannot occur without an effective process of communication (Comfort, 2007). Communication has both technical and social components, each affecting the other and producing potential failure as well as probable strength (Comfort, 2007). Failure in technical systems of communication almost certainly triggers failure in organizational performance under the rapidly changing conditions of disaster. Such failures lead to asymmetrics in access to communication and timely information exchange that are critical to a community’s capacity to adapt quickly to serious threat (Comfort, 2007). The development of a strong communication system with other organizations before a disaster occurs is pivotal to establish appropriate communication in which effective interagency coordination takes place at the time of a disaster (Kapucu, 2006). Coordinating response operations to extreme events is an extraordinarily complex task for public managers. The performance of an intergovernmental system depends on a model of auto-adaptation to extreme events (Comfort, 2002). This model is based on individual, organizational, and collective learning in environments exposed to recurring risk (Comfort, 2002). Such a model requires public investment in the development of an information infrastructure that can support the intense demand for communication, information search, exchange, and feedback that characterizes an auto-adaptive system (Comfort, 2002). However, when a collectivity encounters a major crisis, political rivalries about the interpretation of fast-moving events intensify and become part of the drama that crisis management entails (Comfort, 2002). Crises make and break political careers, shake bureaucratic orders, and define organizational destinies. Five core tasks of crisis leadership, in a political context, are i) sensemaking: recognize signals that something out of ordinary is developing, ii) decision making: interagency and intergovernmental coordination, iii) meaning making: accept a definition of the situation, iv) terminating: return to a sense of normalcy, and v) learning: lessons feed, organizational practices, policies, and laws (Boin, 2005). These characteristics of crisis leadership are important because “when emerging vulnerabilities and threats are inadequately assessed and addressed, some potentially devastating contingencies simply do not happen”. Also, “misperceptions and negligence allow crises to occur” and “the mass media continuously scrutinize and assess leaders” in crisis moments. To improve crisis decision making, leaders should be aware that “the rhetoric of “the leader in charge” has little to do with the reality of effective crisis decision making and coordination and more about how facts are communicated and normalcy restored (Boin, 2005). Leader who lacks the ability to communicate cannot lead in crises since “a crisis never speak for itself”. These leadership skills are especially important because through effective communication leaders share perceptions that channel behavior and manage both the operational and the political dimensions of crisis (Boin, 2005). The challenge of crisis communication arises from the particularities of disaster management and individual differences. Discrepancies between official conceptualization and political reality, tensions between official and sociological designs, organizational infrastructure, and emergency management paradox raise difficulties for decision makers managing disasters that come as a surprise (Rosenthal, 2001). To address these particularities, crisis leaders must avoid the syndrome of “winning the last war” -- when disaster policies become oriented to the past instead of the future based on supposedly known facts instead of creative imagination (Rosenthal, 2001). Disaster scenarios usually do not reach beyond extrapolations of the most recent calamity, and so require incremental solutions upon a typically nonincremental context (Rosenthal, 2001). Governments that fall short of being smooth cannot find rational solutions to sudden problems; therefore, policy-makers and planners “should plan for reality, not for a pseudoreality made of rules and rigid structures since disasters are real events, not occurrences on paper” (Rosenthal, 2001). As for the role of individual differences in crisis communication, decision makers should take into account that crisis managers are not immune to some of the organizational, political, and psychological pressures that are heightened under crisis conditions (Hart, 1991). Political processes corrupt possibilities for organizational learning. Nevertheless, political problems, and in particular that of blame in organizations, ultimately require political solutions (Pidgeon, 1997). For instance, long-term contracts for reducing losses from future catastrophes provide crisis leaders a comprehensive strategic framework for assessing, responding to, and managing extreme risk (Kunreuther, 2010). Even though incumbent leaders resist to contemplate lessons learned from past crises since they risk revealing the deficiencies in prevention, preparedness, and response crisis plans, they also agree that these institutional barriers to learning and change should be overcome (Boin, 2006). 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill would have been dealt more effectively if previously management shortcomings were learned and then properly addressed at the beginning of this crisis (Williams, 1994). Also, the military decision model applied during the Cuban Missiles Crisis replicated a common decision-making shortcoming by overestimating information-processing capacity of individuals and by misrepresenting the social nature of decisions in organizational contexts (Anderson, 1983). The understanding of crisis decision-making processes is at the heart of systematic improvements in public policy. Two theories of decision making under risk that streamline crisis political process are i) maximization of expected utility which features two principles “transitivity” -- if A is better than C, and B is also better than C, a rational decision maker would never choose C -- and “the extended sure-thing principle” -- outcomes that are not affected by your choice should not influence your decision -- and ii) bounded rationality which deals with “cognitive limitations of decision makers forcing them to construct a simplified model of the world to deal with it” (Slovic, 1974). This simplified model is based on the notion of “satisficing” whereby an organism strives to attain some satisfactory, though not necessarily maximal, level of achievement which drastically simplifies decisions by comparing only those situations that differ in relatively small degree from realities already in effect. While coping with crises, leaders must enlarge the social costs of disasters to make themselves more vulnerable to the consequences of the great extremes before a decision is made and to avoid complacency (Slovic, 1974). Crisis decision-making is inter- and multi-disciplinary (Pearson, 1998; Alexander, 1997). Grasping this concept is important to acknowledge that “attempts to control nature and determine government policy will not succeed without a better understanding of the interplay among psychological, economic, and environmental factors as they determine the adjustment process” (Slovic, 1974). Adjustments refer to the many courses of action available to crisis managers such as insurance systems, land policies, structural works, and public relief. Also, the psychological study of decision making should consider “bounded rationality”, which takes into account the limitations of decision makers’ perception and cognitive capabilities (Slovic, 1974). “In the real world people don’t always behave rationally” affirmed Herbert Simon (McCarty, 2001). The reason for this irrationality is “scarcity of attention”. Simon, thus, proposes that instead of aiming the optimal information, we focus on accessing the best information we can for making the most practical choice (McCarty, 2001). Other difficulties to gather the best information -- or “cognitive obstacles to rational decisions” -- are i) “gambler’s fallacy”: when someone assumes that if an event has occurred one year, it is less likely to occur the following year and ii) “anchoring”: faced with masses of information, people began with one rough estimate and then adjust it as more information comes in (Slovic, 1974). The immediate consequence of “gambler’s fallacy” and “anchoring” is a psychological heuristic that explains how people believe they have a much better picture of the truth than they really do and as a result end up underestimating phenomena (Slovic, 1974; Kanehmann, 1974). Framing also influences decision making. “Different windows, lead to different decisions -- even for what was actually the same decision problem” (Mook, 2004). We are “risk seeing” -- accept responsibility -- in cases where we are contemplating losses and we are “risk averse” -- take fixed number -- in cases where we are contemplating gains. The difficulties in studying these irrationalities are that “there is no theory that tells us how we ought to look at the problem” that constantly violate the most fundamental criterion of rationality: consistency (Mook, 2004). For learning purposes, cognitive processes are divided into two systems. System one is unconscious, intuitive, and automatic and system two is a conscious, analytic, and controlled decision-making model (Pierre, 2011). In the case of optimistic bias, people tend to use fast and intuitive thinking -- system one -- whenever possible, and switch over to a more deliberate and effortful system two when they recognize that the problem at hand is not an easy one (Kanehmann, 2011). Natural decision-making explains these systems through the role of experience. “In routine situations and common emergencies, decision makers size up the situation and quickly recognize which actions make sense -- system one (Klein, 1998). Thus, by relying on their holistic assessment of both the situation and the available options, experts actually do not think when they decide -- they “just do what is right” --; however, every time unfamiliar or more complex elements arise, system two exerts oversight on automatic decisions among choices that can be pre-played using mental simulations of future situations (Klein, 1998). Even experts in a given domain cannot rely solely on unconscious decision-making since situations occasionally demand conscious thinking to achieve a “good decision”“ (Klein, 1998). Five steps helping crisis managers navigate between systems one and two are i) preparedness, ii) situation assessment: defining the problem, gathering information, and building of mental models, iii) planning of actions: formulating goals, assessing risk, planning, making decisions, iv) execution of action, and v) review of effects: reviewing actions, revising strategy, and self-reflection (Klein, 1998). Rational individuals do not pursue common interests unless the community is small or otherwise coerced into doing so. In addition, parochial interests discourage attention to broader community needs (Olson, 1965). In crisis situations, key decisions are often made by small, tightly knit group of individuals (Hart, 1990). Dominant leaders believe that by strengthening the “cognitive process” of small groups they are improving institutional decision-making processes (Kellerman, 1983). Groupthink, however, is a cause of policy failure because of its tendency for premature and concurrence seeking among group members (Hart, 1990). These particularities of groupthinking have been identified as the reasons for major fiascoes in foreign policy, large planning projects, and strategic management (Hart, 1990). Crisis-produced stress also leads to the simplification of information processing -- diminishing bureaucratic politics -- and reinforces small group decision-making (Levi, 1980; Monten, 2010). In this context, organizations -- despite being organized in small groups and simplifying decision-making processes -- rather than individuals are still in a better position to tame optimism, anticipate a plan’s weaknesses, and make a decision since organizations are a more conducive environment for sharing experts’ opinions than vis-à-vis arguments (Klein, 1998). Crisis leaders have to deal with stress. They do so by escalating or de-escalating the decision-making processes of i) information: cognitive performance, the perceived need and consequent quest for information, the receptivity and size of the information-processing group, ii) consultation: the type and size of the consultative units, group participation in the consultative process, iii) decisional forums: the size and structure of the decisional forums, authority patterns within decisional units, and iv) alternatives: search for and evaluation of alternatives, the perceived range of available alternatives (Shlaim, 1983). The impact of stress on crisis leaders are on i) contraction, ii) concentration, and iii) activation (Sigelman, 1990). The high level of emotional and physical stress restrict the amount of time for response, threat high-priority goals, and make implementation processes vulnerable to malfunctions (Smart, 1977). Opportunities for Decision-Making Processes -- Political, Information Systems, and Traditional Knowledge Crises are opportunities for political reform. These opportunities, however, are limited (Boin, 2003). Even though crises expose the status quo as problematic, making it easier to gain momentum for alternative policies and institutions, the opportunities for reform in the wake of crisis are smaller than often thought because the requisites of crisis leadership are at odds with the requirements of effective reform (Boin, 2003). Moreover, “it requires political skills to turn disaster and crisis from threat and adversity into an opportunity and a political asset” (Boin, 2006). Communication strategies are political skills that can greatly enhance efficiency and professionalism of delivery of client services (Ferrara, 1996). Even in the absence of communication skills to turn crises into opportunities, crisis agencies usually welcome crises as the moment they can prove their right to exist and as a precondition for changes in conservative systems (Rosenthal, 2001). Crises represent “occasion for decisions” (Rosenthal, 2001). Because crises induce a sense of “urgency”, administrative decision making becomes centralized (Hart, 1993). This centralization is particularly important for emergency managers as they often need to take decisions quickly on very inadequate information (Cosgrave, 1992). An effective emergency management, because of limited information, is often connected with the goals to be achieved in response activities. The on-scene commanding structure and the on-scene commander play an important role in fighting emerging crises. This dynamic decision making at the "sharp end", however, presents severe demands on the commanders due to sudden scenario occurrences and the vast number of variables involved and the apparent uniqueness of each scenario (Rake, 2004). These severe demands are offset by emphasizing the importance of recognition-primed decision making and the vital role of on-scene commanders on crisis developments (Flin, 1996). Operating with very little information, on-scene crisis leaders have to rely on creativity in solving problems (Shlaim, 1983). This creative process is only valid if during crisis management plans reduce the steps required to make critical response decisions (Hale, 2006). The common notion that during crises decision making should be done in line with a command and control structure is invalid (Santen, 2009). The best way for crisis decision making teams in a bureaucratic political context is to follow an integrative negotiation approach as the shared mental model of decision making (Santen, 2009). In Finland, for instance, decision-making is often left in the hands of a small elite group, except in the case of civilian emergencies when key decisions are made at the operational level (Forsberg, 2006). Finns generally avoid defining difficult situations as a “crisis” to prevent the government using this event as a vehicle for acquiring more power (Forsberg, 2006). This situation only occurs because the political elite, the business community, and the civil society have been fairly united and have rejected critical opinions during a crisis and they would rather react to “crisis” cautiously rather than in panic (Forsberg, 2006). This social cohesion observed in the Finn society is made possible because the higher the socioeconomic status of the population, the greater the level of citizen participation in day-to-day community decision-making (Crain, 1967). The main effect of this relationship is the increase of the power of the citizens vis-à-vis the local government and the elite (Crain, 1967). Successful crisis avoidance can simply be a matter of watching the numbers, assigning a meaning, and considering the alternatives (Young, 2008). In crisis management planning, organizations must be positioned to capture and examine nearly every out-of-the-ordinary indicator relevant to their enterprise (Young, 2008). By acknowledging the cognitive and technical limitations imposed by “bounded rationality” -- information, time, and budget constraints -- and the recognition-primed decision model -- when crisis managers assess the situation to seek recognizable scenarios --, it can be argued that a formalized decision making template should be developed to avoid information overload during the most critical of incidents (Young, 2008). In addition, the contingency model of decision-making may offer value to crisis managers since it considers ambiguity, complexity, instability, and accountability along the decision process. By blending these options -- rule-based: following procedures -- and knowledge-based: creative in nature --, additional research would help find a balance between procedural and creative decision-making models (Young, 2008). Insurance is an example of rule-based model since it i) distributes losses, ii) reconstructs loans, iii) relieves welfare payments, and iv) exercises guidance over the extent to which people expose themselves to risks from hazards (White, 1975). Crisis simulation illustrates creative models as this is an exercise in cognitive structuring that entails a search for heuristics and organizational decisions which might render complex, highly interactive social and technological situations comprehensible and controlled (Jarman, 1990). New decision-making models must be developed to accommodate greater flexibility and creativity (Mendonça, 2008). The improvisation in emergency management is based on the paradigm of operational risk management and is motivated by the observation that emergency response organizations must be prepared to improvise during response activities (Mendonça, 2008). The process of emergency response in light of this new concept must discuss the opportunities for supporting the process identified since it deals with complex and unpredictable events (Mendonça, 2004). The fuzzy decision support system (FDSS) is a decision making structure which can be applied to manage the crisis conditions in any large scale systems with many parameters (Menhaj, 2010). After receiving both functional variables and fault signals, the FDSS makes proper decisions to make up and repair the distorted situation and the affected elements of the network according to its data base established through experience gathered from expert managers and decision models properly developed. These decisions are expressed in the form of some scenarios with different desirability degrees, which are determined by some properly developed fuzzy multi-criteria decision making methods, helping the manager choose the best one according to his discretion (Menhaj, 2010). Decisions to invest in information systems (IS) are made by many organizations on a very regular basis. Such decisions can vary from quickly identifying the problem, screening options and choosing a solution in a very straightforward way, to very extensive and repeated search, screen, design and negotiation activities that can take many years (Boonstra, 2003). The common issues involving IS decision-making processes are i) whether there is scope to design a solution, ii) whether distinct alternatives have to be searched for, iii) the degree of urgency and necessity from the perspective of decision-makers, iv) whether the decision can be subdivided in order to follow a gradual process path -- planned v. incremental --, and v) the number and power of stakeholders involved in the process and the extent that their interests vary and contrast (Boonstra, 2003). IS applications should be aware of these factors in order to design a process that fits best with the specific circumstances: no single process should be considered universally applicable (Boonstra, 2003). This conclusion is in contrast with many decision-making models rooted in the IS-field, which suggest to use prescriptive and rational approaches to organize IS decision-making processes (Boonstra, 2003). The understanding that IS applications should be flexible to meet the requirements of strategic crisis response models to check whether it is necessary to expand response structure and lower the cost of configuration that is adequate to the new situation, fulfilling the legislation requirements (Costa, 2005). Three insights over iterative models are i) action-oriented problem solving such as acting, interpreting, and cultivating diagnoses, ii) feedback among these processes opens and closes windows of adaptive problem solving, and iii) reinforcing feedback and confirmation bias, usually considered dysfunctional, for adaptive problem solving (Rudolph, 2009). Local knowledge -- or traditional ecological knowledge -- provides insights on how communities should interact with their environment. Local knowledge is “a cumulative body of knowledge and beliefs, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings with one another and with their environment”(Gunderson, 2002). It is a broad concept that covers all forms of knowledge -- technologies, knowhow, skills, practices, and beliefs -- that enable the community to achieve stable livelihoods in their environment (UNEP, 2008). Various communities rely on indigenous knowledge to sustainably utilize their natural resources. The indigenous knowledge systems provide a variety of options and innovations to deal with the challenges of nature conservation and disaster management in the course of making a living (UNEP, 2008). For example, a community living on the shores of Lake Victoria had a well-organized system for mitigating impeding disasters. There were elders who dealt with rainfall prediction and early warning. Each homestead had a dugout canoe ready for transport in case of heavy flooding. Each community was also required to dig trenches to control the water around the homestead and around farmlands. In addition, they were required to avoid ploughing along the lake shores when heavy flooding was predicted and were advised to catch fish during rainy period when they were plentiful and preserve them by drying and smoking for use in times of scarcity (UNEP, 2008). Other indigenous methods are the ones used by the Swazis to predict natural hazards using wind direction, the shape of the crescent moon, and the behavior of certain animals. Popularizing these and other indigenous pieces of knowledge not only alleviates poverty but also functions as disaster risk reduction efforts. Furthermore, indigenous knowledge should be incorporated into national development plans, taught in schools, and be protected by intellectual property laws (UNEP, 2008). Conclusion The relation between planning and decision making during crises should be viewed “as a form of policy making under adversity and of societal problem-handling processes” (Dror, 1988). Due to the inconsistency of this relation we must acknowledge that “the logic of decision making in emergency environments is “fuzzy” or imprecise, and wisely so, recognize the necessity for innovative problem-solving in unforeseen situations” (Comfort, 1988). Despite planning and decision making relations being irregular, the concepts, problems, and solutions presented in this paper show that planning and decision-making processes complement each other during crisis management. Physical, community, and policy planning offset the shortcomings and maximize the merits of decision-making processes. Planners prepare decision-makers for the uncertainties, risks, and urgencies associated to crisis management and decision-makers utilize critical events to reinforce political and economic interests based on planning principles and practices. This joint operation mitigates social and cognitive challenges and explores financial and cultural opportunities related to crisis management. This positive correlation, however, relies on political will, monetary resources, fluid communication, and technical expertise to thrive and as a result to reduce the impact of and accelerate response to crises. 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Urban Environmental Problems: DDR in Albay

Research question: From a planning perspective, why is the province of Albay in the Philippines considered as a “champion” by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)? Introduction In 2008, the Province of Albay in the Philippines was declared a model for Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) by the UNISDR and the World Bank (SRC, 2010). The province had then initiated innovative approaches to tackling Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and CCA by integrating CCA into its Disaster Risk Management (DRM) structure. Albay maintains its position as the first mover in terms of climate smart DRR by implementing good practices to ensure zero casualty during calamities, which is why the province is now internationally recognized as a local government exemplar in CCA (SCR, 2010). It has pioneered in mainstreaming CCA in the education sector by developing a curriculum to teach CCA from the primary level up. Information, education and communication activities have been organized to create climate change awareness in the province (SCR, 2010). Albay has partnered and cooperated with educational institutions, government agencies and departments, scientific organizations, international and local NGOs, business sectors to implement CCA actions in the province (SCR, 2010). The province continues to invest in strengthening its capacity to use modern technology for climate forecasting, early warning, and land use planning. Albay’s governor has also integrated resilient livelihood into its CCA strategy and has supported changes in CCA policy and contributed to calls for the enactment of several bills on climate change at the national level (SCR, 2010). General Information – The Philippines & Albay The Philippines Situated on the Eastern rim of the Asiatic Mediterranean, the Philippines are one of the world’s largest archipelagos comprising over 7,100 islands. The total land area is about 300,000 km2, over ninety percent of which is contained within the eleven largest islands that form the three major island groups of Luzon in the north, Mindanao in the south and the Visayas in the centre (Engel, 2007). Its physical-geographical characteristics make the Philippines one of the most hazard-prone countries in the world. It is regularly affected by typhoons, floods, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions. According to data from the Belgium-based Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), the Philippines experiences more natural hazards than any other country (Engel, 2007). With 268 recorded disaster events over the last three decades, the Philippines ranks 8th according to World Bank’s Natural Disaster Hotspot list of countries most exposed to multiple hazards (Engel, 2007). Determinants of vulnerability to natural disasters in the Philippines are caused by rapid urbanization that has led to unchecked growth, urban sprawl, and informal and overcrowded settlements, often in hazard-prone areas (Engel, 2007). As of 2002, the country had about 1.2 million families of informal settlers who were vulnerable to typhoons and flooding. Demographic growth and urbanization have also affected provision of basic services, resulting in deteriorating solid waste management and siltation of rivers and drainage channels. These poor urban practices have aggravated flooding in urban areas for the past years and are expected to make the situation more severe in the future (Engel, 2007). Environmental degradation has contributed to increasing natural disaster occurrence in the Philippines. Demographic growth and poor land-use planning have led to the massive depletion of natural resources and destruction of the environment (GFDRR, 2012). Flash flooding, landslides and drought have increased in the past two decades as a result of declining forest cover. Certain areas that have substantially lost their forest cover are also more exposed to typhoons (GFDRR, 2012). Risks from global climate change are also further exacerbating the country’s vulnerability to natural hazards. In the last 15 years alone, the country has recorded the strongest typhoon, the most destructive typhoons, the deadliest storm and the typhoon with the highest 24-hour rainfall (GFDRR, 2012). These climate trends seem to fit the scientific evidence that rising sea surface temperatures enhance the destructiveness of tropical cyclones. The Philippines is expected to experience substantial rise in sea levels, making 70 percent of the 1,500 municipalities located along the coast vulnerable to this phenomenon. The country is also witnessing longer episodes of drought or El Niño, causing a large drop in the volume of agricultural production and sharp declines in Gross Development Product (GDP) (GFDRR, 2012). Albay One of the poorest and the most disaster prone area in the Philippines is the Bicol Region. This region covering the provinces of Catanduanes, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Masbate, Sorsogon and Albay, is oftentimes the host of typhoons because of its geographical location. In particular, the province of Albay is bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the northeast by the Lagonoy Gulf and on the west and southwest by Burias Pass. Thus, according to the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), at least 19-20 typhoons visit the province every year, of which four or five are expected to hit Albay directly (Albay Provincial Government, 2006). In addition to tropical cyclones, the province of Albay is highly vulnerable to other natural disasters such as minor volcanic eruptions, flash floods and mudslides. In this context, government officials have invested in coastal areas to protect villages from sea level rise and storm surges. Also, communities living along the coastline and in the uplands are being prepared to meet the challenges to their environment, livelihood, and homes. The Provincial Government of Albay (PGA) believes that by recognizing the need for appropriate policies and programs to tackle these environmental concerns, it will be effectively prepared to respond to the impacts of natural hazards in a timely and sustainable manner (Lasco, 2012). Albay is located in the Southern part of Luzon about 500 kilometers Southeast of Manila. It is geo-graphically located within the ring of fire and the typhoon belt region. About 198,000 houses are threatened by wind destructions and at least 350,000 people have to evacuate. Mayon Volcano Eruption threats three cities, five municipalities, and 127 villages. 11,000 to 12,000 families are threatened by landslides and about 300,000 people out of 1.3 million are threatened by tsunami. Eight municipalities and two cities are threatened by floods, including its provincial center, Legazpi City (Daep, 2008). In terms of the potential impacts of climate change to natural resources, PGA’s coastal zones are expecting coastal erosion and inundation; loss of private property/community assets; changes to wetlands due to sea level rise, shoreline erosion and saltwater intrusion, shifts in distributions of plant and animal species, increased ecosystem and species heat stress, changes to mangrove habitats due to salt water intrusion, reduced ecosystem resilience to stress, and increased ecological disturbances (Lasco, 2012). UNISDR – Hyogo Framework for Action & Making Cities Resilient Hyogo Framework for Action The international agenda on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) advanced significantly in the last two decades. In the late 1980s, increasing losses in development gains from disasters prompted a global movement toward DRR. The United Nations declared the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) to contribute to technical and scientific buy-in and to make DRR agenda imperative. The “Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action” adopted at the first United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 1994 through the mid-review of IDNDR provided the first blueprint for disaster reduction policy guidance focusing on social and community orientation. At the end of the IDNDR in 1999, the United Nations General Assembly established International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) as the successor mechanism of IDNDR within the United Nations to promote increased commitment to DRR and strong linkages to sustainable development (Matsuoka, 2011). The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is the first plan to explain, describe and detail the work that is required from all different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. It was developed and agreed on with the many partners needed to reduce disaster risk. The HFA outlines five priorities for action, and offers guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience. Its goal is to substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015 by building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. This means reducing loss of lives and social, economic, and environmental assets when hazards strike (UNISDR, 2012). Priority 1: ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation. Countries that develop policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction and that are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable indicators have greater capacity to manage risks and to achieve widespread consensus for, engagement in and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of society. Priority 2: identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. The starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of disaster resilience lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies face, and of the ways in which hazards and vulnerabilities are changing in the short and long term, followed by action taken on the basis of that knowledge. Priority 3: use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities. Priority 4: reduce the underlying risk factors. Disaster risks related to changing social, economic, environmental conditions and land use, and the impact of hazards associated with geological events, weather, water, climate variability and climate change, are addressed in sector development planning and programs as well as in post-disaster situations. Priority 5: strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared and ready to act and are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management (UNISDR, 2012). Local government officials are faced with the threat of disasters on a daily basis and need better access to policies and tools to effectively deal with them. The HFA offers solutions for local governments and actors to manage and reduce urban risk. Urban risk reduction provides opportunities for capital investments through infrastructure upgrades and improvements, building retrofits for energy efficiency and safety, urban renovation and renewal, cleaner energies, and slum upgrading. Local governments are the closest level of government to citizens and their communities. They play the first role in responding to crises and emergencies. They deliver essential services to their citizens, such as health, education, transport and water services, which need to be made resilient to disasters. Based on the five priorities of the HFA, a ten-point checklist for making cities resilient was developed that local governments sign up to. By voluntarily signing up to this checklist, local governments commit to implement DRR activities along these ten essentials. However, making cities safe from disaster requires a broad partnership among national governments, local government associations, international, regional and civil society organizations, donors, the private sector, academia and professional associations as well as citizens. All these stakeholders play a vital role in contributing to building disaster resilient cities (UNISDR, 2012). Making Cities Resilient The Making Cities Resilient: 'My City is getting ready!' campaign, launched in May 2010, addresses issues of local governance and urban risk. With the support and recommendation of many partners and participants, and a Mayors Statement made during the 2011 Global Platform for DDR, the Making Cities Resilient campaign will carry on beyond 2015. The Chendgu Declaration for Action provides a five-point action plan: i) enhance cooperation, ii) incorporate disaster resilience criteria into urban development planning, iii) organize public awareness events, iv) build an international mechanisms for political commitments, and enhance disaster, and v) emergency management of cities. The campaign will enter its second phase 2012-2015. Based on the success and stock-taking by partners and participating cities in the first phase -- 2010-2011 -- the campaign will shift its focus to more implementation support, city-to-city learning and cooperation, local action planning, monitoring of progress, and private sector support to develop “industry standards” and innovative urban risk reduction solutions (UNISDR, 2012). The ten essentials for Making Cities Resilient checklist are: i) put in place organization and coordination to understand and reduce disaster risk, based on participation of citizen groups and civil society. Build local alliances and ensure that all departments understand their role in disaster risk reduction and preparedness, ii) assign a budget for disaster risk reduction and provide incentives for homeowners, low‐income families, communities, businesses and the public sector to invest in reducing the risks they face, iii) maintain up‐to‐date data on hazards and vulnerabilities, prepare risk assessments and use these as the basis for urban development plans and decisions. Ensure that this information and the plans for your city’s resilience are readily available to the public and fully discussed with them, iv) invest in and maintain critical infrastructure that reduces risk, such as flood drainage, adjusted where needed to cope with climate change, v) assess the safety of all schools and health facilities and upgrade these as necessary, vi) apply and enforce realistic, risk‐compliant building regulations and land use planning principles. Identify safe land for low‐income citizens and upgrade informal settlements, wherever feasible, vii) ensure that education programs and training on disaster risk reduction are in place in schools and local communities, viii) protect ecosystems and natural buffers to mitigate floods, storm surges and other hazards to which your city may be vulnerable. Adapt to climate change by building on good risk reduction practices, ix) install early warning systems and emergency management capacities in your city and hold regular public preparedness drills, x) after any disaster, ensure that the needs of the affected population are placed at the center of reconstruction, with support for them and their community organizations to design and help implement responses, including rebuilding homes and livelihoods (UNISDR, 2012). In support of HFA, individuals can be recognized as Champions for four major achievements: i) proven ability to mobilize others to adopt disaster resilient thinking and behavior, ii) ability to successfully influence policy and change at the national, local or community level so that laws or other policy measures are passed to reduce disaster risk, iii) ability to convey messages to at-risk people -- young people, women and girls, the aging population and disabled persons -- in ways proven to reduce those people's vulnerability to disaster, and iv) demonstrating extraordinary commitment to the "Making Cities Resilient" campaign. In this context, United Nations Secretary General has cited the province of Albay as a model for good practices on disaster risk. "We recognize what Albay has been doing to protect its people while building more sustainable towns and cities,” the Secretary-General of the UN declared (Sabater, 2010). Albay’s Disaster Risk Reduction – APSEMO and Leadership APSEMO In July 1994, the Albay Public Safety and Emergency Management Office (APSEMO) was institutionalized. It is an independent department that serves as the technical secretariat and administrative arm of the Provincial Government of Albay (PGA) in terms of DRM. It was created to empower the management of the PGA along public safety and disaster risk management. It supports the Albay Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council (PDCC) in the implementation of organization’s objectives as mandated by a presidential decree and other related laws (Daep, 2007). It is tasked to administer effective and efficient interventions into distress areas in coordination with the different PDCC organic and regular members. APSEMO administers and supervises the systematic delivery of services to the public in terms of DRM and Public Safety coordination with the Local Disaster Coordinating Councils (LDCCs), Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services (PAGASA), Governmental Agencies, and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) due to the effects of natural and man-made calamities. It also facilitates the restoration and rehabilitation of disaster-stricken communities (Daep, 2007). In particular, it is tasked to: i) delineate the functions of PDCC members and volunteers before, during and after the calamity impact; ii) enhance communication linkages within the organization and between sectors involved in public safety anchored on disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery; and iii) maintain active coordination between and among the Local Government Units (LGUs), government organizations, NGOs, and PDCC member agencies to ensure timely and appropriate action on disaster-related activities. Various indigenous local response mechanisms to landslides, floods, strong winds and heavy rainfall are apparent in some communities in the province. However, the APSEMO is still on the process of documenting and verifying the effectiveness of these mechanisms (Daep, 2007). APSEMO has helped the province to achieve the "Zero Casualty" goal during Mt. Mayon eruptions in 2001, 2006 and 2009. The province’s DRRM has proven to be an efficient system in monitoring, evaluating, and implementing disaster operation, backed up with logistical and legislative policy support. APSEMO's DRM model also made Albay become a landmark of and a voice in the international discourse of DRM (PreventionWeb, 2010). Albay aligned DRR into its central economic strategy. A geostrategic intervention (GUICADALE) is both the flagship project and a key DRR initiative. In the long run, Albay is depended on calamity funds for disaster response and DRR initiatives while drawing on the national government and international aid for extreme calamities. There is a 70% overlap between adaptation and disaster risk reduction in the Albay context. Basic principles of DRR and climate action are components of the central economic strategy, not the contingency plan. Albay is the only province in Bicol that has an operational management office that provides effective coordination of the various stakeholders towards promoting efficient intervention on disaster preparedness and emergency response. The successful implementation of sustainable disaster management programs is due to the presence of a permanent office overseeing disaster-management-related activities at the local level (PreventionWeb, 2010). The Provincial Disaster Operation Center (PDOC) was established in 1992 and was tasked to provide technical and administrative functions of emergency-related services. The key features of APSEMO’s disaster risk management are: i)Mitigation: Since 1994, the provincial government allocates 2% of its annual budget to the APSEMO aside from the 5% calamity fund. Another specialized unit has been created in 2009, the Albay Millenium Development Goals Office (AMDGO) so as to ensure that the current and future plans and programs are aligned with the MDGs. Risk assessments are also conducted with the help from national research institutions and foreign funders. Activities include risks and resource mapping, geostrategic relocation, engineering -- flood control and alternative routes -- interventions; and updating of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) with climate-related hazards and vulnerabilities. Another feature that the government has pioneered is that all provincial facilities and school buildings in the province are insured with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and provides for universal health coverage which provides all households with access even to private medical services during emergency situations. ii)Disaster Preparedness: Albay maintains close coordination with warning agencies and some DRR NGOs. Community-based warning and evacuation planning is continuously being conducted. Institutional unit such as Albay Heath Emergency Management (AHEM) is being organized and strengthened. Safe schools, hospitals and permanent evacuation centers are being built and prepared. Validation survey of all school buildings for structural safety, safety from hazards, and safety for health are conducted. In addition, water-sanitation facilities to 700 school building are being provided. Rescue equipments are being acquired and deployed as well as communication facilities. Education and training are continuously conducted. iii)Response and Relief Information: infoboards for alerts and announcements are being installed in areas most accessible to the public. Evacuation protocols are well-established encouraging village-initiated evacuation. The provincial government also provides funds for maintenance of evacuation centers and needs of evacuees. Pre-emptive evacuation is considered as key response mechanism to achieve zero-casualty goal. The province is declared as an open-city once a disaster strikes so as to facilitate the flow of disaster relief. Demand-side relief was introduced in the premise that cash is the most flexible relief support and has pump priming effect. iv)Rehabilitation: Damage and Disaster Assessment System (DDAS) is a well-established process refined over many cases of disasters. It is coordinated by APSEMO that leads an interdepartmental team who coordinates with their national counterparts. Damage assessment process uses risk mapping as its starting point, preparedness activities and the pre-disaster warning phase and the emergency phase. Data gathering is spread out and information analysis and dissemination is centralized. v)CIRCA (Center for Initiatives and Research for Climate Adaptation): CIRCA was established in 2008 for the environmental protection and for the rehabilitation of mangroves and eco-system. It primarily focuses on research, policy formulations studies and information management of climate change and its adaptation, and climate risk reduction. This organization also contributes to “zero casualty” program, which is a combination of climate change adaptation and DRR measures. With its interdisciplinary knowledge, it aims to enhance the coping abilities of Albay residents to the threats brought about by the changing climate and to specifically develop the environmental awareness of the various livelihood sectors of the province. Some of its projects are to enhance awareness of the various sectors of the threats by a changing climate and integrating DDR and CCA into school curriculum; to conduct and explore concrete policy studies that will support better climate risk adaptation; to promote climate risk adaptation by enhancing resilience of the most vulnerable groups, such as programs for river cleanup, mangrove planting, and capacity development for community (PreventionWeb, 2010). In addition to these five features, the governor of Albay issued an executive order mandating APSEMO to become a regular member of the Provincial Land Use Committee (PLUC). This facilitates the integration of DRR policies, strategies and system in the land use plan. Upon the initiative also of the governor, Albay is also using SIMCLIMS (the integrated modeling system for assessing impacts and adaptation to climatic variability and change), a customized software, as a guide in the preparation of CLUP, and REDAS (seismic hazard simulation software that aims to produce hazard and risk maps immediately after the occurrence of a strong and potentially damaging earthquake or a scenario of earthquake). Albay province is also in the process of conducting soil analysis of all the cities and municipalities and three of LGUs have already finished. The province had also organized LGUs through meetings and conferences to establish networking as well as planning and programming to integrate DRR & CCA in the CLUP, where gender, handicap children, elderly are integral part of planning process (PreventionWeb, 2011). Leadership Joey Sarte Salceda is known in the Philippines as the “Green Economist Governor.” He was an advisor to the Philippine Government, which was one of several nations working together to create guidelines for the Green Climate Fund, launched by the UN climate change body (UNFCCC) in 2011 to channel financial resources to developing countries for climate change adaptation and mitigation. At home in Albay Province, Governor Salceda led efforts to identify vulnerabilities in 720 disaster prone barangays, which is the smallest local government unit in the Philippines. He has used several innovative methods to create a culture of prevention, including by convening an inter-faith forum in 2008 that brought leaders of the Catholic and Muslim faiths together, resulting in the “Oratio Imperata” as the mandated prayer for DRR and CCA, which is recited during religious activities in the province. As part of a province-wide food-for-work program, the Governor put people to work replanting 318 hectares of mangrove swamps to better protect coastal areas from dangerous storm surges and build tsunami resiliency. Governor Salceda is active on social media, publishing a blog to promote public awareness; he has made sure that DRR and CCA are included in lesson plans in all learning areas in elementary and secondary schools (UNISDR, 2012). “DRR, together with climate change, is actually an investment in development. If climate disasters do not occur, then our program will build local capacity and there are no regrets. If they do occur, we would have zero casualty and less economic damages,” said Salceda (Gamolo, 2010). The World Bank and INSDR have recognized APSEMO and CIRCA among the sound practices on climate risk management in Asia and in the world (Lasco, 2012). “Albay has a zero casualty policy as far as disaster impacts is concerned,” said Making Cities Resilient Champion Salceda. “We have also created the institutional frameworks to deal both with climate change and disaster risks, and have set aside budgets to reduce future risks from the impacts of climate change, including through our work to achieve the MDGs. Dealing with climate change and disaster risks is the responsibility of chief executives of local government and cannot be delegated or outsourced”, affirmed Salceda (UNISDR, 2010). Salceda had also decentralized and mainstreamed DRR into the local government’s development plans and programs. Disaster preparedness now forms part of the local planning and administration of LGUs, with career staff and regular funding attached. This has seen risk and resource maps being made available, area- and hazard-specific plans being put in place, community-based early warning systems being set up, and communication protocols and evacuation procedures tested. This institutional strengthening and the province’s evacuation preparation resulted in zero casualties for the province during numerous major hazards, including the strong typhoons of November 1995 and November 1998, and the Mayon Volcano eruptions in 2000, 2001 and 2006. This success has rested on APSEMO’s ability to establish effective cross-government and multi-sector working relationships, and to institutionalize them. Its participatory approach has also meant that the government, private sector, NGOs, religious sector, media and grassroots communities have been able to coordinate joint objectives, actions and planning for disaster risk reduction. This has resulted in more cost-effective policy and emergency actions, less duplication of work and ultimately better disaster preparedness and response with lower casualty rates (Daep, 2008). Albay’s DDR program require engineering interventions, the implementation of strict protocols on evacuations and massive resource mobilization for its relocation program, training of evacuation personnel and purchase of disaster response equipment. “Our goal is ‘safe and shared development’, and this means climate-proofing and disaster-proofing the province based on the HFA for disaster,” explained Salceda. “We realize we cannot do it alone, and need support, so we built a base of co-workers to help us in our goal,” said Salceda. Disaster risk reduction and climate risk adaptation have been lodged at APSEMO, CIRCA and AMDGO (Gamolo, 2010). “DRR is global, and institutionalized is a way of life’, stated Salceda (Daep, 2008). The Planning Process in the Philippines – LGC & HFA LGC The Philippine planning process is based on the Local Government Code (LGC) enacted in 1991. This Code was conceived to facilitate the decentralization of the administrative structure, and covers all aspects of local autonomy. It affirms that: “… the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.” Development planning activities were among the tasks that the LGUs were empowered to take responsibility for. In accordance with the LGC, each LGU would work with a comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan to be formulated by its Development Council and to be integrated within the Development Plans of the next higher level. A Development Council was created at all administrative levels to assist the corresponding Executive Council in setting the direction of economic and social development and coordinating development efforts (Engel, 2007). Given that the planning process in the Philippines is rather complex only a brief overview can be provided here that focuses on aspects necessary for understanding how disaster risk management could be integrated in this process. Planning is carried out at national, regional and local levels and comprises five key phases: planning, programming, budgeting, implementation, and monitoring & evaluation. Three types of planning can be identified: i) land use planning which involves the delineation by a government authority of the utilization to which land within its jurisdiction may be put. This physical planning process generates Physical Framework Plans (PFPs) which define zones for industrial, commercial, residential, recreational and other development, ii) socio-economic planning, which is reflected in development plans, and (iii) investment planning which gives rise to investment plans (Engel, 2007). Provincial Physical Framework Plan (PPFP) and Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) establish the spatial policy valid for 15 to 25 years and define the physical pattern of growth. They precede the Comprehensive Development Plans (CDP) in order to guide prioritization of programs in the CDP. PPFPs & CLUPs define the available supply of land resources and areas where development can and cannot take place -- zoning ordinances. In addition, the PPFP provides a detailed situation analysis of physical characteristics and of the social, environmental and economical state of the province. The responsibility for the drafting of these land-use plans lies with task groups called land-use committees that are part of the development councils (Engel, 2007). In terms of vertical linkages, the planning system comprises simultaneous top-down and bottom-up processes. The national level provides so-called ‘national thrusts’ that indicate development directions and guidelines for the local levels. These in turn identify programs and projects that are then integrated into the higher-level development plans. In terms of horizontal linkages each administrative level of planning is expected to produce long-, medium- and short-term plans. For instance, physical framework plans are long-term plans, the medium-term development plans identify strategies for the implementation of the long-term plans and provide greater time-bound operational detail, and the annual investment plans are the short-term plans that enumerate projects that LGUs intend to implement for the year (Engel, 2007). CDPs delineate the sectoral policy for a six-year medium-term duration. They are multi-sectoral, comprising the following sectors: social, economic, environmental and natural resources, infrastructure, governance, administration. CLUPs define the specific applications for the available land resources and provide a convergence mechanism for integrating all existing topical and thematic plans such as the Disaster Management Plan, Local Poverty Reduction Plan, Sustainable Development Plan, Gender and Development Plan, Agriculture and Fisheries Management Plan, Local Tourism Plan. Executive Legislative Agenda (ELA). ELAs compile sectoral programs and projects for a 3-year period -- this coincides with the term of mayor. Annual Investment Plan comprises a list of programs, projects and activities by sector -- including estimated project costs -- that the LGUs envisage carrying out in the upcoming budget year (Engel, 2007). HFA One of the principal strategic goals of the HFA is for “more effective integration of disaster risk considerations in sustainable development planning, policies and programming at all levels, with a special emphasis on disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and vulnerability reduction”. Successful disaster prevention and mitigation cannot be achieved without considering DRM in the planning process. Hence, with DRM turning from short-term disaster preparedness, response and relief measures to long-term prevention and mitigation strategies, the integration of risk reduction measures in development planning is currently one of the most important activities of DRM (Engel, 2007). There are generally two aspects to such integration, both of them equally important. Firstly, DRM can be regarded as a cross-cutting issue that needs to be considered in all planning sectors. The aim is to plan with a DRM lens in hazard-prone areas in order to: i) avoid any building activities that do not immediately reduce the disaster risk in high-risk areas, ii) ensure that projects do not exacerbate the disaster risk, and iii) ensure that structures are able to withstand disasters. Besides this cross-cutting aspect, certain DRM measures can be regarded as stand-alone issues in planning, since they do not have a function that extends beyond the DRM aspect. Included here are certain prevention measures such as dams, rip-raps or slope stabilization in landslide-prone areas and measures that prepare for the risk that remains even if prevention measures are in place. Another important function of development planning in a DRM context is reduction in the vulnerability of the local population. Socio-economic development measures such as the provision of employment opportunities through alternative livelihood programs -- diversification of agriculture, alternative businesses, distribution of livestock, provision of microfinance, etc. -- contribute indirectly to an improved disaster risk management through alleviating poverty and buffering the negative impacts of future disasters (Engel, 2007). Albay’s DRM Opportunities APSEMO has shown that having permanent and institutionalized disaster management offices at a local or provincial level is a good practice. Having a permanent body that is the overall coordinator in times of emergency is particularly important for saving lives and implementing effective and sustainable disaster risk reduction and response. Where APSEMO project initiatives are recognized as a good practice, it hosts study visits in support of Replication Inception Workshops of the Department of Interior and Local Government. It has also supported tertiary institutions to create DRM courses at graduate level, and an Emergency Paramedic Training Unit. In particular, the project was the first in the country to make DRR staff in LGUs permanent -- rather than allowing them to be replaced after each election. Notably, the project gained consistent support for its policies and funding from six Provincial Governors since its inception, showing that political decision-makers have been able to see the benefits of stability and non-partisanship in DRR work. This stability of staffing contributed to more effective teamwork, coordination and relationship building throughout the existence of APSEMO (United Nations, 2010). APSEMO initiative is also an example of a provincial government putting its own house in order by carrying out real DRR mainstreaming throughout its areas of responsibility. By creating and adequately funding a permanent office responsible for DRR mainstreaming and coordination, with permanently appointed staff who can survive the vagaries of the political climate, this has allowed for substantive institutionalization of DRR priorities within the regular planning, governance, programs and projects of local government. Significantly, the provincial government has set DRR goals that directly affect the lives of its constituents -- such as early warning, preparedness and evacuation from local hazards with zero casualties -- taking local responsibility for local risks (United Nations, 2010). The main lessons learned were that the presence of an institutionalized DRR office at local or provincial levels makes it easier to facilitate and coordinate the multiple stakeholders needed for DRR. For APSEMO this included different local and national government agencies, grassroots community groups, and foreign and local donors. A permanent, institutionalized presence results in more cost-effective work that avoids duplication, and more effective DRR practices. However, to successfully set up and institutionalize a permanent DRR coordination office it is required political-level agreement on creating permanent responsibilities and roles, permanent staff, and stable annual funding from regular public budgets. All these elements are particularly important for sustained institutional capacity development (United Nations, 2010). According to a study done with 115 barangays in Albay, the status of the disaster management program in the province is that respondent-barangays share a common vision of implementing socially and environmentally sound disaster management program that is geared towards sustainable development. Their mission is to have a stable disaster management system that is able to protect lives and properties and minimize damages. Their goal is to ensure preparedness in terms of the physical, social, economic and cultural aspects. At the provincial level, a duly written vision is in place and ensured by the APSEMO focusing on “zero casualty and reduced risk of investments through safe and shared development.” Other interesting facts which resulted from APSEMO’s coordination is that barangay halls are now used as the immediate evaluation areas; tricycles are used to transport the evacuees; and, megaphones are used in the information dissemination. Other facts from this survey are that the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) became the primary government agency to provide technical assistance to barangays in times of calamities. DSWD also helps distribute the relief goods to the evacuees. In terms of level of preparedness in various phases of disaster management, barangays have varying level of preparedness in the implementation of disaster management programs at various phases, namely: prevention, mitigation and response, recovery and rehabilitation. At the prevention phase, the barangays were rated to have very poor preparations along the areas of infrastructure development, such as the construction of flood control measures. These barangays, however, were moderately prepared in terms of disaster management orientation, formation of disaster response organizations, counter-disaster planning, land use regulation, emergency communication system, and public education and awareness. They were adequately prepared along disaster management training, community warning system, preparation of evacuation and emergency response training. These barangays likewise conduct drills on a regular basis. The respondent-barangays have moderate preparations in the mitigation phase. This is indicated by the propagation of disaster resilient crops, establishment of seed bank and postharvest facilities, proper land use management, promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, implementation of safety regulation codes, control of hazardous substances, putting-up of systems to protect key installations, and infrastructure development. During the response phase, the barangays were also rated to be adequately prepared in terms of the conduct of medical missions and the relief delivery operations system. They have moderate preparations in the search and rescue operations; provision of temporary shelter; evacuation center management; psychosocial assistance, monitoring and negotiation; mobilization of less vulnerable sectors; implementation of plans; and, survey assessment (Evasco, 2010). Albay’s DRM -- Challenges & Recommendations Challenges The main challenge for Albay’s DRM is that disaster is uncertain. APSEMO can coordinate cost-effective disaster preparedness and quick response but the impacts of a natural hazard maybe beyond its physical control. Politics is also uncertain. Political leadership in LGUs has a short duration. Interventions of newly elected leaders must be dealt with carefully, and DRR needs comprehensive public awareness campaigns and social support to avoid politicization. There is a fundamental need for local DRR institutions to maintain impartiality and independence from the political process. Multi-stakeholder support can be temporary in nature, and is an ongoing process to maintain. There is a need for continuous financial upgrading not only to sustain but to expand APSEMO’s coordination work to lower-level LGUs (United Nations, 2010). Furthermore, the Albay provincial government took a bitter lesson when it let its guard down in 2006, and failed to evacuate people in vulnerable communities when lahars were triggered by supertyphoon "Reming". “It killed more than 300 of my village mates,” lamented Nilda Buenaobra, a village leader in Barangay Maipon, in Guinobatan town. The survivors from four puroks, or sub-villages have since been evacuated and are now in relocation centers. This painful lesson prompted the Albay provincial government to maximize the regular five percent allocation from the provincial budget and embark on a pro-active DRR and disaster management to build up the capacities of the vulnerable sectors. Ensuring nobody dies during disasters means evacuating entire communities when such a threat does occur, even if it is an expensive proposition, said Salceda. “This is why we have been able to ensure zero casualties for several years now,” he explained. At least 300,000 people are potentially affected in the province during strong typhoons and volcanic eruptions, and are moved out to safer grounds. Albay targeted 10,076 households in high risk areas to be relocated, at a cost of US$ 46 million for eight relocation sites. Funds will be shared by the national and provincial government, and international development funding organizations. To date, these households are now in safer locations in 22 permanent relocation sites. While lots have already been provided, there still exists a shelter gap of 4,454 units. The provincial government provided the lots, while the cost of producing the shelters will be shared by the National Housing Authority, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and international financing institutions (Gamolo, 2010). Disasters are cyclical and may intensify in face of climate change, which exponentially increases the costs of DRR. Disaster officials in Albay are planning to redraw the province’s “risk maps” in preparation for the onslaught of La Niña in 2012. They said previously declared safe areas had been hit by massive flashfloods, landslides and even lahar flows from Mt. Mayon. Governor Salceda has also ordered the reactivation of a task force to better prepare residents against La Niña and had put into effect the Reactivated Albay Task Force La Niña 2012 with an initial budget of half million dollars, as part of his “zero casualty” program during disasters (philStar, 2012). The Action Officer of the PDCC identified five major problems in the implementation of the disaster management programs at the provincial level. The risk maps are either not available or needs upgrading. The culture and attitude of the communities in high risks areas also constrain their disaster management programs. Despite the awareness and relocation programs, people from these communities were still persistent to go back to their settlements. The enforcement of easement law seemed to be a failure as indicated by the presence of illegal settlers along riverbanks and coastlines which are generally classified as dangerous areas. There are also pilferages of field monitoring and warning instruments which hamper the disaster management activities. Meanwhile, the common problems that are being encountered at the barangay-level during the prevention phase include the dredging of canals, lack of facilities and equipment relevant in disaster management, lack of actual community drills, and the limited knowledge of the people about the sound practices to prevent disasters. During the mitigation phase, among the problems include the lack of proper coordination, lack of funds to support the mitigation activities, lack of proper education, lack of cooperation during the evacuation, and the limited knowledge of people on most of the mitigation measures. During the response phase, the delayed distribution of relief goods; lack of basic needs of the communities; poor financial system; lack of information dissemination in times of actual disaster; and the absence of emergency vehicles are among the factors that constrained effective disaster management program. Finally, the recovery and rehabilitation phase is oftentimes constrained with the lack of funds; difficulty in the distribution of seeds and planting materials; delay in the transport of people and goods because of the lack of bridges in Yawa River; people seemed not cooperative; lack of appropriate vehicles; and, the persistence of the people to stay in their settlements despite the warning of danger and disaster. With these, the barangay and provincial governments face a number of challenges. These include the strict implementation of forced evacuation; making available relevant training programs; proper information dissemination; conduct of barangay assembly that would serve as an information and education campaign for disaster preparedness; sourcing out funds for medicines and facilities; and strict implementation of the building code (Evasco, 2010). Recommendations The results of a study indicate that Albay Province has adequate preparations in disaster management, particularly during the prevention phase. However, the province has limited preparations during the mitigation, response and recovery and rehabilitation phases of disaster management. This is brought about by a number of problems and constraints at the provincial and barangay levels. Given the high number of high risk barangays in the province, these constraints should be properly addressed in order to come up with a more effective and efficient disaster management programs (Evasco, 2010). On the basis the findings of this study, the following recommendations are: i) the National and Regional Offices of the Civil Defense should intensify their training and education programs related to disaster management to ensure that the personnel would acquire the necessary skills needed in the implementation of disaster management programs. In line with the move towards the institutionalization of the disaster management offices, the Office of Civil Defense, and the department of National Defense should likewise employ additional personnel who shall oversee the disaster management programs at the grassroots level. In addition, these offices should propose for the upscaling of the calamity fund from 5% to a higher rate through a proposed legislation at the national level. It is further recommended that the aid agencies support the bill calling for the institutionalization of the disaster management offices in the different localities so as to ensure continuous funding and proper implementation of their programs along disaster preparedness, ii) the Regional Disaster Coordinating Council in Bicol should replicate the same study in other provinces to assess the capability of the region, in general, and the provinces in particular, to respond and manage disasters. This could also be a baseline data that may be a basis for further enhancement of its programs on disaster management. The office could also hold regular meetings whereby the action officers of the local government units could share their experiences and best practices so that they could learn from one another, iii) the Albay Public Safety and Emergency Management Office should enhance their disaster management programs. Since the concern of these offices is mostly on the implementation of disaster management programs from the pre-disaster to post-disaster stages, they can very well work towards ensuring that transportation facilities and other relevant equipment are in place and could be accessed by LGUs, iv) for the League of Municipalities and Cities in Albay to integrate disaster management as one of its agenda in its future forum or dialogues in order to share lessons and experiences from various cities and municipalities, v) the Municipal Disaster Coordinating Councils in Albay should be able to assess their current state of program implementation on disaster management. They should identify the training needs of the personnel along the areas of disaster preparedness and management. The councils should also take into consideration the disaster safety components specifically in putting up of infrastructure as this is one of the most identified areas of concern in the four phases of disaster management. These offices should also monitor the implementation of building code to check the safety of the infrastructures, vi)the Department of Interior and Local Government, Albay, Provincial Office should include disaster management and preparation as among its topics in its yearly orientation, and vii)the Association of Barangay Captains in Albay should share their experiences in terms of disaster management. Similarly, they should build a strong support system among themselves to ensure that necessary assistance is extended to the local communities who are in greater need (Evasco, 2010). Overall, the Albay Province should intensify promotion and capability-building programs about disaster management and integrate disaster management in the development programs of the local government units (Evasco, 2010). Conclusion Even though the DRM actions enacted by the Albay Province demand constant improvements in every phase of the disaster cycle, it is not correct to affirm that this Filipino province should not be considered as a “champion” in terms of DRR according to HFA criteria. Considering its social and economic circumstances, the Province of Albay has successfully complied with UNISDR guidelines and managed limited resources not only within its borders but also nationwide through workshops led by its governor. By sharing best practices and lessons learned, Governor Salceda has also helped streamline national DRM policies. 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