Urban Environmental Problems: Climate Change

This is a summary and a very brief reflection on assigned readings that deal with the complexity of climate change actions -- mitigation and adaptation planning-- at the institutional level. “Climate change appears to be inevitable” even if mitigation actions are effectively put forth (Quay, 2010). In this context, “planners should use forward-looking climate data” and “scenarios to anticipate the range of global climate changes” (Quay, 2010). To be effective in this endeavor, planners “must embrace new methods that explore uncertainty” (Quay, 2010). These methods for climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies should be “created at the local and regional levels” (Bedsworth & Hanak, 2010). However, the combination of “uncertainty and interdependency makes climate change a wicked problem” (Crane & Landis, 2010). In addition, “planners are relatively uninformed about whether and how particular climate change mitigation and adaptation responses are likely to work” (Crane & Landis, 2010). To manage uncertainty, planners use scenarios “to anticipate the range of global climate changes that may impact communities” and also science, network, and policies (Bedsworth & Hanak, 2010). As for climate change mitigation actions, planners should consider a cap-and-trade system from certifiable credits from forestland and tree planting and retention (Daniels, 2010). The success of these climate action plans depends on “the existence of local political will and leadership” (Basset & Shandas, 2010). The issue of how to deal with climate change and its effects is divided into mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation plans have to do with the efforts that reduce the emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) into the atmosphere. Adaptation plans cover initiatives that prepare a community -- resiliency and recovery -- to the inevitable slow and fast impacts deriving from expected environmental changes in temperature and precipitation. Mitigation plans are divided into the reduction and sequestration of carbon emissions. GHG mitigation plans depend on the joint effort of public and private sectors to provide regulatory enforcement and assist technological innovation to companies and consumers. By ensuring fair competition and providing incentives for research and development, governments and companies foster creativity and scale up best practices. The same partnership between public and private sectors is seen in the sequestration plans of GHG. As farmers and companies receive fiscal incentives to re-plant or keep forests standing, governments increase the number of green areas and create a market for GHG. As the impacts of climate change are increasingly felt, communities started investing in adaptation. Before a decision is made, however, decision makers use scenarios and data to assess the strategic investments needed for short-and long-term risks. The conceptual problem of scenarios is that they only include few variables of the actual reality and the issue with climate change data is that “forward-looking climate data” are uncertain and so, not as precise as past figures and analyses. In this uncertain context, the difficulty is deciding how much should be invested in resiliency considering economic and political risks and what is the “tipping point” for structural and social investments so that communities are able to respond and recover quickly and by themselves to fast and slow onset crisis. Another important issue related to climate adaptation plans is capacity building. The federal and state governments are responsible to provide training and technical assistance to mayors so that they are able to develop disaster risk reduction plans that meet the requirements and standards of national and international guidelines. The economic argument for this institutional investment is that the risks and costs of not adapting to climate changes are significantly higher -- economically and politically -- than the short-term costs of developing networks, state-of-the-art infrastructure, and regulatory systems. References Bassett, E.; Shandas, V. “Innovation and Climate Actions Planning”, Journal of American Planning Association, vl. 76, n. 4, 2010. Bedsworth, L.; Hanak, E. “Adaptation to Climate Change”, Journal of American Planning Association, vl. 76, n. 4, 2010. Crane, R.; Landis, J. “Planning for Climate Change: Assessing Progress and Challenges”, Journal of American Planning Association, vl. 76, n. 4, 2010. Daniels, T. “Integrating Forest Carbon Sequestration Into a Cap-and-Trade Program to Reduce Net CO2 Emissions”, Journal of the American Planning Association, vl. 76, n. 4, 2010. Quay, R. “Anticipatory Governance”, Journal of American Planning Association, vl. 76, n. 4, 2010.

Urban Environmental Problems: E-Waste

This is a summary on the growing issue of e-waste in developing and developed nations. The complexity of this topic is related to the increasing demand for electronic devices, their short life span, and the public health risks imposed by these appliances on local communities living along highly toxic material. Another difficulty in dealing with this issue is the challenge to enforce policies in a worldwide interconnected market. Identifying who is liable to the takeback, recycling or end-of-life processing of e-waste has generated some innovative ideas from private companies but also controversies over the costs and capacity to implement shifts in e-waste management. Heart warns that “e-waste is one of the fastest growing areas of the international waste stream and is increasing at a much higher rate than all other waste streams.” Along these lines, Kahhat affirms that “tons of e-waste were discarded, mainly in landfills, in the U.S. in 2005, and e-waste is projected to grow in the next few years.” Knudson points out that a large part of California’s e-waste is “flowing to developing nations, where it is picked apart by workers exposed to a high-tech cocktail of contamination.” The destination and management of e-waste become more complex in developing areas. Ray states that “the problems relating to mounting solid waste are fast acquiring gigantic proportions in the developing countries of Asia.” Nnorom explains that e-waste in developing countries “are either internally generated or imported illegally as ‘used’ goods in an attempt to bridge the so-called ‘digital divide’.” The possible solutions to e-waste range from transnational regulations to innovative financial mechanisms. Kahhat proposes a deposit paid by consumers at the time of purchase -- which would return to the consumer at the end-of-life product processing. Ray suggests international cooperation rather than trade in wastes. Heart looks at the input aspect of e-waste and pinpoints the need for designing a cleaner production, extending producer responsibility, and establishing standards and labeling. Nnorom also advocates the principle of extended producer responsibility. Saphores remembers that public education programs should target teenagers and younger adults to increase the number of people adhering to recycling programs. In Hawaii, government agencies and businesses have to dispose e-waste adequately; however, home electronics are exempted from this regulation. The solutions to e-waste should take into account the entire life cycle of the product: input, manufacturing, and output. In the input phase, the first great obstacle is to mandate electronic producers to incorporate recycled materials in the composition of its products. The second challenge is ensuring that toxic materials meet the safety standards of public health regulations. The third difficulty is fostering research and development of alternative materials so that electronics are safer, hold more value over time, and last longer. The feasibility of addressing these challenges must be analyzed in the context of a greater dependency of developing governments over multinational corporate capital. As for the production stage, it is necessary to comply with market-driven solutions based on competition, which means not increasing production costs. Thus, the production of electronics should be less focused on its economic aspect and more on the political issues of protecting the sanitary conditions of people working in assembly lines as well as the wellness of local communities. In addition, public authorities are responsible to assess whether the import of e-waste threatens local public health or help bridge the digital gap between rich and poor nations. Regarding output, financial mechanisms have become an incentive for companies to take back e-waste. It also indirectly reduces the amount of electronic waste in landfills. However, this output system heavily relies on management capacity, educational systems, and financial resources. As developed nations present enough capabilities, they can deal with the transactional costs of these innovative mechanisms; however, developing nations must find out alternative ways to address e-waste since they lack management and financial resources and their juridical systems are no able to effectively shift values from consumer to producer liability over e-waste. References eWaste. “What to do with your old electronics”, Department of Environmental Services, City & County of Honolulu, 2005. http://www.opala.org/solid_waste/eWaste.html Heart, S. “Sustainable Management of Electronic Waste (e-Waste)”, Clean, v. 35, i. 4, pp. 305-310, 2007. Kahhat, R. et al. “Exploring E-Waste Management Systems in the United States”, Resources, Conservation & Recycling, v. 52, pp. 955-964, 2008. Knudson, T. “E-waste goes overseas as recyclers comply with California ban”, Los Angeles Times, December, 2010. Nnorom, I.; Osibanjo, O. “Overview of electronic waste (e-waste) management practices and legislations, and their poor applications in the developing countries”, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, v. 52, pp. 843-858, 2008. Ray, A. “Waste Management in Developing Asia: Can Trade and Cooperation Help?”, The Journal of Environment & Development, v. 7, n. 1, pp. 3-25, 2008. Saphores, J. et al. “Household Willingness to Recycle Electronic Waste: An Application to California”, Environment and Behavior, v. 38, n. 2, pp. 183-208, 2008.

Urban Environmental Problems: Waste

This position paper synthesizes the main aspects of assigned papers dealing with waste management and argues that this topic requires a broad institutional and psychosocial approach to be successfully addressed. Waste management technically relates to employment, public health, and manufacturing costs. This relation is greatly exacerbated in developing countries. Wilson’s papers highlight that informal recycling industries are at risk by the privatization of public waste management companies. Cairo’s waste management system, studied by Fahmi, illustrates this conflict between informal and formal industries. In this context, Kallman claims that innovative techniques, technology and policies taking place especially in developed countries streamline waste management and turn it into a sustainable economic chain. As Herbert states, cities like Honolulu urgently needs to address its enormous garbage piles either through advanced technological practices or through controversial public policies. Kollikkathara argues that the solution to waste management depends on the combination of regulatory, scientific, and economic efforts. Along these lines, the Economist defends that private companies would help in this transition to resource management by adding profitable state-of-the-art technology to the waste management industry. Psychological and institutional approaches contribute to the debate on the next steps of waste management systems. From a psychosocial standpoint, the following critique assumes that someone involved in the manual labor within the waste industry continues to do so only because of lack of professional options (Moreno-Sánchez, 2010). Therefore, the argument that technology jeopardizes jobs within the waste industry is objected by the fact that trash pickers would rather -- in very general terms -- look for positions enjoying better social status than picking recycling items in landfills or on the streets. I have had the opportunity to visit few landfills in developing countries and have also talked to people who make a living under extremely unhealthy conditions. Not surprisingly, I have never come across someone claiming against the mechanization of waste management as an autocratic process that unscrupulously steals jobs. What I have frequently heard from garbage pickers -- or the ones running behind trucks -- is that, within their communities, there is a lack of educational opportunities for formal instruction and a limited number of socially recognized positions and formal jobs in the local economy, including the waste management industry itself (Kungskulniti, 1991). In the internationally-awarded movie “Waste Land” one of the pickers precisely summarizes what is a life of sorting out filthy garbage: “This is no future” (Walker, 2010). As for institutional mechanisms regarding waste management, the discussion should not be restricted to regional debates over landfill locations and other technical aspects on how to get growing trash piles out of one’s sight. Also, recycling and closed-loop systems are definitely positive efforts towards minimizing the negative impacts of waste; however, they do not address the issue thoroughly (Davila, 2005). Waste management is about unconscious consumerism and deregulated economic chains (Henn, 1993). Public authorities committed to reduce the impact of waste on public health and turn it into a market opportunity for taxpayers must seriously consider taxation and the enforcement of regulatory mechanisms to change institutional and, as a consequence, individual consumption habits (Pearce, 2003). The taxation principle is straightforward: the more you pollute, the more you pay or the less you pollute, the more incentives you are subjected to receive. The challenge presented by this waste management model lies mainly in amassing political will for the promotion of structural and cultural changes (Conrad, 1999). Developing and developed countries are in different economic stages in terms of waste management. Overall, developed areas have been discussing more passionately about sustainable practices whereas developing regions are still trying to catch up with the material comfort enjoyed in rich regions (Cohen, 2005). Even though these two general groups present diametrical concerns, it is possible to find common ground on long-term practices towards waste management. Elementary education is the realm where rich and poor societies tend to agree (Palmer, 1995). By educating the next generation on sustainable practices, educators are not only shaping the behavior of future consumers but also instilling sustainable values and making well-founded changes within family units since children’s welfare is a crucial decision factor for parents’ rational decisions (Ballantyne, 2010). While rich schools have systematically added sustainability in their curriculum, schools featuring less resource have encouraged their students to engage in the local community efforts that reduce waste and create wealth (Uzzell, 2006). Therefore, there is no clear dichotomy between waste management and technology neither in developing nor in rich countries. The argument of this position paper is that, in addition to technical solutions to waste management issues, this relation will only be effectively addressed if considered from a broad perspective in which employment, public health, and manufacturing tangible and intangible costs are analyzed through the lenses of personal wills, regulatory systems, and educational policies. References Ballantyne, R. “School Environmental Education Programme Impacts upon Students and Family Learning: a case study analysis”, Environmental Education Research, v. 7, i. 1, pp. 23-37, 2010. Cohen, B. “Urbanization in developing countries: current trends, future projections, and key challenges for sustainability”, Technology in Society, v. 28, i. 1-2, pp. 63-80, 2006. Conrad, K. “Resource and waste taxation in the theory of the firm with recycling activities”, Environmental and Resources Economics, v. 14, n. pp. 217-242, 1999. Davila, E.; Chang, N. “Sustainable pattern analysis of a publicly owned material recovery facility in a fast-growing urban setting under uncertainty”, Journal of Environmental Management, v. 75, i. 4, pp. 337-351, 2005. Fahmi, W; Sutton, K. “Cairo’s Contested Garbage: Sustainable Solid Waste Management and the Zabaleen’s Right to the City”, Sustainability, 2, 1765-1783, 2010. Henn, C. “The new economics of life cycle thinking”, Eletronics and the Environment, pp. 184-188, 1993. Herbert, A. “Honolulu Waste Problem”, The Huffington Post, Aug 24th, 2010. Kallman, M. “Talking Trash”, World Resources Institute. Kollikkathara, N. “A purview of waste management evolution: Special Emphasis on USA”, Waste Management, vol. 29, pp. 974-985, Montclair, 2009. Kungskulniti, N. et al. “Solid waste scavenger community: an investigation in Bangkok, Thailand”, Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health, v. 5, n. 1, pp. 54-65, 1991. Moreno-Sánchez, R.; Maldonado, J. “Surviving from garbage: the role of informal waste-pickers in a dynamic model of solid waste management in developing countries”, Environment and Development Economics, 11, 371-391, 2010. Palmer, J. “Environmental thinking in the early years: understanding and misunderstanding of concepts related to waste management”, Environmental Education Research, v. 1, i. 1, pp. 35-45, 1995. Pearce, D.; Turner, R. “Market-based approaches to solid waste management”, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, v. 8, i. 1-2, pp. 63-90, 1993. The Economist. “Turning garbage into gas”, Feb 3rd, 2011. Uzzell, D. “Education for environmental action in the community: new roles and relationships”, Cambridge Journal of Education, v. 29, i. 3, pp. 397-413, 1999. Walker, L. “Waste Land”, Almega Projects & O2 Filmes Production, 2010. Wilson, D. “Development Drivers for Waster Management”, Waste Management, vol. 25, pp. 198-207, London, 2007. Wilson, D. et al. “Role of Informal Sector Recycling in Waste Management in Developing Countries”, Habitat International, vol. 30, pp. 797-808, London, 2006.

Urban Environmental Problems: Water Use and Management

Water issues require physical and community planning. Physical planning has to do with the distribution and safety of the water system to the different type of users and usage through efficient and reliable methods. Community planning recognizes that water challenges differ from localities based on local customs and limited resources. The complexity of water issues require a balance between physical and community planning within local and regional contexts so that citizens have access and develop responsibility over the multiple uses of water. Gleick claims that “physical solutions continue to dominate traditional planning approaches”. However, he adds that “these solutions are facing increasing opposition”. New methods are being developed to meet the demands of growing populations without requiring major new construction or new-large scale water transfers from one region to another. “More and more water suppliers and planning agencies are beginning to explore efficiency improvements, implement options for managing demand, and relocating water among users to reduce projected gaps and meet future needs”. In addition, “the connections between water and food are receiving increasing attention as the concerns of food experts begin to encompass the realities of water availability”. These shifts, however, have not come easily. “They have met strong internal opposition. They are still not universally accepted, and they may not be permanent. Nevertheless, these changes represent a real shift in the way humans think about water use” (Gleick, 2000). The water crisis faced by the city of Guadalajara illustrates Gleick’s proposition. With the drying up of its main source of water, Lake Chapala, Mexico’s largest lake, it will cause far-reaching economic and ecological consequences for the extended region. In order to solve this issue, it is necessary to examine the underlying causes, which are centered on the inadequate and unsustainable management of the Lerma-Chapala river basin -- that extends over five states. Innovative approaches, although as yet insufficient, and institutional response towards integrated sustainable water management would promote a shift from centralized water management at the federal level to a multi-stakeholder and participative system based in river basins. The shift towards a decentralization of the decision-making processes will broaden social participation in these processes (Bertrab, 2003). Water issues must also include environmental planning. Postel poses the following question: “What is the ecological cost of appropriating this much additional water from natural systems?” Postel claims that using more rainfall for food production typically means clearing forests to make way for crops, while using more irrigation water means further straining rivers, lakes, and aquifers. Ad he adds that “more importantly, are there ways to satisfy human needs for water and food without sacrificing a dangerously high proportion of ecosystem services?” (Postel, 2005). In the context of increasing the transparency of water use and planning nationwide, the US Congress passed the Clean Water Act forty years ago to force polluters to disclose the toxins they dump into waterways and to give regulators the power to fine or jail offenders. Most states have passed pollution statutes of their own. However, in recent years, violations of the Clean Water Act have risen steadily across the nation. On Oahu, for instance, Sand Island WWTP has committed over three hundred effluent violations from 2004 to 2009 but no fine was ever imposed on this facility except for a formal enforcement in 2007 (New York Times, 2009). Community planning allows public participation and discretion. Stille highlights that, in India, for instance, Oswald and Mishra's Sankat Mochan Foundation are conducting a feasibility study for a waste-pond system at Varanasi. Even though about forty thousand traditional funerals are performed on the banks of the Ganges annually, the biggest source of pollution are the large sewage pipes that drain directly into the river. In order to stop this toxic effluent, the Indian government spent about a hundred and fifty million dollars building Western-style high-technology wastewater plants along the Ganges, but they are ill-suited to India, which is beset by power outages and monsoons. Therefore, the foundation has won the support of both the central and municipal governments. The final obstacle to building the ponds remains the state government of Uttar Pradesh (Stille, 1998). These papers advocate a decentralized water management system based on physical, community and environmental planning. These papers assume that the multiple uses of water is better discussed, distributed and allocated if they happen through community participation and ecological considerations. In order to agree on this approach, it is necessary to assess the technical, financial, and expertise of localities defending a decentralized method so that the complexity of water management is conducted accordingly and safely in the long term. References Bertrab, E. “Guadalajara’s Water Crisis and the Fate of Lake Chapala”, Environment and Urbanization, 15: 127, 2003. Gleick, P. “The Changing Water Paradigm”, International Water Resources Association, Water International, vl. 25, n. 1, pp 127-138, March 2000. New York Times. “Finding Water Polluters Near You”, Accessed on January 30, 2012. http://projects.nytimes.com/toxic-waters/polluters/hawaii Postel , S. “Liquid Assets: The Critical Need to Safeguard Freshwater Ecosystems”, Worldwatch Institute, 2005. Stille, A. “The Ganges’ Next Life”, New Yorker, January 19, 1998.

Urban Environmental Problems - Water

Privatization has achieved neither the scale nor the benefits anticipated. Sub-Saharan African countries have in general been unable to attract companies that are willing to invest in the region, as it is regarded as too risky (Why too risky? )(Isn’t it a governance problem, then?). Other reasons: First, contracts are short-term, non-investment management and lease contracts. Second, contracts drew up in US dollars to protect companies from local currency devaluation (It means that local governments should draw up contracts in their local currency? What if their economy is not economically stable and their currency is highly volatile impeding investors to safely plan and recoup investments? Isn’t it a macroeconomic issue rather than water?). Third, water utilities are commonly bundled with electricity in order to create more attractive commercial opportunities (This issue arises from the different uses of this resource. It is not the private company that sets the priorities on how to best use water but the local government stating the strategic economic, social, and environmental needs of the local communities). Fourth, multinational companies have stated that African countries do not represent attractive investments due to the very poor state of water utilities and because most consumers cannot afford tariffs that are high enough to generate adequate returns. (From a profit-driven perspective, this argument makes sense; however, local governments do not need to restrict their investment possibilities to companies interested solely in reaping benefits in the short-term. The main challenge of local governments with modest resources is writing contracts that allow companies to reduce investment risks by working under a contract that is enforced in the long-term and acts in accordance with local constraints to avoid social disruptions.) Budds, J; McGranahan, G. “Are the debates on water privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America”, Environment&Urbanization, vol. 15, no. 2, October 2003. This paper studies how ‘‘governance failure’’ affects urban water supply to poor households. The main reason for “governance failures” is the disincentives for utilities to connect poor households and for poor households to connect. The solution suggested is a reform of the networked water supply by monopolistic providers -- public or private. (This passage implies that providing incentives and breaking up monopolies would improve water supply systems. Therefore, the questions that arise are: What are the downsides of incentives (demand vs supply, equilibrium price, tax burden)? What are the benefits of monopolies (price influence, cost structure, scale, bulk buying -- costs down, R & D, wages)? What are the negative aspects of market competition over an essential basic need and a commodity that requires a large investment and scale to become profitable?) The concept of governance failure suggests that decision-making structures and related institutions may contain systematic biases against poor households despite pro-poor policies and the independent ownership status of the water supply network and management. (This passage implies that is not enough to hold a pro-poor policy rhetoric and that management independency does not necessarily translate into policies that benefit low-income families; thus, what is needed to poor policy rhetoric into action and ensure that management independency prioritize the basic needs of the poor?) State failure: 1. Rent-seeking (by officials), 2. Unincorporated externalities, 3. Poacher–game keeper problem (if both supplier and regulator are public), and 4. Regulatory capture (if supplier is private). (It is not clear) Market failure: 1. Imperfect competition, 2. Asymmetric information, 3. Unincorporated externalities, 4. Public good Governance failure: 1. Absence of consumer entitlements to basic services, 2. Political disenfranchisement (lack of ‘‘voice’’ on the part of poor households), 3. Culture of governance (elite-focused, top-down), 4. Economic disincentives for connecting poor households. Individual households may be subject to institutions, incentives, or other factors, which undermine their capability to connect to the water supply system: 1. Tenure system (lack of clear property rights), 2. Lack of skills (literacy) facilitating interaction with service provider, 3. Cultural beliefs (appropriate water treatment protocols), 4. Tariff structure (high connection fees) Why water utilities choose not to connect poor households? Reason: the rising block tariff structure creates a strong disincentive for the water supply utility to connect the poor Why poor households choose not to connect? Reason: connection fees; transaction costs; housing and residence status; security of water supply; and perceptions of water quality Bakker, K; Kooy, M; Shofiani, N; Martijn, E. “Governance Failure: Rethinking the Institutional Dimensions of Urban Water Supply to Poor Households”, World Development, vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 1891–1915, 2008 Neither centralized supply policies nor large-scale profit-making enterprises are able to meet the poor water and sanitation needs. The key to structural improvements in water and sanitation lies in the recognition of informal and “needs-driven” practices and their articulation to the formal system under new governance regimes. (What does the author mean by “recognition”? Once recognized, how to incorporate these practices in a formal system? At what social, political, environmental, economic cost?) The evidence shows that the options available to cover the deficit in basic services rarely rely exclusively on the extension of formal infrastructural networks but on more decentralized, more flexible forms of service provision. (By formalizing the informal, does the system lose its flexibility?) Municipalities are entrusted with the responsibility of formulating territorial and land use policies that seek a balance between individual property rights and collective social and environmental rights. (How to achieve this balance between individual, social and environmental balance? How long does it take how much does it cost to achieve this balance? Is balance forcibly the answer? What are the roles of central planning and market forces in finding the balance between the demand and supply of water?) Allen, A.; Dávila, J.; Hofmann, P. “The peri-urban water poor: citizens or consumers?”, Environment and Urbanization, vol. 18, pg 333, 2006. Bechtel raised water rates so high and so fast and the government magnified the street anger by sending out police to break the protest. (Questions: If a signed contract does not make any reference whatsoever regarding price hikes, can a private company not increase prices freely? Who should the residents of Cochabamba blame for, Bechtel or the local authorities who neglected the interests of their people? Is the role of the police not to guarantee the social order? What are the historic, regional, and cultural contexts of these revolts? Who would finance the foreign company profit? What are the social costs of financing this profit? Who would directly pay for this profit? How much political support had the Cochabamba local authorities from other Latin American leaders? Is this practice of tapping into external resources for capital investments in basic infrastructure restricted to Bolivia? If a location needs to build basic infrastructure but does not have the resources to do so, how should they act to ensure that this basic service is provided based on a win-win situation between the local population and the investor? Had the people of Cochabamba paid higher prices gradually and largely perceived better water and sanitation systems –I in addition to job creation and investments public health issues -- , would they have gone to the streets? Had the foreign company not been from the US, would the revolts have had the same outcomes?) Shultz, J. “The Cochabamba Water Revolt and Its Aftermath”

Carbon Tax in Australia

And this is an interesting study on carbon tax in Australia. A country that has recently approved a 23 Australian dollars charge per carbon ton on the top 500 polluters starting from July 2012. This tax study concludes that, in the short term, the tax burden will be unequally distributed and low-income families will carry a relatively higher burden.

http://www.une.edu.au/bepp/working-papers/economics/econwp11-2.pdf

Climate Change Video

Do not miss this video presented by Prof Stephen Schneider. What I took away from this 11-minute video is to watch "value judgments" and be careful with unknowns like "tipping points".

http://blogs.agu.org/wildwildscience/2012/01/01/take-11-minutes-and-watch-this-video/