Understanding Natural Hazards: Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami

INTRODUCTION At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, an earthquake occurred 80 miles off the coast of Honshu -- Japan’s most populous island --, approximately 240 miles from Tokyo. The initial shock measured at a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale --- making it the fourth most intense quake in recorded history. The quake was followed by powerful aftershocks, the first of which occurring only 30 minutes later at a magnitude of 7.4. Following the quake, a massive tsunami swept across the northeast coast of Japan, reportedly reaching several miles inland and flooding hundreds of square miles of land -- including 42 municipalities in four prefectures (Heritage, 2011). With destruction and damage to roads, bridges, ports, railroads, buildings, and other infrastructure, as well as more than 28,000 people dead or missing, the full disaster caused by the earthquakes and tsunami affected more than two dozen prefectures with a population estimated at over 15 million. The Miyagi, Fukushima, Iwate, Yamagata, Ibaraki, Chiba, Akita, and Aomori prefectures were affected the most, and current estimates of the cost of destruction are between $122 billion and $305 billion -- between 2.2 percent and 4 percent of Japan’s GDP. More than a month after the disaster more than 130,000 people were still housed in more than 2,500 shelters (Heritage, 2011). In addition to this destruction and loss of life, facilities at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station were severely damaged in the disaster. Electrical power that supports plant operations was lost as a result of the earthquake’s damage to the electrical grid. Flooding resulting from the tsunami disabled generators that had powered the cooling systems in the reactors and the pools in which fuel rods were stored. The loss of coolant resulted in overheating, which caused the breech of the containment vessels and subsequently the release of radiation into the air, ground, and water, requiring officials to order mass evacuations of the local population. Some were ordered to shelter in place because of a lack of transportation and the risk of exposure to radiation (Heritage, 2011). The massive earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan, followed by the release of radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, together represent one of the greatest disasters to strike the nation of Japan in modern memory (Heritage, 2011). DEMOGRAPHICS & SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT The earthquake hit a highly populated area in terms of world standards but a lowly populated area of Japan with the exception of the Sendai area. Northern Japan has a combined population of 15.3 million and a Gross Regional Product (GRP) of approximately $527 billion. Hokkaido is Japan's northernmost island with a GRP of $197 billion (Global Trade, 2011). Northern prefectures comprise Japan's agricultural heartland, with dairy production and farming in Hokkaido and highly prized rice growing in Akita and Miyagi. Hokkaido leads Japan in production of sugar beets, kidney beans, potatoes, wheat, soybeans and many other agricultural products. Hokkaido residents, however, are not predominantly farmers with only 5.2 percent of 2.8 million jobs in farming. Hokkaido's economy mostly depends on services -- 71.3 percent of the workforce -- and construction -- 19 percent (Global Trade, 2011). Tourism is a major economic activity thanks to the region’s relatively unspoiled natural beauty. Hokkaido, in particular, is showing gains in its tourism industry with the total number of visitors increasing to 6.49 million people in 2007 (Global Trade, 2011). Northern Japan's well-developed infrastructure, highly skilled workers, and relatively low real estate costs, combined with municipal and regional government investment incentives, have prompted many international companies to view the region as an attractive location for investment and overseas operations. As for export opportunities, home building materials and interiors, packaged homes, sporting/outdoor goods and equipment, marine products, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment continue to be particularly promising sectors in northern Japan (Global Trade, 2011). Northern Japan's two main international airports -- Chitose (Sapporo) and Sendai -- have good passenger and cargo handling capacities and are eager to develop more international routes (Global Trade, 2011). ECONOMIC & HUMAN LOSSES The economic loss estimates from CATDAT varies largely. The loss of $100 billion to $500 billion estimate -- total, with 70% coming from tsunami --, was created after 70 minutes. These uncertainties came about because of the great uncertainties in modelling losses given certain intensities and the uncertainties in damage ratios and industries affected. In later versions, the economic losses from the tsunami reduced to around 57% vs. the earthquake at 43%. Historically in such events, 20-30% of direct economic loss was residential based, with ranging estimates from 25-55% in other forms of industry, infrastructure and commercial losses. Around 70% of the capital stock is inland as compared to around 30% of the capital stock on the coast in the provinces of Miyagi, Iwate, Fukushima and Ibaraki according to the Japanese Cabinet Office. Extrapolating the damage in other prefectures, the Japanese Cabinet Office estimate should be about $231 billion once adding $23 billion loss in other prefectures (Earthquake Report, 2011). From historical quakes and looking at business interruption, for a $280 billion direct economic loss from this earthquake, around $110 billion (2-yr) to $220 billion (5-yr) in extra indirect losses could be expected. Further analysis will be needed over the coming years (Earthquake Report, 2011). Historic tsunami deaths in the CATDAT Damaging Earthquakes Database from Japan include the 1498 Tokaido EQ (31,000), 1586 Tsubu EQ (8,000), 1707 Hoei EQ (5,000-32,000), 1771 Yaeyama (11,941), 1896 Meiji-Sanriku (22,066), 1923 Great Kanto (2,140), 1933 Sanriku EQ (3,002) (Earthquake Report, 2011). From the Tohoku tsunami, around 18,700 dead and missing were expected. There were 46,954 shaking-related deaths in the CATDAT Damaging Earthquakes Database from 1900-2010 before the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. Of these, most occurred in the 1923 Great Kanto EQ (28,560 shaking deaths), 1927 Tango EQ (3,110), 1943 Tottori EQ (1,325), 1945 Mikawa EQ (2,306), 1948 Fukui EQ (4,618) and 1995 Kobe EQ (4,823). From the Tohoku earthquake, the total shaking deaths are currently around 230. Ishinomaki City in Miyagi had the most fatalities with around 3,890 currently expected -- around 2.4% of the population. Otsuchi Town had the highest percentage of the population killed from any municipality -- 10.0%, 1,382 deaths. It is interesting to see that Minamisanriku -- where over 10,000 people were reported to be killed as a result of the tsunami in the first 24 hours -- has had less than 1,000 dead and missing (Earthquake Report, 2011). The peak number of homeless and people living in shelters is hard to calculate given incomplete data in the first few days. It was likely that a total of around 700,000 people were living outside of their homes on the 12thMarch. In Miyagi, for instance, the total in shelters was 320,885 on the 14th March. Around 400,000 people are expected to be homeless as a result of this earthquake. In addition, there was incomplete counting during this period. During the tsunami danger period, locations like Hokkaido, also had many people in tsunami shelters for a few hours after the event. A combination of these factors, mean that it will be impossible to know exactly what happened in the first 2-3 days (Earthquake Report, 2011). When looking at the total impact in Fukushima with the forced evacuations due to the nuclear plant, once all people were found and those who evacuated were counted, the total of the population who went to shelters and other prefectures was around 134,000 people of which around 90,000-110,000 were evacuees of the Fukushima plant disaster and between 24,000 and 44,000 were probably earthquake and tsunami impacted. Other influences may have included the gas, water and power outages, landslides and torrential rain that were also present. As of 30th September 2011, around 56,000 people were living outside the prefecture from Fukushima, and around 50,000 internally -- of which at least 42,000 are from the nuclear affected towns (Earthquake Report, 2011). PREPAREDNESS Japan is arguably the most disaster-aware nation in the world, and has spent several decades developing mitigation strategies for a variety of hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis. The area struck by this event is really where such studies began, and as a result, it represents the state of the art in readiness for earthquake and tsunami disasters (Geohazcop, 2011). The earthquake early warning system there is unparalleled. In place only since late 2007, the system effectively "outruns" the earthquake. Ideally, information about the shock is transmitted to people -- there are few populations as wired as Japan's -- even before the damaging earthquake waves arrive. At best, this system provides up to about 10 seconds of warning in affected regions, and of course works best farther from the epicenter (Geohazcop, 2011). The coastline of northern Japan is steep, rocky and deeply embayed. It's a rugged coast, where small fishing towns sit at the backs of bays since wave and tsunami energy focuses on them (Geohazcop, 2011). An 1896 tsunami killed over 10,000 people in these villages, in some cases eradicating entire towns. In part because of that event, Japan's northern coastline is perhaps the best protected area in the world against tsunamis. Ten-meter high walls defend many towns. Road signs mark the beginning and end of inundation areas determined as such by sophisticated computer simulations. Evacuation routes are well-signed, and vertical evacuation is available in areas distant from high ground. Green belts are designed to dissipate tsunami energy line most of the coast (Geohazcop, 2011). Around 35% of buildings in Hokkaido area were built pre-1980, around 55% from 1981-2000 and 10% post 2001. This means that around 65% has been built under major Japanese seismic codes and that the other 35% has been influenced in the past by seismic codes and earthquakes pre-war (Earthquake Report, 2011). RESPONSE Immediately after the disaster, the government established an emergency response team headed by the prime minister. Within a day, the Ministry of Defense ordered the deployment of all the available resources of the country’s military, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), which included 110,000 active and reserve troops. The government also dispatched nearly 28,000 members of the National Police Force and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency. In addition to “official” responders, the government organized and coordinated volunteer efforts, including the Japanese Red Cross, which serves as an auxiliary to the government for disaster relief. The Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan served as an overall coordinating body for over 300 organizations, including government offices, non-governmental agencies, and civil society organizations (Heritage, 2011). Other prompt actions included allocation of almost $50 billion for critical tasks, such as debris removal, temporary housing, and restoring infrastructure. Response was not perfect, though. Continued concerns included the shortage of fuel and lack of sanitary conditions at some of the temporary housing centers. In some cases the most vulnerable populations -- small children, the aged, the poor, and pets -- suffered disproportionately because of the difficulty in evacuating or reaching them, largely due to impassable roads, evacuations and housing centers where pets were prohibited, and a general reluctance by elderly populations to abandon their homes (Heritage, 2011). Another issue that contributed to the hardship of vulnerable populations was the Japanese style of leadership, which often requires consensus-building or adherence to established procedures. This appears to have been problematic in some cases that required on-the-spot decisions about evacuation orders and response activities (Heritage, 2011). In the aftermath of the disaster, the Japanese people demonstrated remarkable resilience and discipline with no reports of rioting or large-scale disruptions (Heritage, 2011). While municipal authorities have been inundated with volunteers, for the most part the government has avoided the problem of “convergence,” with citizens heeding government warnings not to rush to disaster scenes. The disciplined response did, however, also result in some shortfalls. In some coastal communities, residents were so confident in their response measures for tsunamis they had become complacent and were overwhelmed by the massive scale of destruction. Municipalities lacking the capacity to absorb volunteers found their existing ranks exhausted, meaning that while there were plenty of potential helpers, there was no one to lead or direct them. Thus, a large number of volunteers sat idle because they had received no call to action. Finally, because Japanese citizens were so well-prepared for known threats -- earthquakes and tsunamis --, they were incredibly unprepared for unforeseen disasters, such as the nuclear power plant’s release of low-dose radiation (Heritage, 2011). The government also employed a variety of mediums from traditional warning sirens to social media tools, such as Twitter. However, these warning systems and alerts were not perfect (Heritage, 2011). The government experienced difficulties in communicating in the aftermath of the crisis. As one observer noted, “the government has a tendency to want to have all the facts before making an announcement or a decision. Releasing information based on hunches or half-completed work can be seen as a failure to do a complete job. But in emergency cases, a timely decision based on some information, is better than a delayed decision with complete information.” The government’s inability to provide satisfactory information regarding the conditions at the Fukushima nuclear plant exacerbated fear and uncertainty among Japanese citizens (Heritage, 2011). In general, it appears that when the government relied on established systems and scripted warnings, it proved fairly efficient. On the other hand, when faced with uncertain and unanticipated incidents, such as responding to the situation at Fukushima, the government’s response was less effective. No aspect of the response by the Japanese government was more troubling than its inability to effectively communicate the risks associated with low-dose radiation exposure as a result of damage at the Fukushima nuclear plant. Information was at times understated, inaccurate, and incomplete (Heritage, 2011). Additionally, conflicting information came from Japanese ministries, TEPCO -- the utility operating the plant --, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S. Surgeon General, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Their assessment did more harm than good in terms of effectively communicating the risk of low-dose radiation to the public. Moreover, some analysts used the opportunity to comment on the disaster as an avenue by which to advocate for or against the efficacy of nuclear power rather than focus on providing effective risk communication. The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, which is maintained by the IAEA, also showed poor utility as a risk-communication tool. At one point, the Japanese government elevated the Fukushima plant to “seven,” the level of a major accident. This placed the station on par with the rating given to the 1986 Chernobyl reactor disaster, though the release of radiation at Fukushima was far less substantial (Heritage, 2011). Within a month of the earthquake and tsunami, Japan had received offers of assistance from at least 134 countries and 33 international organizations. In coordination with the government, Japan Platform -- an international emergency humanitarian aid organization -- and the Japan non-governmental organization Center for International Cooperation -- acting as part of the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Asia -- served as the key organizations coordinating support with international non-governmental organizations. Accepted offers ranged from 2,000 blankets from Ukraine to special search and rescue disaster response teams from several countries to extensive assistance provide by the U.S. military. The government of Japan also encouraged support in the form of financial donations through the Red Cross. For the most part, as assessment by an evaluation team from the U.N. Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concluded, “the country can both produce and procure relief supplies domestically and has the capacity to deliver those supplies to the affected population.” There were also, on the other hand, anecdotal reports of delays and confusion in delivering assistance, complications that may, in part, have been attributable to the rigid Japanese style of disaster management (Heritage, 2011). The disaster in Hokkaido had cascading effects across all of Japan. Overall, some 2.74 million households lost power after the earthquake. The loss of the Fukushima power plant delivered a double blow to disaster recovery. The response to the incident at the plant also complicated the overall response requiring evacuations, sheltering of evacuees, support for those sheltering in place, and disaster response assets that had to be dedicated to the incident. In the aftermath of the disaster, the Japanese government and TEPCO came under intense criticism for not ensuring that the facilities at Fukushima were adequately prepared for the disaster. In particular, they have been faulted for not ensuring that safety precautions at the plant had been upgraded to global industry standards and that adequate plans were not in place to protect the back power systems during flooding. Another problem which undoubtedly will increase the impacts of the disaster -- especially in economic terms -- was the lack of resilience in the supply chain. Multiple Japanese companies were forced to suspend operations, not just in areas hit by disaster, but in manufacturing plants around the globe. Companies such as Toyota and Sony were unable to get the parts they needed for production and were forced to simply shut down. This showed a lack of continuity and resilience in the supply chain that will have a cascading effect on consumers worldwide (Heritage, 2011). When the earthquake hit, the nuclear reactors in Fukushima automatically shutdown. When the tsunami arrived, it flooded the diesel generators, causing them to fail. When the diesel generators failed after the tsunami, the reactor operators switched to emergency battery power. The batteries were designed as one of the backup systems to provide power for cooling the core for 8 hours. After 8 hours, the batteries ran out, and the residual heat could not be carried away any more. Because cooling the core is a priority, the reactor has a number of independent and diverse cooling systems. Since the operators lost most of their cooling capabilities due to the loss of power, they had to use whatever cooling system capacity they had to get rid of as much heat as possible. Since the reactor’s cooling capability was limited, and the water inventory in the reactor was decreasing, engineers decided to inject sea water to ensure the rods remain covered with water (MIT NSE, 2011). RECONSTRUCTION & MITIGATION 85% of the Japanese people have no earthquake insurance or are not covered for the damages they’ve suffered (WFS, 2011). Thus, almost all of the tsunami survivors felt personally responsible for reconstruction. The job of fixing damaged structures fell upon the local community and the social welfare councils. They had to appeal to the government for financial support, but all the important decisions were supposed to be made at the local level. This, in part, explained why so many residents chose to stay in damaged housing despite the lack of water, heat, or electricity. Hence, despite the community was badly broken, reconstruction could start right after the disaster (WFS, 2011). The destruction was mostly concentrated in the narrow zone of 4-5 km along the coast. Linking and balancing hard -- infrastructure -- and soft -- education -- measures are important for risk reduction measures (Vervaek, 2011). Early warning system is effective only if it is properly perceived (Vervaek, 2011). Although there was an early warning issued immediately, people underestimated the height of the tsunami due to repeated occurrences of earthquakes, and a “feel safe” mis-perception prevailed. Although the evacuation advisory and evacuation order were issued, people took their own judgment. To enhance the immediate and proper decision of people, it is required to mention the expected height of the tsunami in the evacuation order and advisory. Also, during preparedness, it should be encouraged the dissemination of past experiences through storytelling to the school children from the old people (Vervaek, 2011). It is equally important that the government customized information sharing between the affected people. This could be done through need survey and providing need specific programs through radio. Finally, the protection of official buildings is necessary so that the government can start response and recovery works earlier. In terms of volunteer coordinator, this should be considered as a full-time specialized work, with access and knowledge to different mapping tools and social networking system. REFERENCES Doan, S et al. “An analysis of Twitter messages in the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake”, March 2011. Accessed on Jan 28, 2012. http://www.mendeley.com/research/analysis-twitter-messages-2011-tohoku-earthquake-1/ Earthquake Report. “Japan Tohoku earthquake and tsunami: CATDAT 41 report”, October, 2011. 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