Urban Environmental Problems: Water Use and Management

Water issues require physical and community planning. Physical planning has to do with the distribution and safety of the water system to the different type of users and usage through efficient and reliable methods. Community planning recognizes that water challenges differ from localities based on local customs and limited resources. The complexity of water issues require a balance between physical and community planning within local and regional contexts so that citizens have access and develop responsibility over the multiple uses of water. Gleick claims that “physical solutions continue to dominate traditional planning approaches”. However, he adds that “these solutions are facing increasing opposition”. New methods are being developed to meet the demands of growing populations without requiring major new construction or new-large scale water transfers from one region to another. “More and more water suppliers and planning agencies are beginning to explore efficiency improvements, implement options for managing demand, and relocating water among users to reduce projected gaps and meet future needs”. In addition, “the connections between water and food are receiving increasing attention as the concerns of food experts begin to encompass the realities of water availability”. These shifts, however, have not come easily. “They have met strong internal opposition. They are still not universally accepted, and they may not be permanent. Nevertheless, these changes represent a real shift in the way humans think about water use” (Gleick, 2000). The water crisis faced by the city of Guadalajara illustrates Gleick’s proposition. With the drying up of its main source of water, Lake Chapala, Mexico’s largest lake, it will cause far-reaching economic and ecological consequences for the extended region. In order to solve this issue, it is necessary to examine the underlying causes, which are centered on the inadequate and unsustainable management of the Lerma-Chapala river basin -- that extends over five states. Innovative approaches, although as yet insufficient, and institutional response towards integrated sustainable water management would promote a shift from centralized water management at the federal level to a multi-stakeholder and participative system based in river basins. The shift towards a decentralization of the decision-making processes will broaden social participation in these processes (Bertrab, 2003). Water issues must also include environmental planning. Postel poses the following question: “What is the ecological cost of appropriating this much additional water from natural systems?” Postel claims that using more rainfall for food production typically means clearing forests to make way for crops, while using more irrigation water means further straining rivers, lakes, and aquifers. Ad he adds that “more importantly, are there ways to satisfy human needs for water and food without sacrificing a dangerously high proportion of ecosystem services?” (Postel, 2005). In the context of increasing the transparency of water use and planning nationwide, the US Congress passed the Clean Water Act forty years ago to force polluters to disclose the toxins they dump into waterways and to give regulators the power to fine or jail offenders. Most states have passed pollution statutes of their own. However, in recent years, violations of the Clean Water Act have risen steadily across the nation. On Oahu, for instance, Sand Island WWTP has committed over three hundred effluent violations from 2004 to 2009 but no fine was ever imposed on this facility except for a formal enforcement in 2007 (New York Times, 2009). Community planning allows public participation and discretion. Stille highlights that, in India, for instance, Oswald and Mishra's Sankat Mochan Foundation are conducting a feasibility study for a waste-pond system at Varanasi. Even though about forty thousand traditional funerals are performed on the banks of the Ganges annually, the biggest source of pollution are the large sewage pipes that drain directly into the river. In order to stop this toxic effluent, the Indian government spent about a hundred and fifty million dollars building Western-style high-technology wastewater plants along the Ganges, but they are ill-suited to India, which is beset by power outages and monsoons. Therefore, the foundation has won the support of both the central and municipal governments. The final obstacle to building the ponds remains the state government of Uttar Pradesh (Stille, 1998). These papers advocate a decentralized water management system based on physical, community and environmental planning. These papers assume that the multiple uses of water is better discussed, distributed and allocated if they happen through community participation and ecological considerations. In order to agree on this approach, it is necessary to assess the technical, financial, and expertise of localities defending a decentralized method so that the complexity of water management is conducted accordingly and safely in the long term. References Bertrab, E. “Guadalajara’s Water Crisis and the Fate of Lake Chapala”, Environment and Urbanization, 15: 127, 2003. Gleick, P. “The Changing Water Paradigm”, International Water Resources Association, Water International, vl. 25, n. 1, pp 127-138, March 2000. New York Times. “Finding Water Polluters Near You”, Accessed on January 30, 2012. http://projects.nytimes.com/toxic-waters/polluters/hawaii Postel , S. “Liquid Assets: The Critical Need to Safeguard Freshwater Ecosystems”, Worldwatch Institute, 2005. Stille, A. “The Ganges’ Next Life”, New Yorker, January 19, 1998.

Urban Environmental Problems - Water

Privatization has achieved neither the scale nor the benefits anticipated. Sub-Saharan African countries have in general been unable to attract companies that are willing to invest in the region, as it is regarded as too risky (Why too risky? )(Isn’t it a governance problem, then?). Other reasons: First, contracts are short-term, non-investment management and lease contracts. Second, contracts drew up in US dollars to protect companies from local currency devaluation (It means that local governments should draw up contracts in their local currency? What if their economy is not economically stable and their currency is highly volatile impeding investors to safely plan and recoup investments? Isn’t it a macroeconomic issue rather than water?). Third, water utilities are commonly bundled with electricity in order to create more attractive commercial opportunities (This issue arises from the different uses of this resource. It is not the private company that sets the priorities on how to best use water but the local government stating the strategic economic, social, and environmental needs of the local communities). Fourth, multinational companies have stated that African countries do not represent attractive investments due to the very poor state of water utilities and because most consumers cannot afford tariffs that are high enough to generate adequate returns. (From a profit-driven perspective, this argument makes sense; however, local governments do not need to restrict their investment possibilities to companies interested solely in reaping benefits in the short-term. The main challenge of local governments with modest resources is writing contracts that allow companies to reduce investment risks by working under a contract that is enforced in the long-term and acts in accordance with local constraints to avoid social disruptions.) Budds, J; McGranahan, G. “Are the debates on water privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America”, Environment&Urbanization, vol. 15, no. 2, October 2003. This paper studies how ‘‘governance failure’’ affects urban water supply to poor households. The main reason for “governance failures” is the disincentives for utilities to connect poor households and for poor households to connect. The solution suggested is a reform of the networked water supply by monopolistic providers -- public or private. (This passage implies that providing incentives and breaking up monopolies would improve water supply systems. Therefore, the questions that arise are: What are the downsides of incentives (demand vs supply, equilibrium price, tax burden)? What are the benefits of monopolies (price influence, cost structure, scale, bulk buying -- costs down, R & D, wages)? What are the negative aspects of market competition over an essential basic need and a commodity that requires a large investment and scale to become profitable?) The concept of governance failure suggests that decision-making structures and related institutions may contain systematic biases against poor households despite pro-poor policies and the independent ownership status of the water supply network and management. (This passage implies that is not enough to hold a pro-poor policy rhetoric and that management independency does not necessarily translate into policies that benefit low-income families; thus, what is needed to poor policy rhetoric into action and ensure that management independency prioritize the basic needs of the poor?) State failure: 1. Rent-seeking (by officials), 2. Unincorporated externalities, 3. Poacher–game keeper problem (if both supplier and regulator are public), and 4. Regulatory capture (if supplier is private). (It is not clear) Market failure: 1. Imperfect competition, 2. Asymmetric information, 3. Unincorporated externalities, 4. Public good Governance failure: 1. Absence of consumer entitlements to basic services, 2. Political disenfranchisement (lack of ‘‘voice’’ on the part of poor households), 3. Culture of governance (elite-focused, top-down), 4. Economic disincentives for connecting poor households. Individual households may be subject to institutions, incentives, or other factors, which undermine their capability to connect to the water supply system: 1. Tenure system (lack of clear property rights), 2. Lack of skills (literacy) facilitating interaction with service provider, 3. Cultural beliefs (appropriate water treatment protocols), 4. Tariff structure (high connection fees) Why water utilities choose not to connect poor households? Reason: the rising block tariff structure creates a strong disincentive for the water supply utility to connect the poor Why poor households choose not to connect? Reason: connection fees; transaction costs; housing and residence status; security of water supply; and perceptions of water quality Bakker, K; Kooy, M; Shofiani, N; Martijn, E. “Governance Failure: Rethinking the Institutional Dimensions of Urban Water Supply to Poor Households”, World Development, vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 1891–1915, 2008 Neither centralized supply policies nor large-scale profit-making enterprises are able to meet the poor water and sanitation needs. The key to structural improvements in water and sanitation lies in the recognition of informal and “needs-driven” practices and their articulation to the formal system under new governance regimes. (What does the author mean by “recognition”? Once recognized, how to incorporate these practices in a formal system? At what social, political, environmental, economic cost?) The evidence shows that the options available to cover the deficit in basic services rarely rely exclusively on the extension of formal infrastructural networks but on more decentralized, more flexible forms of service provision. (By formalizing the informal, does the system lose its flexibility?) Municipalities are entrusted with the responsibility of formulating territorial and land use policies that seek a balance between individual property rights and collective social and environmental rights. (How to achieve this balance between individual, social and environmental balance? How long does it take how much does it cost to achieve this balance? Is balance forcibly the answer? What are the roles of central planning and market forces in finding the balance between the demand and supply of water?) Allen, A.; Dávila, J.; Hofmann, P. “The peri-urban water poor: citizens or consumers?”, Environment and Urbanization, vol. 18, pg 333, 2006. Bechtel raised water rates so high and so fast and the government magnified the street anger by sending out police to break the protest. (Questions: If a signed contract does not make any reference whatsoever regarding price hikes, can a private company not increase prices freely? Who should the residents of Cochabamba blame for, Bechtel or the local authorities who neglected the interests of their people? Is the role of the police not to guarantee the social order? What are the historic, regional, and cultural contexts of these revolts? Who would finance the foreign company profit? What are the social costs of financing this profit? Who would directly pay for this profit? How much political support had the Cochabamba local authorities from other Latin American leaders? Is this practice of tapping into external resources for capital investments in basic infrastructure restricted to Bolivia? If a location needs to build basic infrastructure but does not have the resources to do so, how should they act to ensure that this basic service is provided based on a win-win situation between the local population and the investor? Had the people of Cochabamba paid higher prices gradually and largely perceived better water and sanitation systems –I in addition to job creation and investments public health issues -- , would they have gone to the streets? Had the foreign company not been from the US, would the revolts have had the same outcomes?) Shultz, J. “The Cochabamba Water Revolt and Its Aftermath”