Understanding Natural Hazards: Sendong (Washi) Typhoon

Part A -- Nature of the event (Timeline, Processes, Place) Mindanao island, the southernmost in the Philippines, is a mineral-rich region not normally in the path of the average twenty typhoons that hit the Southeast Asian country each year (Christian Science Monitor, 2011). However, on December 15, 2011, tropical storm Sendong and associated flooding -- also known as Typhoon Washi -- hit several regions in northern Mindanao, including the cities of Cagayan del Oro and Iligan City (Red Cross, 2012). Cagayan del Oro and Iligan are vulnerable because they sit near mountain ranges and are coastal areas (UNISDR, 2011). The catastrophic flash flooding triggered by Sendong resulted in at least 1,268 fatalities. In post-analysis, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) upgraded Sendong from a tropical storm to a severe tropical storm (Wikipedia, 2012). On December 12, 2011, the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) noted that a developing area of low pressure had persisted about 945 km south-southeast of Guam. Situated along the southern edge of a subtropical ridge, the system tracked steadily westward towards the Philippines (Wikipedia, 2012). Located within a region of good diffluence and moderate wind shear, deep convection was able to maintain itself over the circulation. Development of banding features and improvement of outflow indicated strengthening was likely. Further development over the following day prompted the JTWC to issue a Tropical Cyclone Formation Alert early on December 13 (Wikipedia, 2012). Less than six hours later, both the JTWC and the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) classified the system as a tropical depression. Maintaining a westward track, the depression was forecast to intensify slowly over the following three days. For much of December 13, a slight increase in shear displaced thunderstorm activity from the center of the depression, delaying intensification. By December 14, convection redeveloped over the low and the JTWC subsequently assessed the system to have attained tropical storm status (Wikipedia, 2012). Early on December 15, the system crossed west of 135°E and entered the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration's (PAGASA) area of responsibility. Upon doing so, PAGASA began issuing advisories and assigned the cyclone with the local name Sendong. Shortly thereafter, the storm passed close to or over Palau (Wikipedia, 2012). By 6 am UTC, the JMA upgraded the system to tropical storm status, at which time they assigned it with the name Washi. Maintaining a rapid westward track, Washi slowly became more organized, with low-level inflow improving during the latter part of December 15. On December 16, Washi reached its peak strength as a severe tropical storm and made its first landfall along the east coast of Mindanao. After passing Mindanao, Washi weakened due to land interaction, but the storm quickly regained its strength, in the Sulu Sea. Late on December 17, Washi crossed Palawan and arrived in the South China Sea, and the system moved out of the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) on December 18. Washi weakened to a tropical depression and dissipated on December 19, because of cool, dry air, in association with the Northeast Monsoon (Wikipedia, 2012). Part B -- Physical Impacts (Damage & Economic Losses) Severe Tropical Storm Washi brought ten hours of torrential rains that triggered disastrous flash flooding over Mindanao, an area that rarely experiences tropical cyclones. More than 200 mm of rain was reported in places where rivers were already swollen. During the overnight hours, hundreds of people were killed as flood waters and landslides destroyed homes along mountain sides. In some locations, flood waters rose by 3.3 m in less than an hour. Residents impacted by these flood waters were forced to seek refuge on their roofs amidst 90 km/h winds. The mayor of Iligan regarded the floods as the worst in the city's history. More than 2,000 people were rescued from the hardest hit areas (Wikipedia, 2012). The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) Update Report dated 27 December 2011 has placed the number of dead at 1,453, injured at 4,594, with thousands still missing, 113,336 families -- 719,485 persons -- affected with 11,441 families -- 54,795 persons -- still inside 56 evacuation centers, 42,325 houses damaged -- 12,805 totally and 29,520 partially --, with the damage to infrastructure, agriculture, and school buildings estimated to have reached US$ 27 million (Rappler, 2012). Over half of the damage was due to damaged roads and bridges (Wikipedia, 2012). At least thirty infrastructure projects worth US$ 23 million were damaged. The Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (RDRRMC) revealed that sixteen of the affected projects were on road sections, nine were on bridges, and five were on drainage and flood control. The report also showed that the highest amount of damage was in the second engineering district of Cagayan del Oro, particularly the 1,800 linear revetment of the Cagayan del Oro River worth US$ 13 million which was totally washed out (The Mindanao Current, 2012). Part C -- Human and Social Impacts The Philippines topped the disaster league table last year with 33 major reported events, twelve more than China, and affecting 12.5% of the population (UNISDR, 2012). Tropical storm Sendong was the second disaster with more number of deaths in 2011 (1,430). The first was the earthquake in Japan (19,846) and the third a flood in Brazil (900) (UNISDR, 2012). More than 42,000 people have been assisted by Red Cross inside evacuation centers and in surrounding areas. In addition, almost 89,5000 people have received food from Red Cross and almost 36,600 people have been reached with basic but crucial relief supplies (Red Cross, 2012). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), in support of the Philippine Red Cross, appealed to donors for US$ 6.1 million, a dramatic revision of the initial call for US$ 2.8 million that was made in the days following Typhoon Sendong. These increased financial needs reflect the perilous situation still faced by those who were severely affected, explains Richard Gordon, the chairman of the Philippine Red Cross. “More than a month on from Sendong at least 223,000 people are still living in emergency shelters, with host families, or in makeshift conditions. It may take a long time for these people to get back into permanent homes, and they will need our support in the interim.” The Red Cross pledged to support 4,000 families with either safe transitional shelter or with repair kits to help them rebuild homes. “The transitional homes are intended for families whose houses were destroyed, and the repair kits are for other families to rebuild homes that were damaged,” said Selvaratnam Sinnadurai, the IFRC’s representative to the Philippines (IFRC, 2012). In the wake of the storm, authorities decreed some land unsafe for rebuilding, explained Sinnadurai. “The process underway now is to find new and safe land. But in the interim, people need to be able to continue their lives with dignity and with access to basic support, and that’s we are aiming to achieve.” The revised operation will also see the Red Cross provide 2,000 families with cash or other livelihoods support as well as reaching 15,000 families -- 75,000 people -- with food, water storage containers and hygiene kits. Those families receiving water containers will also be provided with crucial information on health and hygiene, helping them to take the necessary steps to avoid exposure to illness and disease. A recent outbreak of the deadly bacteria Leptospirosis has claimed 16 lives and affected 377 others. In all, the Red Cross now intends to reach 100,000 people through these various interventions (IFRC, 2012). A massive relief operation involving the evacuation of 100,000 people occurred on the morning of December 17, 2011. Approximately 20,000 soldiers were mobilized to assist in recovery efforts and evacuations. The Philippine Coast Guard was dispatched to search for missing people after villages were reported to have been swept out to sea. Sixty people were rescued off the coast of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and another 120 in the waters near Opol township. President Benigno Aquino III visited Cagayan del Oro and Iligan on December 20, 2011, and declared a state of national calamity in the affected provinces. The President also appealed to its citizens to help the victims in their way of celebrating Christmas in his Christmas Message (Wikipedia, 2012). Sendong’s damage to farmlands in the Visayas and Mindanao reached US$ 190,000, according to initial estimates released by the Department of Agriculture (DA). A report by the DA said the storm damaged a total of 1,904 hectares of rice farms where US$ 85,000 worth of seedlings in vegetative stages were planted. “For corn, affected [were] 2,060 hectares with a production loss estimated at 189 metric tons valued at US$ 105,000. Most of the affected corn areas were in the vegetative stage,” the report read. The report said Sendong also damaged agricultural crops in the regions of Mimaropa, Bicol, Zamboanga Peninsula, Northern Mindanao and Davao. The agriculture department noted that the rice crops affected covered 1,904 hectares of which 1,305 are in Palawan, 455 hectares in Camarines Sur, and 141 hectares in Northern Mindanao. “These areas are newly transplanted or in the seedling stage and are expected to recover as soon as flood waters recede. Hence, no estimate of volume of production loss is reported,” according to the report (Business Mirror, 2012). Part D -- Analysis of Factors Contributing to the Disaster The Philippines is as helpless a paper sailboat in a storm every time there’s a typhoon (Silverio, 2012). Corruption is what eats up what should be allocations for disaster preparedness campaigns and plans (Silverio, 2012). It is important to realize the necessity of having a good government; one that takes into consideration the safety and welfare of the people above everything else; one that looks far into the future not to secure itself in power but to see what it can and should do to ensure that Filipinos will never again suffer like they are suffering now because of a typhoon (Silverio, 2012). “We know that we are always the ones blamed when disaster happens but citizens need to understand that we cannot do magic,” said Lawrence Cruz, Mayor of Iligan. “We need the help of every citizen as well as the help of national governments to anticipate disasters. It is a collective effort and everybody needs to understand the challenge” (UNISDR, 2012). Land tenure and illegal logging are the main problems faced by the local governments of Illigan and Cagayan del Oro. “Mayors have different concerns and different needs,” said UNISDR Chief, Margareta Wahlström (UNISDR, 2012). "We need to rebuild communities with the confidence that we are not rebuilding the risks again; we need to ensure that reconstruction of homes and infrastructure will be on safer ground following sound construction standards; we need to soon restart and create livelihoods; and restore normalcy in people's lives with a stronger sense of hope and confidence for the future," said the Senator Loren Legarda (UNISDR, 2012). Senator Legarda pointed to the high number of deaths as an indicator of ill-preparedness within communities, which she said highlighted the importance of empowering local authorities to take risk reduction measures. That meant incorporating disaster risk reduction into local government budgets. “Strengthening the capacity of local government units to address disaster risks and hazards is a major component of the national strategy for disaster resilience,” she said. “A national plan, no matter how good, will remain ineffective if not translated into local plans and action.” As complaints emerged from the public about lack of guidance from the government, Legarda told she would organize regional workshops to explain the country’s disaster risk reduction and management law, known as Republic Act 10121. “I will put all the tools together. I will ask UNISDR to assist in effective disaster prevention in the local level.” Legarda also explained that the Philippines had a comprehensive land use planning system, and that the Department of Environment and National Resources had produced a hazard map identifying high-risk areas where homes should not be built. But 340 municipalities out of about 1,500 -- most of them poor and highly vulnerable to disasters -- had yet to update their plans. She also said those maps had outlined areas to which people could be evacuated safely but, in the early days of the storm, the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council reported that many residents had refused to leave their homes, raising further concerns about the public’s lack of awareness. “I don’t think there was any seriousness and understanding of the gravity of Sendong. Even if there had been sufficient warning, there was no preparedness,” Legarda said. “A clear and effective early warning and response system using red flags like in Bangladesh must be established.” She urged local government units not to “wait to be inundated before taking necessary flood prevention measures.” These include flood control infrastructure such as river embankments, pumping stations, flood walls, drainage systems, storm drains, canals and flood retention areas (UNISDR, 2011). She also pointed out the need for social mobilization to be linked to early flood warnings to ensure timely evacuations, the need to develop risk-sensitive comprehensive land use plans, and the need for greater cooperation between the public and private sectors to reduce risk (UNISDR, 2011). The UNISDR Chief, Margareta Wahlström, said: “There are many lessons to be learned about risk management from this tragedy. The first is that more must be done to ensure early warning systems are effective in an age when climate change is intensifying the impact of typhoons. The storm was identified two days before flash floods swept through Cagayan del Oro City and Illigan City. More must be done to educate people on disasters and climate change so they understand the risk they run when they refuse to heed warnings and do not evacuate on time. The second is to understand the deadly cocktail of exposure and vulnerability created by poverty, rapid urbanization and deforestation which results in huge loss of life, homes and hard-won development gains when a storm of this magnitude strikes. “Senator Legarda also said: “We have to take note that the high number of casualties caused by Typhoon Sendong could be due to lack of awareness of the risk and proper action of residents in affected areas, as they have not experienced floods of such magnitude in the past. Thus, information dissemination and community disaster preparedness is also a crucial part in this effort, because an educated populace would be prepared and know what to do in times of disaster” (UNISDR, 2011). The Mindanao Declaration expresses particular concern that "logging, mining, unsustainable agriculture, and other similar land-use activities increase the vulnerability of many ecosystems and communities in our island." It recognizes that "mitigation and adaptation measures by all sectors and levels of government have been inadequately implemented and weakly coordinated resulting in inefficient use of resources and lack of accountability" (UNISDR, 2012). PART E -- Proposed Solutions for Pre- and Post-Disaster Phases Days after the disaster, Senator Legarda called on President Benigno Aquino to launch immediately the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP). Legarda said that “under Republic Act 10121 or the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act, a comprehensive NDRRMP should be developed and implemented.” “With the more destructive disasters that have come before us, it is high time that the NDRRMP be immediately launched as this outlines the specific strategies to reduce disaster risks,” she added. According to the DRRM Act, which was signed into law in 2010, the NDRRMP must provide for the identification of hazards, vulnerabilities and risks to be managed at the national level; disaster risk reduction and management approaches and strategies to be applied managing said hazards and risks; agency roles, responsibilities and lines of authority at all government levels; and vertical and horizontal coordination of disaster risk reduction and management in the pre- and post-disaster phases. “As envisioned in the law, this National Plan will guide the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive and integrated local disaster risk reduction and management plan (LDRRMP). Without a national disaster prevention plan rolled out at full speed, cities and municipalities will be unprepared and repeatedly battered by unexpected disasters,” the Senator stressed. Legarda added that local governments must ensure that their development plans can withstand the impact of worsening disasters and climate change. “Climate change is a clear and present danger. It is a national security concern. Demanding immediate government action to address its impact is the very least we can do in remembrance of the Mindanao flashflood victims who would have hopefully issued a wake-up call for everyone,” the Chair of the Senate Committee on Climate Change pointed out. The Government of Philippines, through the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) began the development of a new disaster loss database for the country, with support from the United Nations International Strategy for Risk Reduction (UNISDR).The Philippines is the latest country in Asia to begin to systematically account for all its disaster losses, using standardized criteria and definitions and local level geo-referencing. This federal initiative counts with local support. Mayors from the Mindanao cities ravaged by Typhoon Sendong have been tasked to invest more in prevention and mitigation measures, by disaster risk reduction champion vice-Mayor Al Arquillano from San Francisco who won the Sasakawa award for making his municipality safer against disasters. Speaking at a Forum of Mayors organized by UNISDR, Arquillano asked the 20 mayors present to do what is needed to be less vulnerable to floods and droughts as he warned that “we will be facing many more in the future”. He invited his counterparts in Mindanao to visit his municipality to see how San Francisco has developed resilience (UNISDR, 2012). The Head of UNISDR, Margareta Wahlström, congratulated three Philippines Senators for leading an in-depth, two-day post-mortem with local leaders into the devastating losses caused to Mindanao island by Typhoon Sendong. She said: "The Mindanao Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction Priorities is a very honest and searching analysis of the man-made contributions to this disaster in which over 1,000 people lost their lives. It is very significant that this initiative has the support of three influential Senators.” "It is important now to focus on recovery and ensure that Mindanao builds back better and that we take this opportunity to avoid re-creating the risks exposed by Typhoon Sendong. The priority now is to take care of the 4,981 families who have been left homeless. I met many of them on my visit last month and their views must be taken on board when it comes to implementing the Mindanao Declaration. "Essentially, this declaration contains an eight-point plan of action which is an endorsement for the passage of laws which, if successfully implemented, will establish a permanent, independent disaster management and risk reduction agency and promote cooperation between local governments on these issues." Senator Legarda said: "Leaders have the capacity to protect our people and secure future generations. The important starting point is political commitment, and our measure for success is more disaster-resilient development investments” (UNISDR, 2012). During response, President Aquino said that "the first priority is to relocate to areas that no longer pose a danger to them", followed then by instructions to implement disaster mitigation programs, including reforestation. He also states that "(the government) has no desire to engage in finger-pointing or to assign blame at a time like this. Yet, we have an obligation to find out exactly what has happened." Aquino said he had formed a task force to investigate the reasons behind the disaster and to determine whether a nationwide logging ban had been violated. He declared a state of national disaster, a move intended to release greater funding, and ordered the speedy restoration of power and drinking water supplies in all affected villages. "If we want this tragedy to be the last of its kind, we need to learn from our mistakes," he said (Christian Science Monitor, 2011). The inquiry report ordered by President Aquino covers the specific actions taken by all the appropriate agencies involved in response efforts starting with the warning of the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) and also what officials were doing before, during, and after the storm hit land. According to an official, PAGASA and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) issued warnings to communities concerned and that the response from the government was immediate and that the Armed Forces was prepared for and undertook search-and-rescue operations. Moreover, a geologist said that local officials of Cagayan de Oro City and Iligan City were fully aware of the danger posed by flash floods in their respective areas since 2009. “We sent the local government units copies of the geohazard maps covering these areas. In fact, the entire province of Misamis Oriental, including Iligan City and Cagayan del Oro City, specific areas that were hit by Sendong, had been identified as prone to flash floods”, the scientist claimed (Business Mirror, 2012). As a result of the inquiry report, officials and specialists recommended eight priority points to be addressed by disaster risk reduction plans in Mindanao. The first is -- knowledge -- to improve the use of technology to address gaps in knowledge and communication of existing knowledge on disaster hazards and the inclusion of disaster risk reduction in the school curriculum. The second is -- emergency preparedness and response -- to address the needs of vulnerable and exposed communities through adequate evacuation centers, regular drills, emergency family kits, simplified response protocols, and effective psycho-social interventions. The third is -- DRRM Plans -- to adopt and implement disaster risk reduction and management plans at the regional, provincial, city, municipal and barangay levels. The fourth is -- the enforcement of laws -- to strict enforcement of environmental, natural resources, land-use laws, including prohibiting mining and logging in disaster-prone and vulnerable areas. The fifth is -- ecosystem-based approach -- to carry out river basin management and massive reforestation including planting mangrove forests. The sixth is -- national legislation -- to pass laws that will establish a permanent, independent disaster management and risk reduction agency and promote inter-local government cooperation on DRR. The seventh is -- institutional mechanisms -- to set up the appropriate institutional mechanisms for disaster risk reduction implementation, including institutionalizing command systems at all levels. And the eight is -- implementation -- to invest in capacity building, resource mobilization strategies and mechanisms to implement these priorities (Mindanao Declaration, 2012). The declaration was approved by consensus during the Mindanao summit on disaster risk reduction and geo-hazard awareness, the first island-wide gathering to discuss and learn lessons from the Sendong tragedy (Prevention Web, 2012). Special Representative Wahlström said: "The Philippines has a very sophisticated disaster response system and it has the capacity to be a world-leader in disaster risk reduction. I am confident the government will act on the lessons learned from Typhoon Sendong to ensure better coordination and improved dissemination of early warnings as well as implementing existing legislation on land use and deforestation. The UN system will be fully engaged in helping the country in the recovery phase" (UNISDR, 2012). References: BBC. “Philippines Typhoon Washi death toll reaches 1,249”, December 27, 2011. Accessed on March 5, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16336706 Business Mirror. “Sendong deadliers than Odoy”, December 1, 2011. Accessed on March 7, 2012. http://businessmirror.com.ph/home/top-news/20935-sendong-deadlier-than-ondoy Christian Science Monitor. “Typhoon Sendong recovery efforts begin in Philippines”, December 19, 2011. Accessed on March 5, 2012. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1219/Typhoon-Sendong-recovery-efforts-begin-in-Philippines Christian Science Monitor. “Typhoon Sendong: Did illegal logging cause flash flooding in Philippines?”, December 20, 2011. Accessed on March 7, 2012. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1220/Typhoon-Sendong-Did-illegal-logging-cause-flash-flooding-in-Philippines Engel, E. et al. “Being Prepared Disaster Risk Management in the Eastern Visayas, Philippines”, SLE, 2007. IFRC, “Philippines: Red Cross to more than double Typhoon Washi response”, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed on Feb 29, 2012. http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/press-releases/asia-pacific/philippines/philippines-red-cross-to-more-than-double-typhoon-washi-response/ Mindanao Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction Priorities. “Mindanao Summit on DRR and Geo-Hazard Awareness”, 2012. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/25214_82085008mindanaosummitdrrdeclaratio.pdf Prevention Web. “Philippines – Disaster Statistics”. Accessed on March 9, 2012. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=135 Rappler. “Investigate factors that lead to deaths from Sendong”, January 4, 2012. Accessed on March 8, 2012. http://www.rappler.com/nation/683-investigate-factors-that-led-to-deaths-from-sendong Red Cross. “Philippines Typhoon Washi”, Red Cross Australia. Accessed on March 1, 2012. http://www.redcross.org.au/philippines-floods-2011.aspx Relief Web. “Strategic Action Plan”, Regional Development Council, Region X, Cagayan del Oro, Philippines. Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_608.pdf Silverio, I. “Lessons from Typhoon Sendong”, Bulatlat. February 16, 2012. Accessed on March 4, 2012. http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/02/16/lessons-from-typhoon-sendong/ The Mindanao Current. “Sendong Damage to Infrastructure”, January 14, 2012. Accessed on March 8, 2012. http://themindanaocurrent.blogspot.com/2012/01/sendong-damage-to-infrastructure.html The Watchers. “Tropical storm “Sendong” on path to Philippines”, The Watchers, December 15, 2012. Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://thewatchers.adorraeli.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/wp27111.png UNISDR. “2011 Disasters in Numbers”, International Disaster Database, 2012. UNISDR. “Funding crucial for national disaster prevention plans”, December 29, 2011. Accessed on March 8, 2012. http://www.unisdr.org/archive/24424 UNISDR. “Mindanao mayors gather after Typhoon Sendong”, January 31, 2012. Accessed on March 3, 2012. http://www.unisdr.org/archive/24914 UNISDR. “Philippines tragedy underlines need for improved risk management”, December 19, 2011. Accessed on March 2, 2012. http://www.unisdr.org/archive/24261 UNISDR. “Typhoon Sendong – Chronicle of a disaster foretold”, December 20, 2011. Accessed on March 1, 2012. http://www.unisdr.org/archive/24308 UNISDR. “UNISDR chief compares typhoon damage in Mindanao to Japanese tsunami”, January 27, 2012. Accessed on March 1, 2012. http://www.unisdr.org/archive/24862 UNISDR. “UNISDR welcomes Typhoon Sendong Post-Mortem”, February 22, 2012. Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://www.unisdr.org/archive/25290 Wikipedia. “Tropical Storm Washi”. Accessed on Feb 28, 2012. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tropical_Storm_Washi

Understanding Natural Hazards: Hilo’s Tsunami History & Communication Preparedness Issues and Response Improvements

Introduction Tsunamis are a series of waves of very long length and period that can travel up to one thousand kilometers per hour in the open ocean. They are caused by disturbances that displace large volumes of water and are usually generated by seafloor displacement during earthquakes, but they can also be caused by volcanic eruptions, submarine landslides, and oceanic bolide impacts. Tsunamis can impact coasts on either ocean-wide, regional, or local scales. In the open ocean the tsunami wave height may be only a meter or two, but as the wave approaches shallow water it slows down and begins shoaling resulting in dramatic increases in wave height. Damage from a tsunami is caused by inundation, wave impact, and sediment erosion and deposition. In general, the larger the tsunami, the greater the impact (SOEST, 2012). Tsunamis have killed more people in the Hawaiian Islands than all other natural disasters combined. The Hawaiian Islands have been hit by numerous tsunamis, some generated thousands of miles away, others the result of earthquakes and landslides occurring within the archipelago (Hawaiian Encyclopedia, 2012). Big Island, Hilo: Brief Tsunami History (When, Origin, Magnitude, and Impact) Tsunamis are an ever-present threat to the people of Hawaii and have proven to be one of the most deadly natural disasters on the islands (Sutton, 2011). An estimated 221 people have been killed by tsunamis in Hawaii in the twentieth century. Most of these deaths occurred on the Big Island during the tsunamis of 1946 and 1960, two of the largest tsunamis to strike in the Pacific (Pacific Disaster Center, 2012). Seven of the fifteen destructive tsunamis that reached the Big Island between 1812 and 1975 led to damage in Hilo; six of those seven were caused by earthquakes off the Chilean coast (Sutton, 2011). Historically, the city of Hilo has been the target of many destructive tsunamis (Sutton, 2011). Approximately 25 percent of the property and population of Hilo are located within its tsunami inundation area (Sutton, 2011). The natural shape of Hilo Bay amplified the waves, which then surged onto land. Hilo has a population of approximately 45,000 and is the second largest city in the Hawaiian Islands (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). Following a brief history of tsunamis on the Big Island -- focused on Hilo: 1868: An earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale on the island of Hawai‘i causes a landslide that destroys a village and creates a localized tsunami reported to be more than 60 feet high. Nearly every European-style home in the Ka‘ū district of Hawai‘i Island was destroyed. The mud flow buries a village of 31 people along with about 50 animals, killing 40 people in all. The tsunami kills 48 people when water surges ashore up to 60 feet high, sweeping away the ancient village of ‘Āpua in Puna (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1877: A large earthquake occurs near Peru, and a tsunami arrives in Hilo before dawn. 37 houses are destroyed, 45 people are killed, and many more injured (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1918: A 5-foot high tsunami arrives in Hilo, doing little damage (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1923: An earthquake in the Aleutian Islands generates a tsunami that sends waves to more than 20 feet above normal in the Waiākea area of Hilo (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1946: The tsunami of April 1, 1946 was the deadliest natural disaster in the history of modern Hawaiʻi (Nishimoto, 2002). This tsunami was generated by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake in the Aleutian Islands (Pacific Disaster Center, 2012). An estimated 159 people in the Hawaiian Islands were killed, including 96 in Hilo and 24 in Laupāhoehoe on Hawai‘i Island. The tsunami brought 15 waves in all, rising up to 56 feet above sea level in some places, and 33 feet in Hilo where close to 500 homes and businesses are destroyed and more than 1,000 more damaged, causing an estimated $26 million in damage, including railroads, bridges, piers and ships (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1952: On November 4, 1952 a tsunami was generated by a magnitude 8.2 earthquake on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the USSR. In Hawaii, property damage from these 12-foot waves was estimated at $800,000-$1,000,000; no lives were lost. The waves beached boats, caused houses to collide, destroyed piers, scoured beaches, and moved road pavement especially in Hilo (Pacific Disaster Center). 1960: This tsunami was caused by an earthquake in Chile. The Chilean earthquake -- magnitude 8.3 -- occurred 6,600 miles away from the Hawaiian Islands. The tsunami waves generated by the earthquake took more than 15 hours to reach Hawai‘i’s shores. Hilo once again took the brunt of the damage as it was hit by at least seven significant tsunami waves over a 2-hour period. The third wave was the most destructive. In Hilo Bay, the tsunami created a bore that rushed ashore at a speed reported to be more than 37 miles per hour, surging water as high as 36 feet above sea level. In all, 61 people were killed in Hilo, with 43 more requiring medical care for their injuries. In addition, at least 229 homes were destroyed, as well as 308 public structures and businesses. The destruction was most severe near Hilo’s Kamehameha Ave., where entire city blocks were washed away. Damage was estimated up to $50 million. Many people died because they went to the shoreline to investigate what was happening as the water drained out from the bay and river (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1964: One of North America’s largest earthquakes ever recorded -- magnitude 8.4 on the Richter scale -- occurs in Alaska, sending tsunami waves toward the Hawaiian Islands. In Hilo, the waves rise to more than 12.5 feet. No people die in the Hawaiian Islands (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 1975: November 29, two strong earthquakes shake the southeast region of Hawai‘i Island, causing a small eruption of Kīlauea Volcano and generating a localized tsunami that hits the remote Ka‘ū area on the southeast shore of the island of Hawai‘i. One of the 1975 earthquakes registered at least 7.2 on the Richter scale. The tsunami comes ashore near the site of an old Hawaiian village that is now a campground area called Halapē. The ground in the area sinks some 12 feet and rocks fall from the cliffs above. A tsunami wave sweeps campers onto a rugged lava field and washes some of them into a huge crack in the lava, killing two people and injuring many more. One of the tsunami waves traveled more than 300 feet inland (Hawaii Encyclopedia, 2012). 2010: At approximately 8:34pm on February 26, 2010, a magnitude 8.8 earthquake occurred in the subduction zone off the south-central coast of Chile. Its epicenter was relatively close to the location of the Chilean earthquake that generated the devastating 1960 tsunami. The tsunami waves arrived in Hilo at 11:38 am, with wave heights of less than 3.1 feet (Sutton, 2011). 2011: the Big Island of Hawaii did sustain some damage as a result of the tsunami of March 11, 2011; however, the damage reported was relatively minimal. There were no deaths or serious injuries reported (Fischer, 2011). The King Kamehameha Kona Beach Hotel got a foot of water in the lobby and canoes in the harbor were destroyed. Flooding was also reported in Kahului. The waters surged in some harbors hours after the initial wave hit. At Napoopoo at Kealakekua Bay, one wave reached at least 100 feet inland and an elevation of 11 or 12 feet (Star-Advertiser, 2011). Communication Preparedness Issues A review of historical data for Hawaii reveals that significant tsunamis have been reported for only four of twenty-six potentially tsunamigenic earthquakes from 1868 through 2009 with magnitudes of 6.0 or greater. During the same time period, three significant tsunamis have been reported for substantially smaller earthquakes. This historical perspective, the fact that the last significant local tsunami occurred in 1975, and an understandable preoccupation with tsunamis generated around the margins of the Pacific suggest apparent deficiencies in i) personal awareness of what to do in the event of a possible local tsunami, ii) the distribution of instrumentation capable of providing rapid confirmation that a local tsunami has been generated, and iii) the subsequent issuance of timely warnings for local tsunamis (Walker, 2010). Many of the fatalities and injuries associated with past tsunamis can be attributed to such deficiencies as lack of awareness of tsunami hazards, human error, inadequate support of mitigation efforts, and poor communications between scientists, government agencies, and the general public (Walker, 1996). 1946 and 1960 tsunamis caused tragic loss of life and enormous economic damage in Hilo and along the shores of the Hawaiian Island chain. Even though the government agencies knew there was a tsunami alert and the media were broadcasting warnings, the 1960 tsunami took the lives of sixty-one people in Hilo only fourteen years after ninety-six people were killed during the 1946 event. Over twelve hours notice of a possible large tsunami was given in 1960 and the siren warning system sounded more than four hours prior to the event. Contributing to the tragic loss of life was a lack of communication between government agencies in addition to media inaccuracies and a public that was not educated in tsunami safety (Johnston, 2012). The most serious deficiencies are found in the following areas: a lack of knowledge of tsunami hazards at nearly every level of our society, an ineffective warning system for locally generated tsunamis primarily affecting the Kona, Ka,u, and Puna coasts of the Big Island, and the probability of unacceptably high levels of false warnings for Pacific-wide tsunamis (Walker, 1996). Most aspects of communications are continually tested and upgraded by State and County Civil Defense agencies, as well as the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. However, one perceived glaring deficiency in communications is likely unless corrective actions are taken. Because of an absence of instrumentation along parts of the Puna and Kona coastline from Punaluu to Kapoho, a small unfelt earthquake could generate a highly localized but destructive tsunami along shorelines popular with residents and tourists -- i.e., Punaluu, Pohoiki, and Ahalanui --, and in coastal campground areas of the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park. No warnings would be possible in those areas for such a tsunami although some other shorelines at risk on the Big Island are instrumented with devices -- i.e., along the Kona Coast from Honokohau to Milolii -- that would detect such tsunamis and provide Civil Defense personnel with an opportunity to sound warning sirens. History confirms that a highly localized destructive tsunami will occur (Walker, 2004). Even though data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s tsunami buoys has a substantial history of success, warnings perceived as “false” by the public are always a possibility. The people of Hawaii need to understand the limitations of warning systems. They need to know that once the reliability of data used in the warning system is established, false warnings will be reduced or eliminated. Also, for some warnings only limited evacuations may be required (Walker, 2004). Not only does Hawaii have a warning system for Pacific-wide tsunamis but also a warning system for locally generated tsunamis for part of the Big Island. This system also provides an early warning for the rest of the State should a large tsunami occur on the Kona Coast. Historical data and the successful operation of the tsunami sensors on the Kona Coast suggest that local warning criteria should be reviewed to eliminate overcautious, and obviously false, local warnings. Also, some criteria might be eliminated so that warnings can be called more quickly. Necessary upgrades and expansions of the local warning system should be made. These upgrades should be done by informing the public on the differences and characteristics of both Pacific-wide and local warnings (Walker, 2004). Because of existing potential deficiencies in education, instrumentation, and warnings, locally generated tsunamis may be far greater risk to loss of life in the Hawaiian Islands than Pacific-wide tsunamis. These deficiencies should be addressed and corrected by public officials, educators, residents, and visitor industry personnel prior to, rather than after, the next locally generated tsunami (Walker, 2010). Communication Response Improvements Effective tsunami mitigation can only be accomplished through continual awareness education for the public, media and emergency personnel, and with accurate and timely warnings (Johnston, 2012). Messages that are clear, concise, and instructive increase public understanding and allow people to take practical steps to protect themselves before, during, and after a crisis (Sutton, 2011). As the Big Island does not have network television broadcast news stations, local residents rely on more than a dozen AM and FM radio stations, two major daily newspapers, and several smaller weekly papers. These are complemented by online news sites like Hawaii 24/7. Hilo is also the seat for the Hawaii County Civil Defense, which is responsible for coordinating preparedness and response activities for the Big Island (Sutton, 2011). In the weeks prior to 2010 tsunami, Hilo conducted a tsunami drill, exercising the coordination among county departments, testing alert mechanisms, disseminating information via local media, and identifying areas for improvement. These yearly drills, along with monthly tests of the sirens and alert systems, help ensure the local government and its many partners are prepared for an actual event. Alerts on the Big Island include sirens, emergency alert systems (EAS) messages on broadcast radio and television, and public service announcements. Additional strategies include door-to-door to homes in the evacuation zone, helicopter flyovers of “off-the-grid” areas, and police patrols with bullhorns announcing mandatory evacuations. Hawaii County has also implemented a number of self-subscription services that provide alert information to desktop computers and mobile phones, raising the attention of those who have registered for key information (Sutton, 2011). Public officials also monitor social networking responses and post accurate information in reply (Sutton, 2011). In terms of educating the population and reminding them about tsunami risks, Hilo is home to Hawaii’s only tsunami museum, mostly dedicated to the understanding of the 1946 Pacific Tsunami (Wikipedia, 2012). Tsunami Awareness Month is held in April to commemorate the lives lost to the 1946 disaster. In April, NOAA scientists and Civil Defense volunteers visit the schools across the State located in hazardous zones to help them understand risks and improve evacuation plans. The same is done by scientists from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center and the International Tsunami Information Center to help families prepare for tsunamis (Hawaii 24/7, 2010). Regarding mitigation planning, local public and private authorities should i) implement modeling to determine the effect on Hawaii of a “100-year 9.0 magnitude earthquake” from regions in the Western and Southwestern Pacific, including Japan, ii) expand and upgrade the local warning system, iii) implement standardized tsunami education in schools, iv) review warning criteria for local earthquakes, v) harden facilities against salt water flooding, and vi) understand the potential social and economic impact of tsunamis so as to minimize losses and speed recovery in the next large tsunami (Walker, 2004). Historic memory about preparedness efforts on the Big Island is dominated by past tsunami experience and the recognition of the need for increased public education and communication among networked organizations (Sutton, 2011). The 1994 East Java tsunami event was the impetus for a strong local preparedness campaign in Hilo, resulting in increased knowledge about tsunami planning, including recognizing the physical signs of a tsunami, implementing alert systems and street signage, and integrating organizations at the local level (Sutton, 2011). Local preparedness measures increased communication among organizations through coordination with Community Emergency Response Team, opened the doors of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to local news reporters, making them communication partners and extensions of the public information function within Civil Defense (Sutton, 2011). County officials have described local broadcast media as extremely important partners for disseminating hazard information to the public in times of emergency (Sutton, 2011). Media outlets have been outfitted with generators and promised fuel access if critical infrastructure is disabled and radio becomes the sole source of public information. News media receive press credentials and passes that allow them access to the EOC. Throughout response, media personnel are able to monitor EOC operations and do not need to wait for official briefings or news releases before disseminating information (Sutton, 2011). The State communication warning process for tsunamis involves several agencies. Seismic recording stations at the U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) Hawaiian Volcanic Observatory (HVO) on the Big Island capture the earthquake from its many recording stations. HVO geologists usually have a position of the earthquake within five minutes of the event and send this information to local civil defense authorities. The information from HVO is also immediately provided to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) on Oahu and to local civil defense. PTWC makes its own assessment whether to issue or not a bulletin minutes after the HVO report, with its own estimation of location and a different and more precise estimate of the quake’s magnitude. The PTWC is responsible for communicating the information to other public authorities. The PTWC continuously monitors data across the state, mostly from the Big Island since that is where the majority of seismic activity occurs. Primary responsibility for informing the public about emergency situations lies with Civil Defense (CD) which controls the Emergency Alert System (EAS). Multiple communication systems exist between the PTWC and CD; phone lines are backed up with satellite and radio systems. PTWC has a dedicated phone line supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. They also communicate via text bulletins through normal weather channels, such as the World Meteorological Organization, an agency of the United Nations, and Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System, a National Weather Service program (Francica, 2006). In 2007, the governor of Hawaii created a committee to suggest methods to include multiple non-traditional communications means to disseminate information (Lingle, 2007). The key recommendations for improving the emergency communications plan were i) update the State of Hawai`i Emergency Alert System plan, ii) establish a “media center” in the CD emergency operations, iii) install dedicated phone lines for accredited electronic and print news organizations, iv) provide updates every thirty minutes to improve the flow of information to the public and help refute unsubstantiated rumors and other sources of false information, v) assign as a liaison officer to be dedicated to the media at any activation of the State EOC, vi) establish a dedicated CD Web site to provide the media with updates online to assist media organizations, vii) assess the feasibility and technological capability of using the text messaging function for emergencies, viii) explore the possibility of communicating via electronic message signs on the freeways, ix) increase public awareness about emergency preparedness, x) work with the Hawai`i consular corps, xi) identify sign language translators, xii) news outlets to restore power during an outage, xiii) provide diesel fuel for backup power generators during extended blackout periods, and xiv) track the progress of recommendations (Lingle, 2007). References Big Island. “Civil Defense plans island-wide tsunami warning exercise Tuesday, January 27”, Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://www.bigisland-bigisland.com/civil-defense-plans-islandwide-tsunami-warning-exercise-tuesday-january-27.html Fischer, J. “New on Hawaii’s Big Island for March 2011 and Beyond and Tsunami Damage Update”, About.com Guide, March 18, 2011. Accessed on March 4, 2012. http://gohawaii.about.com/b/2011/03/18/big-island-march-2011.htm Francica, J. “Using Geospatial Technology to Communicate with the Public When Disasters Strike”, Directions Media, 2006. Hawaii 24/7. “April is “Tsunami Awareness Month” in Hawaii”, March 19, 2010. Accessed on March 5, 2012. http://www.hawaii247.com/2010/03/19/april-is-tsunami-awareness-month-in-hawaii/ Hawaiian Encyclopedia. “Tsunamis”, 2012, accessed on March 7, 2012. http://www.hawaiianencyclopedia.com/tsunamis.asp Johnston, J. “An examination of hazard communication logs and public response during the 1946 and 1960 tsunamis that impacted Hilo, Hawaii”, Geological Society, v. 361, pp. 91-105, 2012. Lingle, L. “Recommendations for Improving Public Communications During Emergencies”, Executive Chambers, Governor’s Comprehensive Communications Review Committee, January 5, 2007. Nishimoto, W. “An oral history of the April 1, 1946 tsunami at Laupahoehoe, Hawaii: a case study in the educative value of construction history from memory and narrative”, University of Hawaii at Manoa, PhD thesis, 2002. Pacific Disaster Center. “Hawaii Tsunami Events”, accessed on March 6, 2012. http://www.pdc.org/iweb/tsunami_history.jsp SOEST. “Tsunami Hazards”, Coastal Hazard Analysis Report, 2012. Sutton, J. et al. “Changing Channels: Communicating Tsunami Warning Information in Hawaii”, Center for Integrated Emergency Preparedness, 2012. Walker, D. “Critical evaluations for the state of Hawaii subsequent to the 26 December 2004 Asian tsunami”, Science of Tsunami Hazards, v. 23, n. 1, p. 17, 2005. Walker, D. “Human Factors Compounding the Destructiveness of Future Tsunamis”, The International Journal of the Tsunami Society, v. 14, n. 2, pp. 79-84, 1996. Walker, D. “Potential Deficiencies in Education, Instrumentation, and Warnings for Locally Generated Tsunamis”, Science of Tsunami Hazards, v. 29, n. 2, p. 139, 2010. Walker, D. “Regional Tsunami Evacuation for the State of Hawaii: A Feasibility Study Based on Historical Runup Data”, Science of Tsunami Hazards, v. 22, n. 1, p. 3, 2004. Wikipedia. “Hilo, Hawaii”, accessed on March 3, 2012. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilo,_Hawaii Wikipedia. “List of historic tsunamis”, accessed on March 5, 2012. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_historic_tsunamis

Understanding Natural Hazards: Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami

INTRODUCTION At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, an earthquake occurred 80 miles off the coast of Honshu -- Japan’s most populous island --, approximately 240 miles from Tokyo. The initial shock measured at a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale --- making it the fourth most intense quake in recorded history. The quake was followed by powerful aftershocks, the first of which occurring only 30 minutes later at a magnitude of 7.4. Following the quake, a massive tsunami swept across the northeast coast of Japan, reportedly reaching several miles inland and flooding hundreds of square miles of land -- including 42 municipalities in four prefectures (Heritage, 2011). With destruction and damage to roads, bridges, ports, railroads, buildings, and other infrastructure, as well as more than 28,000 people dead or missing, the full disaster caused by the earthquakes and tsunami affected more than two dozen prefectures with a population estimated at over 15 million. The Miyagi, Fukushima, Iwate, Yamagata, Ibaraki, Chiba, Akita, and Aomori prefectures were affected the most, and current estimates of the cost of destruction are between $122 billion and $305 billion -- between 2.2 percent and 4 percent of Japan’s GDP. More than a month after the disaster more than 130,000 people were still housed in more than 2,500 shelters (Heritage, 2011). In addition to this destruction and loss of life, facilities at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station were severely damaged in the disaster. Electrical power that supports plant operations was lost as a result of the earthquake’s damage to the electrical grid. Flooding resulting from the tsunami disabled generators that had powered the cooling systems in the reactors and the pools in which fuel rods were stored. The loss of coolant resulted in overheating, which caused the breech of the containment vessels and subsequently the release of radiation into the air, ground, and water, requiring officials to order mass evacuations of the local population. Some were ordered to shelter in place because of a lack of transportation and the risk of exposure to radiation (Heritage, 2011). The massive earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan, followed by the release of radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, together represent one of the greatest disasters to strike the nation of Japan in modern memory (Heritage, 2011). DEMOGRAPHICS & SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT The earthquake hit a highly populated area in terms of world standards but a lowly populated area of Japan with the exception of the Sendai area. Northern Japan has a combined population of 15.3 million and a Gross Regional Product (GRP) of approximately $527 billion. Hokkaido is Japan's northernmost island with a GRP of $197 billion (Global Trade, 2011). Northern prefectures comprise Japan's agricultural heartland, with dairy production and farming in Hokkaido and highly prized rice growing in Akita and Miyagi. Hokkaido leads Japan in production of sugar beets, kidney beans, potatoes, wheat, soybeans and many other agricultural products. Hokkaido residents, however, are not predominantly farmers with only 5.2 percent of 2.8 million jobs in farming. Hokkaido's economy mostly depends on services -- 71.3 percent of the workforce -- and construction -- 19 percent (Global Trade, 2011). Tourism is a major economic activity thanks to the region’s relatively unspoiled natural beauty. Hokkaido, in particular, is showing gains in its tourism industry with the total number of visitors increasing to 6.49 million people in 2007 (Global Trade, 2011). Northern Japan's well-developed infrastructure, highly skilled workers, and relatively low real estate costs, combined with municipal and regional government investment incentives, have prompted many international companies to view the region as an attractive location for investment and overseas operations. As for export opportunities, home building materials and interiors, packaged homes, sporting/outdoor goods and equipment, marine products, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment continue to be particularly promising sectors in northern Japan (Global Trade, 2011). Northern Japan's two main international airports -- Chitose (Sapporo) and Sendai -- have good passenger and cargo handling capacities and are eager to develop more international routes (Global Trade, 2011). ECONOMIC & HUMAN LOSSES The economic loss estimates from CATDAT varies largely. The loss of $100 billion to $500 billion estimate -- total, with 70% coming from tsunami --, was created after 70 minutes. These uncertainties came about because of the great uncertainties in modelling losses given certain intensities and the uncertainties in damage ratios and industries affected. In later versions, the economic losses from the tsunami reduced to around 57% vs. the earthquake at 43%. Historically in such events, 20-30% of direct economic loss was residential based, with ranging estimates from 25-55% in other forms of industry, infrastructure and commercial losses. Around 70% of the capital stock is inland as compared to around 30% of the capital stock on the coast in the provinces of Miyagi, Iwate, Fukushima and Ibaraki according to the Japanese Cabinet Office. Extrapolating the damage in other prefectures, the Japanese Cabinet Office estimate should be about $231 billion once adding $23 billion loss in other prefectures (Earthquake Report, 2011). From historical quakes and looking at business interruption, for a $280 billion direct economic loss from this earthquake, around $110 billion (2-yr) to $220 billion (5-yr) in extra indirect losses could be expected. Further analysis will be needed over the coming years (Earthquake Report, 2011). Historic tsunami deaths in the CATDAT Damaging Earthquakes Database from Japan include the 1498 Tokaido EQ (31,000), 1586 Tsubu EQ (8,000), 1707 Hoei EQ (5,000-32,000), 1771 Yaeyama (11,941), 1896 Meiji-Sanriku (22,066), 1923 Great Kanto (2,140), 1933 Sanriku EQ (3,002) (Earthquake Report, 2011). From the Tohoku tsunami, around 18,700 dead and missing were expected. There were 46,954 shaking-related deaths in the CATDAT Damaging Earthquakes Database from 1900-2010 before the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. Of these, most occurred in the 1923 Great Kanto EQ (28,560 shaking deaths), 1927 Tango EQ (3,110), 1943 Tottori EQ (1,325), 1945 Mikawa EQ (2,306), 1948 Fukui EQ (4,618) and 1995 Kobe EQ (4,823). From the Tohoku earthquake, the total shaking deaths are currently around 230. Ishinomaki City in Miyagi had the most fatalities with around 3,890 currently expected -- around 2.4% of the population. Otsuchi Town had the highest percentage of the population killed from any municipality -- 10.0%, 1,382 deaths. It is interesting to see that Minamisanriku -- where over 10,000 people were reported to be killed as a result of the tsunami in the first 24 hours -- has had less than 1,000 dead and missing (Earthquake Report, 2011). The peak number of homeless and people living in shelters is hard to calculate given incomplete data in the first few days. It was likely that a total of around 700,000 people were living outside of their homes on the 12thMarch. In Miyagi, for instance, the total in shelters was 320,885 on the 14th March. Around 400,000 people are expected to be homeless as a result of this earthquake. In addition, there was incomplete counting during this period. During the tsunami danger period, locations like Hokkaido, also had many people in tsunami shelters for a few hours after the event. A combination of these factors, mean that it will be impossible to know exactly what happened in the first 2-3 days (Earthquake Report, 2011). When looking at the total impact in Fukushima with the forced evacuations due to the nuclear plant, once all people were found and those who evacuated were counted, the total of the population who went to shelters and other prefectures was around 134,000 people of which around 90,000-110,000 were evacuees of the Fukushima plant disaster and between 24,000 and 44,000 were probably earthquake and tsunami impacted. Other influences may have included the gas, water and power outages, landslides and torrential rain that were also present. As of 30th September 2011, around 56,000 people were living outside the prefecture from Fukushima, and around 50,000 internally -- of which at least 42,000 are from the nuclear affected towns (Earthquake Report, 2011). PREPAREDNESS Japan is arguably the most disaster-aware nation in the world, and has spent several decades developing mitigation strategies for a variety of hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis. The area struck by this event is really where such studies began, and as a result, it represents the state of the art in readiness for earthquake and tsunami disasters (Geohazcop, 2011). The earthquake early warning system there is unparalleled. In place only since late 2007, the system effectively "outruns" the earthquake. Ideally, information about the shock is transmitted to people -- there are few populations as wired as Japan's -- even before the damaging earthquake waves arrive. At best, this system provides up to about 10 seconds of warning in affected regions, and of course works best farther from the epicenter (Geohazcop, 2011). The coastline of northern Japan is steep, rocky and deeply embayed. It's a rugged coast, where small fishing towns sit at the backs of bays since wave and tsunami energy focuses on them (Geohazcop, 2011). An 1896 tsunami killed over 10,000 people in these villages, in some cases eradicating entire towns. In part because of that event, Japan's northern coastline is perhaps the best protected area in the world against tsunamis. Ten-meter high walls defend many towns. Road signs mark the beginning and end of inundation areas determined as such by sophisticated computer simulations. Evacuation routes are well-signed, and vertical evacuation is available in areas distant from high ground. Green belts are designed to dissipate tsunami energy line most of the coast (Geohazcop, 2011). Around 35% of buildings in Hokkaido area were built pre-1980, around 55% from 1981-2000 and 10% post 2001. This means that around 65% has been built under major Japanese seismic codes and that the other 35% has been influenced in the past by seismic codes and earthquakes pre-war (Earthquake Report, 2011). RESPONSE Immediately after the disaster, the government established an emergency response team headed by the prime minister. Within a day, the Ministry of Defense ordered the deployment of all the available resources of the country’s military, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), which included 110,000 active and reserve troops. The government also dispatched nearly 28,000 members of the National Police Force and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency. In addition to “official” responders, the government organized and coordinated volunteer efforts, including the Japanese Red Cross, which serves as an auxiliary to the government for disaster relief. The Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan served as an overall coordinating body for over 300 organizations, including government offices, non-governmental agencies, and civil society organizations (Heritage, 2011). Other prompt actions included allocation of almost $50 billion for critical tasks, such as debris removal, temporary housing, and restoring infrastructure. Response was not perfect, though. Continued concerns included the shortage of fuel and lack of sanitary conditions at some of the temporary housing centers. In some cases the most vulnerable populations -- small children, the aged, the poor, and pets -- suffered disproportionately because of the difficulty in evacuating or reaching them, largely due to impassable roads, evacuations and housing centers where pets were prohibited, and a general reluctance by elderly populations to abandon their homes (Heritage, 2011). Another issue that contributed to the hardship of vulnerable populations was the Japanese style of leadership, which often requires consensus-building or adherence to established procedures. This appears to have been problematic in some cases that required on-the-spot decisions about evacuation orders and response activities (Heritage, 2011). In the aftermath of the disaster, the Japanese people demonstrated remarkable resilience and discipline with no reports of rioting or large-scale disruptions (Heritage, 2011). While municipal authorities have been inundated with volunteers, for the most part the government has avoided the problem of “convergence,” with citizens heeding government warnings not to rush to disaster scenes. The disciplined response did, however, also result in some shortfalls. In some coastal communities, residents were so confident in their response measures for tsunamis they had become complacent and were overwhelmed by the massive scale of destruction. Municipalities lacking the capacity to absorb volunteers found their existing ranks exhausted, meaning that while there were plenty of potential helpers, there was no one to lead or direct them. Thus, a large number of volunteers sat idle because they had received no call to action. Finally, because Japanese citizens were so well-prepared for known threats -- earthquakes and tsunamis --, they were incredibly unprepared for unforeseen disasters, such as the nuclear power plant’s release of low-dose radiation (Heritage, 2011). The government also employed a variety of mediums from traditional warning sirens to social media tools, such as Twitter. However, these warning systems and alerts were not perfect (Heritage, 2011). The government experienced difficulties in communicating in the aftermath of the crisis. As one observer noted, “the government has a tendency to want to have all the facts before making an announcement or a decision. Releasing information based on hunches or half-completed work can be seen as a failure to do a complete job. But in emergency cases, a timely decision based on some information, is better than a delayed decision with complete information.” The government’s inability to provide satisfactory information regarding the conditions at the Fukushima nuclear plant exacerbated fear and uncertainty among Japanese citizens (Heritage, 2011). In general, it appears that when the government relied on established systems and scripted warnings, it proved fairly efficient. On the other hand, when faced with uncertain and unanticipated incidents, such as responding to the situation at Fukushima, the government’s response was less effective. No aspect of the response by the Japanese government was more troubling than its inability to effectively communicate the risks associated with low-dose radiation exposure as a result of damage at the Fukushima nuclear plant. Information was at times understated, inaccurate, and incomplete (Heritage, 2011). Additionally, conflicting information came from Japanese ministries, TEPCO -- the utility operating the plant --, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S. Surgeon General, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Their assessment did more harm than good in terms of effectively communicating the risk of low-dose radiation to the public. Moreover, some analysts used the opportunity to comment on the disaster as an avenue by which to advocate for or against the efficacy of nuclear power rather than focus on providing effective risk communication. The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, which is maintained by the IAEA, also showed poor utility as a risk-communication tool. At one point, the Japanese government elevated the Fukushima plant to “seven,” the level of a major accident. This placed the station on par with the rating given to the 1986 Chernobyl reactor disaster, though the release of radiation at Fukushima was far less substantial (Heritage, 2011). Within a month of the earthquake and tsunami, Japan had received offers of assistance from at least 134 countries and 33 international organizations. In coordination with the government, Japan Platform -- an international emergency humanitarian aid organization -- and the Japan non-governmental organization Center for International Cooperation -- acting as part of the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Asia -- served as the key organizations coordinating support with international non-governmental organizations. Accepted offers ranged from 2,000 blankets from Ukraine to special search and rescue disaster response teams from several countries to extensive assistance provide by the U.S. military. The government of Japan also encouraged support in the form of financial donations through the Red Cross. For the most part, as assessment by an evaluation team from the U.N. Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concluded, “the country can both produce and procure relief supplies domestically and has the capacity to deliver those supplies to the affected population.” There were also, on the other hand, anecdotal reports of delays and confusion in delivering assistance, complications that may, in part, have been attributable to the rigid Japanese style of disaster management (Heritage, 2011). The disaster in Hokkaido had cascading effects across all of Japan. Overall, some 2.74 million households lost power after the earthquake. The loss of the Fukushima power plant delivered a double blow to disaster recovery. The response to the incident at the plant also complicated the overall response requiring evacuations, sheltering of evacuees, support for those sheltering in place, and disaster response assets that had to be dedicated to the incident. In the aftermath of the disaster, the Japanese government and TEPCO came under intense criticism for not ensuring that the facilities at Fukushima were adequately prepared for the disaster. In particular, they have been faulted for not ensuring that safety precautions at the plant had been upgraded to global industry standards and that adequate plans were not in place to protect the back power systems during flooding. Another problem which undoubtedly will increase the impacts of the disaster -- especially in economic terms -- was the lack of resilience in the supply chain. Multiple Japanese companies were forced to suspend operations, not just in areas hit by disaster, but in manufacturing plants around the globe. Companies such as Toyota and Sony were unable to get the parts they needed for production and were forced to simply shut down. This showed a lack of continuity and resilience in the supply chain that will have a cascading effect on consumers worldwide (Heritage, 2011). When the earthquake hit, the nuclear reactors in Fukushima automatically shutdown. When the tsunami arrived, it flooded the diesel generators, causing them to fail. When the diesel generators failed after the tsunami, the reactor operators switched to emergency battery power. The batteries were designed as one of the backup systems to provide power for cooling the core for 8 hours. After 8 hours, the batteries ran out, and the residual heat could not be carried away any more. Because cooling the core is a priority, the reactor has a number of independent and diverse cooling systems. Since the operators lost most of their cooling capabilities due to the loss of power, they had to use whatever cooling system capacity they had to get rid of as much heat as possible. Since the reactor’s cooling capability was limited, and the water inventory in the reactor was decreasing, engineers decided to inject sea water to ensure the rods remain covered with water (MIT NSE, 2011). RECONSTRUCTION & MITIGATION 85% of the Japanese people have no earthquake insurance or are not covered for the damages they’ve suffered (WFS, 2011). Thus, almost all of the tsunami survivors felt personally responsible for reconstruction. The job of fixing damaged structures fell upon the local community and the social welfare councils. They had to appeal to the government for financial support, but all the important decisions were supposed to be made at the local level. This, in part, explained why so many residents chose to stay in damaged housing despite the lack of water, heat, or electricity. Hence, despite the community was badly broken, reconstruction could start right after the disaster (WFS, 2011). The destruction was mostly concentrated in the narrow zone of 4-5 km along the coast. Linking and balancing hard -- infrastructure -- and soft -- education -- measures are important for risk reduction measures (Vervaek, 2011). Early warning system is effective only if it is properly perceived (Vervaek, 2011). Although there was an early warning issued immediately, people underestimated the height of the tsunami due to repeated occurrences of earthquakes, and a “feel safe” mis-perception prevailed. Although the evacuation advisory and evacuation order were issued, people took their own judgment. To enhance the immediate and proper decision of people, it is required to mention the expected height of the tsunami in the evacuation order and advisory. Also, during preparedness, it should be encouraged the dissemination of past experiences through storytelling to the school children from the old people (Vervaek, 2011). It is equally important that the government customized information sharing between the affected people. This could be done through need survey and providing need specific programs through radio. Finally, the protection of official buildings is necessary so that the government can start response and recovery works earlier. In terms of volunteer coordinator, this should be considered as a full-time specialized work, with access and knowledge to different mapping tools and social networking system. REFERENCES Doan, S et al. “An analysis of Twitter messages in the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake”, March 2011. Accessed on Jan 28, 2012. http://www.mendeley.com/research/analysis-twitter-messages-2011-tohoku-earthquake-1/ Earthquake Report. “Japan Tohoku earthquake and tsunami: CATDAT 41 report”, October, 2011. Accessed on Jan 28, 2011. http://earthquake-report.com/2011/10/02/japan-tohoku-earthquake-and-tsunami-catdat-41-report-october-2-2011/ Geohazcop. “Japan prepared well for tsunami”, December, 2011. Accessed on Feb 1, 2012. http://www.geohazcop.org/workshops/Sant_Feliu_2011/abstracts/discussion_session2.php Global Trade. “Political and Economic Environment in Japan”, September 2011. Accessed on Jan 27, 2012. http://www.globaltrade.net/f/business/text/Japan/Business-Environment-Political-and-Economic-Environment-in-Japan.html Heritage. “The great eastern Japan earthquake assessing disaster response and lessons for the US”, December, 2011. Accessed on Feb 2, 2012. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/the-great-eastern-japan-earthquake-assessing-disaster-response-and-lessons-for-the-us Japan Today. “IAEA seeks bigger crisis role in disasters like Fukushima accident”, July 2011. Accessed on 20, 2012. http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/iaea-chief-seeks-bigger-crisis-role MIT NSE. “Modified version of original post written by Josef Oehmen”, March, 2011. Accessed on Jan 25, 2012. http://mitnse.com/2011/03/13/modified-version-of-original-post/ MNT. "Twitter for Crisis Communication: Lessons Learnt from Japan's Tsunami Disaster", International Journal of Web Based Communities, 2011, in press. Accessed on Jan 28, 2012. http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/222619.php Smart Planet. “Fukushima ocean radiation could pose sleeper threat”, December 2011. http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/fukushima-ocean-radiation-could-pose-sleeper-threat/11042 The Diplomat. “New Leaders Forum”, March 2011. Accessed on Jan 26, 2012. http://the-diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/05/31/japans-crisis-and-the-sdf/ Vervaek, A. et al. “Impressive Early Survey Report on the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, Japan”, Earthquake report, April 2011. Accessed on Jan 28, 2012. http://earthquake-report.com/2011/04/12/impressive-early-survey-report-on-the-tohoku-earthquake-and-tsunami-japan/ WFS (Word Future Society). “Lost and Found in Japan”, December 2011. Accessed on January 29, 2012. http://www.wfs.org/node/2282 White Paper. “Land and Real Property 2006”. Accessed on Jan 25, 2012. http://tochi.mlit.go.jp/h18hakusho/ch1_se1/setsu_1-1_eng.html

Humanitarian Assistance: Evaluation

Evaluation measures performance, which depends on results -- numbers that show that a post situation is better or worse than the previous one. Evaluations, even though extremely necessary, are especially difficult to carry out in humanitarian assistance contexts. Humanitarian assistance requires the analysis of many variables that are frequently not clear about how outcomes should be interpreted. Evaluations have become more deeply ingrained in the humanitarian sector. However, the quality of the evaluations themselves still leaves much to be desired. The development of better evaluations is not just an end in itself: high-quality evaluations should have a positive effect on improving learning, accountability and performance in the sector (ALNAP, 2001). Measurement and analysis explore the benefits, dangers, and costs of humanitarian assistance impact. Scrutiny of how money is spent and management systems focusing on results help organizations demonstrate impact more clearly. However, the measurement of the impact of humanitarian interventions is increasingly difficult because there is i) lack of basic data, ii) relief interventions are often of short duration, iii) capacity and resources are stretched, iv) insecurity may limit access to populations, and v) the space for analysis and research is constrained. These difficulties and risks, however, do not mean that humanitarian assistance impact cannot be measured. Impact can still be analyzed and discussed through a combination of scientific tradition with participatory and analytical approaches. This complex analysis, though, should consider that attempts to measure impact encompass broader indirect and unintended consequences, and the concern for the impact of humanitarian aid should not be narrowly restricted to the project level since humanitarian assistance operates at system-wide levels (HPG, 2004). The complexity of humanitarian assistance assessments makes evaluation results become highly controversial. To reduce controversies, these assessments should narrow down their scopes by defining benchmarks that indicate to donors that the money allocated on humanitarian aid has been well spent. The combination of specific assessments with clear indicators lead to a scenario in which it is possible to monitor changes before, during, and after humanitarian aid takes place. These scenarios, however, are not meant to be definitive diagnosis of a current situation due to the inherent complexity that humanitarian assistance entails but help donors and aid receivers to have a better picture of what are the main lessons learned and best practices that can be replicated in other emergency situations. The goal of humanitarian assistance evaluation, after all, is not perfectness but optimum. References: ALNAP. “Evaluating International Humanitarian Action: Reflections from Practitioners”. Chapters 1 and 11. Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. Zed Books. Review ALNAP Evaluation and Training Resources, 2001. Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Overseas Development Institute, “Measuring the impact of Humanitarian aid: a review of current practice” HPG Report #17, 2004.

Humanitarian Assistance: Gender

Gender is one factor defining vulnerability. Women are more vulnerable during the disaster cycle because of their persistent lack of access to political participation, regular income, and land acquisition. Governments and communities that ignore these challenges to empower women increase their social and economic costs during extreme events. The equality between men and women is the platform to build resilient societies. Vulnerabilities to disaster are not equally distributed. Unsustainable global patterns of settlement, resource management, social organization, and political economy increasingly put some population groups more than others at risk from disaster. Exposure to environmental hazard and risk of catastrophic disaster, like other life chances, are shaped by overarching social structures of caste and class, race and ethnicity, age and physical ability, and sex and gender. Gender, especially, is a pervasive division affecting all societies, and it channels access to social and economic resources away from women and towards men. Women are often denied the vote, the right to inherit land, and generally have less control over income-earning opportunities and cash within their own households. Normally women access to resources -- vote, land, and income -- is inferior to that of men. Less access to resources, in the absence of other compensations to provide safe conditions, leads to increased vulnerability (Enarson, 2000). The challenge to address gender issues in the context of humanitarian assistance is that the appeal to “pay attention to gender issues” often falls on deaf ears and may seem irrelevant. “Paying attention to gender issues”, however, means recognizing the different needs, capacities and contributions of women, girls, boys and men (IASC, 2006). The defense for less vulnerability can come from an economic perspective. As societies are invariably linked and their parts function as a system, it is logical to affirm that whenever a portion of the collectivity is harmed, the totality is indirectly affected. The consequences of vulnerability for a society are usually translated into social disruptions and financial costs. The more political disagreements and development losses a locality encounters during extreme events, the more resources are devoted to vulnerable groups at the expense of other collective priorities. The right timing to reduce vulnerabilities -- and address gender issues, for instance -- is at the preparation stage of disasters as this is the period when decisions can be made reasonably. The responsibility to address vulnerability deriving from gender issues comes from the government. Elected officials represent the totality of the voters, and so are accountable for the welfare of their constituents. Governments, however, are guided by political and economic interests rather than humanitarian affairs. Therefore, vulnerable groups must coordinate and organize themselves in order to claim for resources and improvements in their living conditions so that they are better prepared to “bounce back” once a disaster hits. The solution to vulnerability depends on social mobilization. References: Enarson, E.; Morrow, B.“Toward Gendered Disaster Policy, Practice and Research.” In The Gendered Terrain of Disaster: Through Women’s Eyes, Elaine Enarson and Betty Hearn Morrow (editors). Praeger Publishers and the International Hurricane Center, Florida International University, 2000. Inter-agency Standing Committee, “Women, Girls, Boys and Men Different Needs – Equal Opportunities”. IASC, 2006.

Humanitarian Assistance: Conflict Zones

Humanitarian assistance needs to provide security, not be given security. If it is safety that an affected group needs, this is what humanitarian agencies should provide. This logic complies with the definition of humanitarian assistance based on independence, neutrality, and impartiality principles. Once humanitarian agents need security to provide aid, they are automatically picking a side to support. This situation just increases the threats faced by humanitarian groups. Bolletino defends security for humanitarian agents and argues that the main structural and procedural issues impeding more effective security management are i) lack of strategic thinking, ii) disconnection in decision-making, and iii) inadequate risk assessment tools. The solution seems to be the creation of a wide network that systematically collect and exchange anecdotal reporting on the field security environment. Humanitarian assistance is not effective even in the absence of such obstacles. Assuming that humanitarian agents can safely deliver aid, they are still the target of local groups since the provision of aid is always politically perceived. By choosing a group to support, humanitarian agencies show whom they favor in the aftermath of disastrous events. This situation only exacerbates rather than attenuates local inequalities. Security is not about guns but justice. Countries, regions, and cities become more secure if they are given the chance to politically and economically participate in the global market and decisions. If they are systematically excluded, their voices are constantly ignored and whenever a disaster strikes, there is a great lack of knowledge on the real causes of unexpected outcomes. Humanitarian assistance is about supporting a collectivity to protect themselves and by themselves before a disaster strikes. Reference: Bolletino, V. “Understanding the security management practices of humanitarian organizations”, Disasters, v. 32, i. 2, pp. 263-279, 2008.

Humanitarian Assistance: The Disaster Cycle -- Building Disaster Resilient Communities

“Humanitarian organizations are better in delivering life-saving assistance than in strengthening local capacity” (Smillie, 2001). This happens because “in the heat of each new crisis, the scramble to save lives often eclipses the goal of partnership with local institutions” and also because “patterns of relationships established during the relief phases of conflicts, many of them distressingly long-lived, are difficult to alter as reconstruction and development possibilities open up” (Smillie, 2001). The apparent solution to this address this challenge is “building local institutional capacity” (Smillie, 2001). The strengthening of institutional capacity happens during preparedness. In times of normalcy, a society functions smoothly. By carefully allocating resources and strategically conducting public interventions, a government promotes physical and social reconstructions under the concept of “building back stronger”. Time to design, analyze and implement alternative plans is crucial in the process of building resilient communities. Development should be the main goal of humanitarian assistance. Once international humanitarian organizations promote the welfare of vulnerable communities, a society improves its response system to the next crisis. International humanitarian agencies having long-term commitments with local agencies contribute to the efforts of local governments in mitigating the magnitude of cyclical crisis impacts. Development is organic. Local government and communities delineate the steps that a locality takes in the disaster cycle. Social needs are different in each disaster stage. By investing in long-term education, transferring expertise and technology, and promoting the exchange of best practices, international humanitarian agencies proactively address challenges encountered throughout the disaster cycle. Reference: Smillie, Ian. “Capacity Building and the Humanitarian Enterprise” Chapter 1 in Patronage or Partnership: local capacity building in humanitarian crises. Ian Smillie (editor). Kumarian Press, 2001.

Humanitarian Assistance: Building Cultural Competence in Disaster Preparedness and Response

Cultural sensitivity is an important aspect of humanitarian assistance. Efforts to understand local values, habits, and traditions undeniably contribute to the relief operations of international agencies. By “winning the hearts” of the affected population, aid agents not only develop a deep understanding of the context they are immersed in but are also able to provide an adequate treatment to the vulnerable groups. The difficulty of cultural sensitivity, however, is its delivery process and the dispute over who should coordinate it: international or local agencies. Marsella argues that quite often “good intentions go awry”. This happens because victims and service providers feature “constrasting cultural traditions” and invariably “must work with one another” after “the failure to grasp the significance of cultural differences in the provision of services.” The solution to this cultural shock is supposedly “the rendering of care” that “must be responsive to the cultural context of suffering.” Humanitarian workers by “showing sensitivity to the situational and historical dimensions of the disaster including racial, religious, socioeconomic, and political aspects” are able to offset the negative aspects that cultural contrasts create. Working in partnerships with local agencies could be an alternative to prevent undesirable cultural shocks. Local agencies have historical knowledge of local and regional conflicts and can assist affected populations respecting specific traditions and mannerisms. By working with local agencies and letting them be the first responders, international organizations avoid cultural misunderstandings and reduce operational costs since it requires fewer agents to be deployed to the affected location. However, this global-local partnership may not be playing out in accordance with the interests of the international agencies and local governments and are, as a result, frequently disregarded as a cultural effective and cost-reduction alternative. Humanitarian crises are market and political opportunities. International agencies and governments take advantage of crisis to urge for external funding and secure resources for staff’s payroll. In addition, there is no better opportunity to justify the importance of institutional existence and the need for further donations than dramatic situations where the media puts a vulnerable group in the spotlight so that the international community begins operating in its empathy mode. If international agencies are interested in extra funding for their expanded cadres, local governments tap into humanitarian crises to reinforce leadership positions and to be locally perceived as an essential player during crisis response. In this context where financial and political interests are fiercely disputed and placed above the genuine needs of humanitarian idealists, the expected outcomes for cultural shocks seem only to intensify. Reference Marsella, A.J.; Johnson, J.L.; Watson, P.; Gryczynski, J. (Eds.) “Ethnocultural Perspectives on Disaster and Trauma.” Foundations, Issues, and Applications Series, Springer Press, 2007.

Humanitarian Assistance: Hunger

Scholars usually relate food insecurity with poverty. As a solution for this complex issue, they frequently invoke the right of every human being for food and development and urge the international community to coordinate this complicated relationship worldwide. The assumption that “global governance” exists and has the means to end world hunger through policies addressing poverty issues deserves a careful analysis. International governmental organizations have long affirmed that “respect for human rights will help lift people out of poverty” (Oxfam, 2012). This belief is corroborated by the fact that many scholars state that “international governmental agencies are creations of nation states and act in their behalf” (Kent, 1994). Also, scholars not rarely quote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to argue that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family” (Kent, 2005). Nevertheless, the notion of global governance is disputable. International governmental organizations are indeed the result of nation-states agreements. However, it does not seem accurate to attribute to their executive boards and agencies the same legal status that federal governments enjoy since “there are not international agencies capable of calling national governments to account if their preparations are not adequate” (Kent, 2011). Poverty and food security are not directly related. Poverty is addressed by economic development and political reforms -- “questions that are not easily answered” (Sen, 1981). Food security, from international and technical perspectives, has to do with the distribution of surpluses -- exchange -- and the end of bargaining diplomacy -- ownership (Sen, 1981). Poverty is a long-term process that is inextricably linked to the management abilities of local public authorities. Food insecurity, however, could be addressed in the short term since the world food production generates surpluses continuously. The question is how regional and national surpluses flow into localities that urgently need to placate starvation. The second point is the use of food as a bargaining tool in the international arena. Countries restrict and promise access to food -- as well as their production tools and expertise -- as a last resort decision whenever the international community fails to come to a consensus on how to resolve a complex diplomatic issue. The most notorious contemporary examples are North Korea -- creating famine to discourage nuclear research -- and Iraq -- exchanging food for oil. In these cases, the international community is part of the foundation rather than the relief efforts of severe social situations. Therefore, task forces organized by international agencies “to provide robust and consistent support to countries struggling to cope with food insecurity” are not necessarily effective -- and genuine -- mechanisms to improve access to food and increase production (United Nations, 2008). Food security becomes a plausible objective once governments agree to stop using food as a pervasive instrument that affects mainly innocent civilians and invariably leave unscathed unscrupulous leaders. World hunger is indirectly and responsibly managed by government accountability and realistic interpretations of the driving forces guiding economic and political decision-making processes in international and national organizations. References: Kent, G. “The roles of international organizations in advancing nutrition rights.” Food Policy, 19(4), pp. 357-366, 1994. Kent, G. “Freedom from Want: the Human Right to Adequate Food”, Chapter 3, pp. 45 - 59. Georgetown University Press, 2005. Kent, G. “The Human Right to Disaster Mitigation and Relief,” Environmental Hazards, Vol. 3, pp. 137-138, 2001. Oxfam. “About us”, Accessed on March 4, 2012. http://www.oxfam.org/en/about Sen, A. “Poverty and Famines”, Oxford University Press, 1981. United Nations. “High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis”, Draft Framework for Action, Draft as of April, 2008.

Humanitarian Assistance: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The assessment of refugees’ related-issues must consider the organizational context and jurisdictional logic of humanitarian intervention. The actions and history of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) perfectly illustrate the complexities involved in the management of refugees and internally displaced persons. UNHCR was created after the WWII to provide assistance to civilians affected by the warfare in Europe. The interstate conflict indirectly displaced a great number of people who needed immediate access to shelter, food, and medical supplies. Today UNHCR no longer operates in European belligerent states but in nations that have been under systematic political turmoil and economic difficulty. The term “internally displaced persons” is emblematic about the new direction that this UN agency has geared towards over the past decades. As important as going over the historical context of UNHCR, it is also crucial to understand the legal process within the broad system of the United Nations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is another organization created in the wake of the WWII and its mandate has been to settle legal disputes and provide advisory opinions to states. ICJ’s activities, however, have been consistently hindered by the executive structure of the Security Council, which gives its permanent members the ability to veto the Court’s rulings. Therefore, the current scope of UNHCR -- as well as of other international refugee organizations -- has been predominantly concentrated on impoverished nations. This has happened not only because these states face a growing number of socioeconomic challenges but also because the heads of these countries lack political influence and diplomatic leverage to exchange favors and to find negotiable solutions to internal plights. The risk of having refugee agencies concentrating their efforts and resources exclusively in fragile political systems is the legitimization of a global decision-making model that prolongs every form of inequality. Humanitarians concerned about durable solutions should be aware of that and thus allocate their energy and limited resources to tackling deep-rooted causes rather than the spillover effects of asymmetric power distribution.

Humanitarian Assistance: The role of IGOs and IOs

This is a summary and a brief reflection on humanitarian assistance coordination efforts carried out by international government organizations and international organizations. According to the website of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the objective of this organization is to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA staff is supposed to do so by mobilizing and coordinating efforts, advocating rights, promoting preparedness, and facilitating sustainable solutions. In terms of budget, OCHA had US$ 242 million for its operations in 2011; however, 70% of this amount was directed to staff costs. Voluntary contributions from States and private donors comprise this budget. The total budget of OCHA represents 0.6% of UN regular budget. Since 2002, OCHA’s budget has quadrupled but allocation has remained the same -- geographically and within the organization. In addition to financial contributions, a pool of countries also offers political and technical support. Coordinating different stakeholders is the main challenge of OCHA. Donors usually earmark resources, aid agencies oftentimes are not concerned about the costs of coordination, host authorities operate under hidden agenda, and the public pressure for direct alleviation of suffering (Sommers, 2000). Other inherent challenges related to the coordination of humanitarian assistance are: reducing the weight of interpersonal relationships between international organizations’ decision-making processes, centralizing or decentralizing strategic decisions, channeling funding to NGOs, defining who creates and controls information, dealing with the assumption that UN agencies and international NGOs -- not donor and national governments -- should take the lead on coordination, resolving the dispute over funding, managing the power of donor, deciding on whether to marginalize or involve host governments, and creating a long-term reconstruction plan (Sommers, 2000). To address these challenges, it is required a type of command-and-control authority and the establishment of working relationships with national authorities (Sommers, 2000). A logical question to ask regarding OCHA’s operations is the relation between budget allocation and OCHA mission. Humanitarian assistants do need money to finance operations; however, it is argued whether budget should be reallocated from response to preparedness, whether most of budget actually reaches its clients, and whether political and technical support are more necessary than money during the disaster cycle. Other two issues that OCHA has to deal with are related to its ability and capacity to coordinate different interests so that humanitarian assistance is effectively delivered and to keep open the channels of communication with host governments during humanitarian crises. Assuming that humanitarian crises are expected to increase over the next decade due to climate change and intra- and inter-state political instability, OCHA staff and international organizations have to manage wisely their limited resources and develop a relationship with unstable governments. If OCHA finds itself not able to deliver long-term solutions to donors and host nations, the own existence of the organization becomes questionable. Reference Sommers, M. “The Dynamics of Coordination”. Occasional Paper #40. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, and the Humanitarianism and War Project, Tufts University, 2000.

Humanitarian Assistance: Who supplies the relief?

This is a summary on how the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) provides humanitarian assistance and a critique on the structure and methodology of this assistance considering political, economic, and planning aspects. USAID/OFDA provided a financial assistance of almost 400 million dollars to other nations -- mainly developing -- in forms of material, human and monetary contribution in 2003. In 2010, this figure tripled and reached the amount of 1.3 billion dollars. The mandate of this federal agency is mainly to help nations in crisis to immediately respond to disasters and recover. This consensual assistance takes place under three different departments: response and mitigation, logistics, and program support. Politics is inextricably linked to crisis response. Public authorities make decisions based on internal and external calculations whether to provide assistance or not to a disaster inflicted region. If the assessment is positive, assistance is approved and allocated. However, if it presents high strategic risks, a well-knitted speech justifies the political decision or the topic is deliberately ignored by the mainstream local media to avoid unnecessary damages from political and economic spill-over effects. USAID/OFDA, for instance, did not provide any help to Cubans, Somalians, North Koreans, or South Ossetians in 2003 and 2010 fiscal years because of underlying geopolitical interests -- or simply indifference. Economics also play a role in humanitarian assistance. Before a decision is made on the provision of humanitarian assistance, opportunity costs and cost-benefit analysis are considered by decision-makers. Even though humanitarian assistance might help a donor nation achieve its geopolitical objectives, donor nations also assess what are at stake by diverting taxpayers’ money to other regions of the globe. Also, in this -- self-interest, calculated benefit, cost-risk -- equation, donor nations take into account the actual return-on-investment and -- or should also consider -- the capacity of local governments to avoid predicted human and natural disasters for rapid and slow onset events. Planning is pivotal in humanitarian assistance. Decision and policy makers must acknowledge that by offering assistance during the preparedness phase of the disaster cycle, political risks and economic costs are largely reduced. Humanitarian assistance, therefore, should shift from response to preparedness since a donor country has more to gain politically and economically by partnering with local governments during the planning phase. In this scenario, local governments are in charge of providing assistance and coordinating first responders. By acknowledging that humanitarian assistance is not a perfect system, let alone an impartial and neutral activity, professionals acting in this area should grasp the political and economic contexts in which they are inserted in so that they also advocate a shift in the direction of humanitarian efforts from relief to preparedness. This shift would also greatly contribute to the subtle messages donor nations like the U.S. send across the globe when engaging in aid relief. The suspicion over humanitarian assistance as deriving from tacit interests would diminish by adopting transparent and pragmatic approaches to humanitarian assistance -- an activity not guided by the idealism of human rights but by the realpolitik of governments’ mutual cooperation. References OFDA Annual Report, 2003. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual_reports/pdf/AR2003.pdf USAID Disaster Assistance, 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual_reports/index.html