Climate Change and Food Security in Brazil

Climate change directly impacts food security. The objective of this paper is to identify institutional mechanisms that address climate change as well as availability and access to essential crops. The scope is the North and the Northeast of Brazil, since these are the macro-regions most vulnerable to the effects of climate change in this country, whose institutional mechanisms has been internationally recognized as effective tools to tackle food issues in the face of climate change.

This paper is divided into four parts. The first establishes the relation between climate change and food security in general terms. The second narrows down the topic to Brazil’s context. The third deals with regional policies addressing food security in the North of Brazil, especially in the Amazon region. The fourth explains how the poorest part of this country, the Northeast, has addressed the effects of climate change from an institutional standpoint.

First Part - Climate Change and Food Security

Changes in climate are expected to bring greater levels of climate variability and to worsen the social and economic stresses that the world’s poor live with (Tompkins, 2008). The growing amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere has melted polar ice caps, shifted rainfall patterns, accelerated desertification and droughts, and increased the number of diseases (Domingues, 2008). Defining these uncertainties is extremely important in the process of designing food security policies.

Food security is “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Chakraborty, 2011). Even though an increasing number of carbon dioxide emissions increases crop biomass and grain yield in the short term -- causing a phenomenon known as “the fertilization effect”, especially in subtropical areas -- there is emerging evidence and current observations of reduced grain yield from high-temperature and water limitations in tropical areas, making a wholesale increase in the long term unlikely (Chakraborty, 2011). Also, the impacts of plant diseases likely minimize or reverse any benefit from the carbon dioxide fertilization effect. Nevertheless, grain production has doubled over the last forty years as a consequence of changes in plant protection and other agricultural technology, including a 15-20-fold increase in pesticide worldwide (Chakraborty, 2011). Despite this, the overall proportion of crop losses has increased during this period and an excessive use of insecticides has increased pest outbreaks and losses in croplands. As farmers respond to challenges of securing sufficient, safe and nutritious food for the ever-expanding human population under changing climate, pesticide usage is expected to increase (Chakraborty, 2011).

Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 1.02 billion people went hungry in 2009 -- the highest ever level of world hunger. The constraints on food security are declining investment in agriculture, land degradation, urban expansion, conversion of crops and croplands into non-food production. These constraints are expected to reduce the total global cropping area in 8-20% by 2050 (Chakraborty, 2011). In addition to pesticides and cropland, commodities’ prices have been greatly affected by climate change. Commodities’ prices are defined by intersectoral relationships between oil production, financial markets, Asian countries’ demand, and the increased production of biodiesel (Wilkinson, 2010). In this context, the International Food Policy Research (IFPRI) has conducted a study on different climate models and results showed a general decrease in the growth rate of agribusiness production. If these numbers prove to be right, developing countries will be the most affected, especially in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Abramovay, 2010).

Countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have designed national policies related to food security to offset the losses of crop production, especially due to climate change (Pretty, 2003). In Uganda, India, and Brazil, for example, food security policies are expected to sustain economic growth with sustainable demand and stability; improve income distribution and quality of life; restrain inflation; promote sustainable expansion of internal market; invest in education; provide sanitary conditions; reduce public deficits; and redefine the role of the state (Zibetti, 2002; Pretty, 2003). Specifically, it is necessary agrarian and land reforms as well as agro-industrial, scientific, and technological policies at the regional and national levels (Zibetti, 2002).

The capacity to adapt to climate change relies on wealth, technology, education, information, capacity, infrastructure, resource accessibility, and management. Adaptation policies are necessary to avoid species migration and the extinction of fauna and flora, which leads to priceless losses of genetic patrimony. The contemporary society also needs to adapt to shifts on sea currents affecting entire food chains in the oceans, and the strengthening of parasites resulting in the diminishment of species (Conrado, 2000). Climate change also modifies soils, depletes and salinizes portable water, and forces millions of people to live in and flee from disaster-prone areas. The factors that intensify vulnerability to climate-related catastrophes are a combination of population growth, poverty, and environmental degradation. A possible solution is creating impact indicators and natural monitoring systems over tree blossom and seed production. Indicators like these ones alert planners about the risks, costs, and necessary planning to tackle climate change accordingly. In the agriculture sector, it is necessary to improve the eco-efficiency of cultures, promote adequate soil management, prioritize native seeds, incentivize agro-ecology, reduce the number of mono crops, and invest in the formation of rural leaders (Conrado, 2000). Water scarcity also poses a formidable challenge to increase food production by 50% to meet the projected demand of the world’s population by 2050 (Chakraborty, 2011). Climate change, therefore, will make conditions even more difficult by increasing the uncertainty over the availability of water for irrigation and the risk -- magnitude, extent, and frequency -- of other hazards over food security, especially in developing countries.

Second Part – Food Security in Brazil

Context

Climate change directly impacts food security in Brazil. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that climate change has caused the following impacts: desertification in the Amazon, biodiversity loss, water scarcity, agriculture and cattle-raising losses, and crop deployment (Domingues, 2008). FAO and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released in 2005 three reports on the projections over world agricultural production. This study points out Brazil as a major global player in agribusiness by 2016. In 2005, Brazil became the third largest exporter of food just behind the United States and Canada (Lourenço, 2008). In 2008, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) assessed the impacts of global warming on the main crops in Brazil over the next decades. This study showed that grain harvest losses are estimated to be around US$ 4 billion by 2020 and US$ 9 billion by 2070 (Domingues, 2008). Climate change also dislocates croplands since farmers seek suitable climate conditions for their crops. Manioc, for instance, is expected to disappear from arid areas. Coffee will no longer be concentrated in the Southeast. The South will be hosting manioc, coffee, and sugar-cane, which will substitute soybean mainly due to water stress. It is expected that sugar-cane will spread all over the country doubling its area size (Domingues, 2008). Crop deployment will affect many economic sectors. The production cost of agriculture and cattle-raising will increase as well as the cost of inputs for householders. Econometric studies ex-post are unable to identify and assess these phenomena because the dynamism of regional economic variables are determined by cyclical fluctuation and structural factors like demographics and public policies (Domingues, 2008). In addition, lack of studies on these phenomena prevents us from adopting ex-post models to adequately estimate future impacts. The model that should be used, therefore, is ex-ante. These analyses show how climate change effects amplify and neutralize economic inter-relationships through a Computable General Equilibrium (EGC) model. Examples of EGC in public agencies are mitigation policies and carbon taxes (Domingues, 2008).

Institutional Structure

Brazilian leaders have set up institutional platforms to address the challenges of food security. In the context of building a “Strategic State” -- which is a national project in which the State is in charge of establishing an integrated vision encompassing values and aspirations over land --, the government has promoted agrarian reforms and agricultural policies for the agribusiness, food production chains, agro-industries, family agriculture programs, and alternative uses of rural properties. Officials have tried to speed up this process by redistributing land, increasing food productivity, fostering job creation, rising living standards and income levels. In the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the country has attempted to reduce agricultural subsidies. In terms of cropland, Brazil has the potential to expand its agricultural frontier while increasing the number of job opportunities. Most of Brazil’s land structure -- little over 60% -- is comprised of very small landholdings. The percentage of the number of people working in these very small croplands is almost half of the total number of people working in the agriculture sector in the country; however, very small landholdings represent only 8% of the total agricultural area (Zibetti, 2002). These numbers show the importance of very small landholding cropland for the Brazilian economy and the extreme concentration of land in the national land structure.

The National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA) represents a model of governance guided by effective participation by civil society. Described as a tool for communication between the government and citizens, CONSEA is an advisory body to the president on policies and general guidelines for food and nutrition security. Composed of fifty four representatives, two-thirds from civil society and the private sector and one-third from the federal government, CONSEA’s members are labor unions, business associations, the food industry, church groups, professional associations, academics, and non-governmental organizations representing family farmers, indigenous communities, and others. The government representatives come from nineteen different federal ministries and special secretariats. Despite such diversity of interests, since 2003 CONSEA has put forward a number of proposals and initiatives, such as the increase in allowances for the federal School Meals Program and the creation of the Food Procurement Program (PAA), which promotes direct crop and milk purchases by the government for building food stocks -- and regulating prices -- and to be used in government food program such as School Meals or food banks. Small farmers earn up to US$2,000 per year through PAA. But the Council’s most significant accomplishment so far has been the elaboration of the National Law on Food and Nutrition Security (LOSAN), passed by the Brazilian Congress in 2006. Article 1 of this law establishes definitions, principles, guidelines, objectives and composition of the National System for Food and Nutrition Security -- SISAN -- through which the State, with the participation of organized civil society, will formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and actions towards ensuring the human right to adequate food. For the first time the right to food is institutionalized as a matter of public policy and an obligation of the state in this country. LOSAN also strengthened CONSEA, since it establishes the national council as a permanent state institution, with an elected president from civil society and the mandate to develop programs for SISAN (Rocha, 2009).

Brazilian agriculture specialists have worked to reduce the country’s vulnerability to climate change. This is done by identifying causes, defining agricultural scenarios, and coordinating research projects. This coordination is led by the Center of Meteorological and Climate Research Applied to Agriculture (CEPAGRI), EMBRAPA, and Agritempo -- this is a network of agro-meteorological information. This institutional collaboration creates a database and models that define agricultural scenarios at the national level. The two projects carried out by these institutions are Brazil’s Agricultural Zoning and Climate Risks Zoning, which focuses on family agriculture, biofuels, and pasture. The scenarios designed have considered temperature increases of 1, 3, and 5.8 degrees Celsius and of rainfall of 5, 10, and 15%. These scenarios were simulated in a homogeneous way for the entire country and disregarded any technological evolution in the management of cultures and genetic enhancement as well as plant adaptation to new conditions. The cultures assessed were soybean, corn, rice, and beans (Pellegrino, 2007).

Biofuels

The production of biofuels is related to food security. It is largely assumed that biomass cultivation for biofuels has gradually destroyed native forests (Sachs, 2007). Biofuel Watch -- a British non-governmental organization and -- Lester Brown are voices supporting this argument. Hunger, however, is not a direct result of lack of food but derives from low income. In addition, the calculus of cultivable land areas for biofuels cannot be done by juxtaposing productive chains and by the sum of assigned areas but by seeking integrated food production systems and adapting energy sources for various biomes (Sachs, 2007). Arguments in favor of biofuels are that vegetable residual or co-products become basic input for anew cyclical production; areas utilized for biomass are the degraded and marginalized ones; plants used are rustic; new oleaginous plants featuring high level of energy are expected to surge increasing the average productivity per hectare of food cultures and as a result reduce the amount of necessary areas for production; and forests and agro-forestry systems expand the production of cellulosic ethanol since reforestation increases production (Sachs, 2007). Thus, it is important to assess the natural limits of biofuel production by respecting the double imperative of the inviolability of native forests and of the obligation to ensure food security for everyone. These measures are met by integrating small farmers into productive chains through public policies and organizing cooperatives for the commercialization and industrialization of products (Sachs, 2007). It is important to note the cross effect of biofuel and food since both rely on the same raw material. Certification of exported products also ensures the respect for ecological and social norms. The establishment of a regulatory agency would be able to intervene in the negotiation with foreign investors and assess projects from social, environmental, and economic criteria and also to promote ecological zoning (Sachs, 2007). The emphasis, though, should be on food and energy integrated systems. The government will accomplish so by increasing investments in research institutions like EMBRAPA. Finally, it is necessary to avoid the over appreciation of the exchange rate to guarantee the competitive price of Brazilian commodities in foreign markets (Sachs, 2007).

Third Part – The Amazon

International and national mechanisms have attempted to mitigate the effects of climate change on the Amazon. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and Afforestation and Reforestation (A/R) are mitigation instruments to make forests worth more alive than dead by providing monetary incentives to maintain forests standing (Trivedi, 2009). In 2005, the Amazon faced a large drought. The Southwestern and Western portions experienced one of their worst droughts in sixty years, compounded by extensive forest fires. The causes appeared to be warmer global temperatures and lower rainfall. The consequences were lower water levels in the rivers; drained floodplain lakes and streams; and isolation of hundreds of riverine villages and communities (Trivedi, 2009). REDD offers incentives to countries to reduce their deforestation relative to a historical reference level calculated from their deforestation rate in a recent snapshot of time. It operates at the national level and link compensation to a country’s success in reducing recent deforestation rates. The concern over this mechanism is that it targets only a subset of countries and connects incentives to annual deforested areas, which may inadvertently push deforestation to other areas (Trivedi, 2009).

Deforestation in the Amazon is driven primarily by economic profitability in the forms of agricultural expansion and logging, governance weaknesses because of lenient law enforcement; and a deterministic poverty cycle. In the Brazilian Amazon, largely populated by indigenous groups, small-scale farmers are estimated to account for about one-fifth of deforestation. At the international level, REDD compensates developing nations for the opportunity cost of conservation; the costs of agricultural intensification and the efforts in certifying logging and agribusiness; and management costs entailed in enforcement and monitoring at the frontier. Innovative financial mechanisms include financial bonds, insurance premiums, microcredit and patient capital, and eco-certification. REDD objective is to establish an “eco-utility” framework to value forests in equal measure for climate change mitigation and adaptation (Trivedi, 2009).

At the local level, Computable General Equilibrium (EGC) models provide a framework to determine how changes in policies and technology affect deforestation. Such model can take into account a wide range of indicators and variables in calculating the magnitude of the effects of these forces on deforestation (Angelsen, 2001). EGC considers technological change in agriculture outside the Amazon; rising costs in transportation; investments in infrastructure; changes in the real exchange rate; macroeconomic policies, credit, and fiscal subsidies; and population growth (Angelsen, 2001). This model assumes that land has qualitative characteristics, thus divides it into: forested land, arable land, and grassland and pasture. The limitation of this model is the assumption on average deforestation rates which makes it a static model whose results represent the impact of poverty experiments in a timeless world (Angelsen, 2001).

Computable General Equilibrium models are complemented by participatory policymaking processes (Angelsen, 2001). However, public policies emerging from these procedures constitute in very challenging issues. Several factors shape public policies in the Amazon. Some of them are population growth; human development index; urban network and size of rural population; local and regional infrastructure; land conflicts -- access and entitlements --; extensive model of exploration and agribusiness; conservation of natural resources and biodiversity; productivity of family agriculture; indigenous people and sustainable practice; and reduction of social inequalities (Schröder, 2010).

Specifically to food security, the current rate of grain production in the Amazon must change. The current rate of grain and cattle-raising production growth is not sustainable and thus it is necessary to reduce the number of potential products deriving from environmental assets. Some instruments already implemented are the enactment of a moratorium over soybean production (Schröder, 2011). Customers are committed not to buy soybean from deforested areas. Another instrument is adjusting the conduct of cattle-raising ranchers, which is a partial answer to the complexity of agriculture and livestock industry goods coming from this region. The objective is to avoid the acquisition of cow meat supplied by farms incurring in socio-environmental irregularities and to promote state programs fostering cattle-raising modernization as well as the recuperation of degraded areas and rural property relisting (Schröder, 2010).

Family agriculture is the main unit of production in the Amazon. Over 85% of family units occupy 13% of the total area. The reasons for the continuation of this social group are a historical process of unchecked economic growth and consolidation of social gathering groups, and new limits opened up by colonization resulting from the expansion of agricultural frontiers and investments in infrastructure (Schröder, 2011). State governments have tried to streamline the production of the family unit by helping them conserve natural resources based on indigenous and traditional knowledge. Officials have designed specific policies for family agriculture since 1990 to address food security, poverty, income generation, and value-added. These policies have been reviewed over time to promote social mobility, insertion into productive process, and efficient and organized commerce structures (Schröder, 2011). The promotion of the diversity of the rural space in the Amazon has had the support of the National Program to Strengthen Family Farming (PRONAF) which is coordinated by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA). PRONAF promotes family agriculture through programs of credits for investments and costs. MDA articulates the Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (ATER) program throughout the national territory. The growth rate of families benefitting from ATER increased 788% from 2003 and 2009. This is a reflection of 1082% of increased investments in this program during the same period (Schröder, 2010).

Other programs and institutions have also contributed to the issue of food security in the Amazon. In 2010, it was signed a National Policy on Technical Assistance and Rural Extension for Family Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (PNATER). The goal of this program is promoting the continuity of ATER’s services with agility and without interruption to ensure the effectiveness of implementation and accountability. PNATER greatly helped simplify administrative procedures (Schröder, 2010). EMBRAPA is another important institution in the Amazon. It promotes the availability of technology for family agriculture and technical assistance to farmers. Partnering with PRONAF, EMBRAPA has created a credit line that makes it possible to invest in infrastructure and seek conditions to increase family agriculture productivity through research integration and technical assistance (Schröder, 2011). Another plan is the Harvest Plan for Family Agriculture. This program ensured commercialization and assigned a new market for family production -- School Meals Program. A federal law required that 30% of all public money assigned to School Meals Programs must be used to buy products from family agriculture (Schröder, 2010). Two other programs are the National Plan for Promoting Socio-Biodiversity Chains (PNPPs), which aims to promote conservation and the sustainable use of biodiversity, and Policies of Guaranteed Minimum Prices (Schröder, 2010). MDA, for its part, concentrates on the actions of credit, commercialization, technical assistance, inputs, besides land regularization, and infrastructure. The main problems of these regional programs are the challenges for establishing direct communication and adapting public policies to the particularities of the Amazon producers (Schröder, 2010). To successfully do so, it is necessary to strengthen the articulation between research, rural extension, credit, and different sustainable sectors; advance the process of organization and land regulation; ameliorate institutional, juridical, and budget mechanisms; and define and implement indicators and methodologies for the monitoring of results (Schröder, 2010).

Fourth Part – the Northeast

In Brazil, the impacts of climate change are more visible in the dry areas. The Northeast region hosts the most vulnerable population in the country and its gross development product is usually half of the national average. It occupies 18% of the country’s territory, features fragile fauna and flora, an irregular distribution of rain, intermittent rivers, and a high climatic variation. It comprises nine states located at the heart of the region’s infamous “polygon of drought”. Most of its population is made up of Black and indigenous groups (Santos, 2008).

The process of desertification is intensified by poverty and vice-verse. The Northeast features three types of droughts: annual, which lasts seven to eight months every year; seasonal, which lasts one-two years in cycles of thirteen years; and extended, which lasts over three years. El Niño has great influence on the occurrences of these droughts. The federal and state governments have established statistical and dynamic forecasts to mitigate the negative impacts of these extreme events. The long-term monitoring system aims to alleviate the effects of climate change, and promote adaptation and mitigation policies to countermeasure the effects of droughts (Santos, 2008).

The state of Ceará, for instance, has prepared its institutions to deal with the effects of climate change. State agencies are undergoing political and socio-economic change processes. These changes have happened because of decision-making processes based on social indicators and participatory policymaking (Tompkins, 2008). The main aspects of these changes are the democratization of decision-making; decentralization; environmental sustainability; societal participation; stakeholder-driven organizations supporting agencies’ missions; and reform of networks which have provided financial, human, and political support for domestic and international initiatives (Tompkins, 2008). Public policies have integrated disaster response into social and economic policy process and long-term commitment to investments in disaster risk reduction and in collaborative learning-based approach to managing risk. The key factor is managing entrenched poverty and exclusion in hazard-prone areas (Tompkins, 2008).

Climate change impacts the Northeast’s economy. The EGC multi-regional model is represented by a set of linear equations and solutions obtained in the form of growth rate. This multi-regional bottom-up model features national results based on the aggregation of state results. This model simulates policies that have an impact over specific prices and create a system for the regional mobility of factors between regions and sectors. The configuration of this model includes thirty sectors in each of the twenty-seven regions; presents inter-state commercial matrixes for each product; and flows of internal and external commerce. These EMBRAPA’s scenarios include eight crops -- rice, beans, corn, cotton, manioc, soy, sugar-cane, and sunflower. The analysis takes into account production rate and its relation with profitability and capital deployment. It also measures the variation of land supply. These simulations encompassed nine quinquenniums from 2005 to 2050. The findings of these scenarios have led to conclude that the regional gross domestic production is negative in terms of employment, intra-migration, input-output relation, and urban infrastructure services in the Northeast (Domingues, 2008).

Fifth Part – Conclusion

This paper studies the relation between climate change and food security in two macro-regions of Brazil. Institutional frameworks served as platforms to analyze problems emerging from this cause-effect relationship. Even though Brazilian national and regional programs have been successful in addressing food security issues intensified by increasing threats imposed by climate change. The country still faces pressing challenges on its food and nutrition policies.

The first challenge is on the supply side. It is necessary more innovative policies combining basic safety-net and well-targeted mechanisms with structural-change components. Cash transfer programs combined with food policies are not meant only to alleviate income poverty but mainly to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Long-term structural changes founded on investments in human capital through education and health break this vicious cycle.

The second challenge is on the demand side. Lack of information and knowledge among small-scale farmers has prevented them from taking full advantage of recent government agricultural programs. Policies to support small-scale family farmers have the same double objective of providing short-term support in conjunction with long-term structural changes. These, however, cannot be realized without further resources geared to farmers’ capacity in gathering information; market-functioning and general education; and forming associations and cooperatives.

The third challenge is in the implementation process. The effectiveness of social councils in governance for food and nutrition security has been undermined by the lack of appropriate training and education among potential representatives from civil society. Local patronage and corruption are also obstacles to effective participatory governance in many municipalities.

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Political Structure and Oil Spill in Brazil

Introduction

This paper studies how political structures have shaped decision making during a recent oil spill in Brazil. The first part briefly explains political disputes over oil royalties from a social perspective. The second part summarizes the roles of and conflicts between oil agencies. The third part points out political obstacles for enacting a National Contingency Plan. The fourth part lists the sequence of events related to Chevron’s oil spill off Rio de Janeiro’s coast followed by a brief conclusion.

1. Political Structure

Chevron's oil spill off the Brazilian coast in November 2011 exposed the major environmental risks of tapping the country's new wealth. It also risked delaying economic development by fueling nationalistic oil politics. The accident quickly became politicized at a time when states were campaigning against a proposal to spread oil wealth more widely. "The reality is that this spill is going to speed up the politicizing of Brazil's oil industry," said Cleveland Jones, a geologist with the National Oil and Gas Institute at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. "We are not going to have a real discussion about the risks and benefits of offshore oil exploration, but an idiotic political discussion. The political risk is going to rise in the industry. This spill will be another excuse to limit the role of companies other than Petrobras in Brazil's oil industry and for the politicians to take more control of the country's oil industry", declared Jones (Blount, 2011).

At the federal level, endless political disputes, excessive bureaucracy and regulation, corruption, and slow judicial systems have led to governmental inefficiency that significantly increased transaction costs. To improve its efficiency, Brazilian public agencies have been undergoing various institutional reforms since the end of the military regime -- 1964 to 1985. For example, in 2007, the discovery of huge additional offshore hydrocarbon deposits in subsalt layers prompted the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to propose changes in the legal regime applicable to Exploration and Production (E&P) activities. This change aimed at decreasing the Congress influence over petroleum private businesses and increasing the autonomy of regulatory agencies in strategic decision-making processes (Almeida, 2011).

The royalty dispute caused not only a fight among Brazil’s states, it also complicated political alliances between the ruling Labor Party and the centrist party, the country’s largest political party, which maintains a dominant presence in the oil-producing states of Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo, both major oil producers. Thus, in order to avoid more conflicts, senators and deputies decided to put the discussion of royalty allocation “on the back burner” (Ball, 2009). By deliberately refraining from openly debating this important national issue, the federal and state administrations put off the creation of a dynamic intergovernmental crisis management system characterized by four risk decision points: detection, interpretation, communication, and mobilization of a collective response system (Comfort, 2007).

A historical constraint on decision making is elite membership in the Brazilian society. Institutional membership is based on economic wealth, such as landholding records and tax returns. Elite values are a barometer of the strength of a democracy in two ways. Firstly, dictate and establish the norms of a democratic conduct. Secondly, reflect the health of a nation's democracy and its appeal to the wider population. Elite discourses on economic progress and the establishment of democracy should not be ignored (Wells, 2010). Elite decisions play an important role in shaping collective definitions and perceptions by highlighting preferred courses of action using three types of symbolic “crisis handling devices” -- framing, ritualization, and making. Understanding these social mechanisms of control is crucial to identify the dimensions of crisis management in local and regional politics (Hart, 1993).

The discrepancy between the parliamentary makeup and social reality of Brazil is abysmal. One out of every three legislators is a millionaire and of these "millionaires" the average capital worth is above one million dollars. The social composition of the Brazilian parliament is a direct reflection of the neoliberal policies adopted during the Cardoso administration of the 90's, which have been strengthened by Lula. Legislatures and political parties are the key institutions and aggregation of elite interests in the political process. Elites are represented in political parties and Legislatures not only at the national level but also at the state and local levels (Wells, 2010). This legitimate means of expression of the elites in political processes impedes the modernization of a public service based on nonhierarchical, independent, and decentralized institutional structures governed by market mechanisms -- competition -- and independent regulatory agencies. A centralized political control also obstructs teams and networks to be flexible and to become nonhierarchical forms of organization, which prevents the surge of new leaders whose skills would help the country achieve better policy outcomes and provide higher quality and cost-effective public services (Kapucu, 2009).

The elite control over public institutions in Brazil also hinders the implementation of an informal but successful crisis management system. Since the two principal concerns of the elite is maintaining its ideals and ensuring the preservation of privileges and rights conferred by its position in the socio-political structure, it becomes nearly impossible to formalize an informal management style which includes ten rules for conducting a successful crisis management program: i) assure that the real crisis is identified, ii) remember that power is what managers have and what the opposition thinks the manager has, iii) do not become involved in areas where the personnel are inexperienced, iv) go outside the opposition's experience and get the opposition on your "home field.", v) make the opposition play by its own rules, vi) do not let issues drag on too long, vii) keep the pressure on and keep in mind that a good crisis manager does not let up or declare victory at the first sign of success, viii) remember that the threat is usually more terrifying than the problem itself, iv) keep in mind that there is nothing to lose and everything to gain -- but it is important to make sure there is truly nothing to lose, and x) remember that the price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative (Lurie & Ahearn, 1991). The patrimonialist way of governance also holds back the establishment of an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which is a mutual aid agreement and partnership that allows states to assist one another in responding to natural and man-made disasters, often in advance of federal disaster assistance (Kapucu et al, 2009).

2. Petroleum Entities

According to the oceanographer David Zee, who was advising the federal police in the Chevron case, fining Chevron would not ensure that oil companies would start investing in prevention mechanisms. "This fine is innocuous mainly because it does not aim the main target which is mitigating the risks of future leaks”, Zee affirmed. The specialist also stated that this event should have been used to lay out a national debate over environmental legislation. “Brazil needs to rethink its regulations and laws to enforce mechanisms of prevention, especially related to drilling beyond pre-salt layer", Zee stated. The scientist also criticized the emergency procedures to contain the leak. "Chevron should have acted in less than forty-eight hours but it took over five days to respond”, he claimed. Zee urged the Brazilian oil regulator, ANP, to establish clearer criteria and a list of oil accidents so that it would be possible to fine companies based on the extension and magnitude of damage caused (Andrade, 2011).

In terms of oversight and subsidies, the most effective strategy to remove the government from political stalemates and corruption is avoiding legislators taking over the large flow of money coming into the country from oil operations. Under the military dictatorship, the government created an independent oil company that controlled its own finances and was less prone to political meddling. As Brazil shifted to democracy, Petrobras, the national oil company, partially kept its independence and the oil industry exponentially grew in the country. Hence, continued success depends on successive governments to remain at arm’s length and the enactment of accountability instruments (Victor, 2009). It is equally important that oil companies create a crisis management team -- with a clear chain of command -- well in advance of any crisis. This team should meet every six months to discuss potential crises and how to respond to them. These teams should also be cross-functional to receive inputs from all aspects of their actions, identify every possible disaster imagined and potential crises -- as well as possible responses -- and determine how vulnerable the company is to hazards (Kash & Darling, 1998). Finally, oil companies should also consider the increased number of threats deriving from climate change. By supporting changes in institutional structures and relationships and by partnering with public agencies, oil companies would be able to enhance governance and resilience, and as a result, reduce their overall vulnerability (O’Brien et al, 2006).

Brazil’s government and petroleum companies share responsibility. The legal contract is the primary tool for managing contractor responsibilities and performance. This means that the focus should be on the relationship between operating companies and first-tier contractors. It is also important to establish risk management systems to emphasize the growing importance of “managerial responsibility” since it is extremely difficult to apply standards and implement procedures across the entire contracting chain to ensure good performance. Seven key actions offering guidance for governments and civil society organizations are i) collaborate on early-stage planning and assessments by evaluating workforce capacity, enterprise development opportunities, stakeholder expectations and local content strategy; and by agreeing on environmental and social obligations, standards and evaluation methods ii) invest in capacity building in underdeveloped local markets by funding programs to build local capacity and supporting local business associations and networks iii) encourage uptake of standards through procurement and processes by ensuring health, safety, environmental and social expectations are included in prequalification and tender processes and making sure tender processes are open, transparent and free of corruption iv) ensure that contracts incentivize good practice by balancing incentives for cost, schedule and responsible practices, including provision of dedicated funds for environmental and social measures; by working with lead contractors to align expectations of environmental and social performance; and by ensuring that they do the same with subcontractors v) build capacities and trust on the job by assisting contractors in developing and funding environmental and social management plans and considering longer-term contracts to support capacity development vi) establish excellent communication and oversight throughout the chain by ensuring open lines of communication and feedback mechanisms; by coordinating oversight activities to lessen confusion and overlap; and by supporting local community liaison officers vii) build trust and accountability with external stakeholders by encouraging public reporting using recognized guidelines; and by encouraging good practices in public engagement and resolution of grievances and independent oversight by third-party organizations. Success in delivering good social and environmental outcomes strengthens the industry’s social license to operate and its ability to respond effectively to stakeholder expectations. It requires, however, a concerted effort across the industry, both top-down and bottom-up, and across stakeholder groups (Wilson, 2011).

In December 2001, the National Council for the Environment published the Federal Resolution 293/01 -- “the Oil Law” -- establishing the minimum requirements for an oil spill response plan. The resolution is general in some parts, basically because it is applicable to wider issues involving oil and quite theoretical in many ways so as it demands a subjective approach from the Brazilian Federal Environmental Agency’s (IBAMA) technicians. Experience has shown that some adjustments are needed and since late 2006 the resolution has been revised with the participation of environmental authorities, ANP, Brazilian Navy as well as oil companies. The main objective is minimizing uncertainty concerning oil spill response plans by documenting practices and procedures. Besides the compulsory implementation of a particular oil spill response plan for activities involving oil platforms, terminals and pipelines, the “Oil Law” established that IBAMA should coordinate the implementation of Regional Emergency Response Plans and a National Contingency Plan. However, after ten years, both plans are very far from being developed and implemented. This is primarily due to the lack of a specialized technical team to coordinate these projects. Hence, the Ministry of the Environment and IBAMA should make an effort to integrate all the parts involved, such as regional environmental agencies, oil companies, coast guard, and ANP. The Ministry of the Environment, for example, has mapped sensitive areas. These maps must be shared since they are fundamental for planning protection priorities, defining response strategies, and combating oil spills. The oil companies operating in these areas have to build a response plan to protect the various ecological resources existing in that area. For IBAMA, the great challenge is to guarantee that oil spill response plans for these areas are fully operational and all social and ecological measures to protect these areas are respected. One of the key points learned by the oil companies and IBAMA is the importance of local community’s participation in the development of an effective plan. These communities are important to the process because of their knowledge of local tidal currents and shoreline access points (Maggi, 2008).

Due to the complete separation of competences between the environment and regulatory agencies, ANP has directed its action to the installations of operational safety. The agency, through its Operational Safety Division, developed an Operational Safety Management System -- SGSO --, including seventeen management practices, concerning management leadership and personnel, facilities and technology, and operational practices. Thus, based on safety practices comprised within the SGSO, the operators of a given facility should prove that any kind of risk that may accrue from offshore drilling and production operations are strictly under control. ANP verifies these controls through periodical audits performed in the facilities (Jablonski, 2011).

The Oil and Nuclear Licensing Office -- ELPN/IBAMA -- is a new bureaucracy in the process of ever-rising demand for licensing. Despite inadequate staffing and limited resources, this entity adheres to strict schedules and provides a thorough analysis of environmental documents. Environmental regulation, starting in the mid-1960s, has developed in a fragmented manner through a series of laws, decrees, resolutions and edicts without the necessary effort to ensure compatibility among the diverse legal instruments. Congressional efforts have been underway to provide coherence and consolidation to environmental law, and, more recently, a process was initiated for the restructuring of the National Environmental Council (CONAMA), the consultative and deliberative body attached to the Ministry of Environment that is charged with studying and proposing policy guidelines, and decides on norms and standards compatible with environmental quality. Oil spill and emergency preparedness is an area of particularly high activity in terms of new regulations. In 2000, three main regulatory tools issued were i) one that establishes the procedures for communication of accidents and accidental release of pollutants to be adopted by the oil and gas companies, ii) another requiring oil companies to present a program of environmental audits in all their oil and gas facilities in national territory, iii) and a third ruling on the prevention and control of pollution caused by oil and other toxic or hazardous substances in national waters. Despite the laws, no single operator has yet prepared an environmental impact assessment so that it is too soon to know how these regulations will impact on the proposed emergency preparedness of the operators (Armstrong, 2003).

Oil accidents in Brazil have generated political pressure for rapid regulatory response from government authorities, politicians, environmentalists, media, and the general public. However, the institutional framework of the oil industry is still poorly defined due to recent changes in E&P. The new regime added complexity to the framing of a new regulatory system for environmental protection in which the responsibilities of the various actors are inadequately delineated. Some of the regulations are not in place, others are not adapted to the new oil market regime and others have unclear roles because there was never much demand to apply certain regulations. In this unclear institutional environment, a series of institutional conflicts arises between the regulatory body and the regulated industry; between different organizations at the same level of government; between different levels of government; and regarding the public character (Oliveira, 2003).

3. The National Contingency Plan

An emergency plan is a collection of emergency procedures that must be performed to adequately respond to specific accidental scenarios. An emergency procedure also describes the human and material resources required and includes ancillary documentation, such as maps, simulation results, and list of authorities to contact. The local environmental protection agency and other government authorities audit companies from time to time to verify if they have emergency plans that cover all plausible accidental scenarios, and if they have the necessary equipment or access to the required resources within a reasonable amount of time (Fernandes, 2007).

Contingency plans minimize damage caused by a possible oil spill in the sea. In Brazil, the development of these plans has been in charge of companies involved in the exploration, production and transport of oil. CONAMA has established guidelines that should be followed by oil companies in case of accidents with oil spill. This design of the best disaster responses is difficult to be achieved because it depends on several factors such as quantity and type of oil spilled, location of oil spill, weather and ocean conditions, among others. The question is especially difficult to be treated due to the dynamic nature of the marine environment. The aim is to develop disaster responses for various situations that change over time. The prediction of trajectories of the oil spill is essential to properly manage disaster response in a coastal area. The use of computational models for simulation approaches has been applied with promising results (Khroling, 2011).

In case of oil spill, the interests of environmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and of oil companies are inevitably in conflict in the decision process of choosing the best response strategy. In such situations, a consensus to reach the best viable solution is of great importance. The advantages and disadvantages of different types of responses should be weighted. On the one hand, equipment costs and maintenance befall upon oil companies, and on the other hand non-governmental organizations demand the smallest environmental impact on the coastal areas affected by oil spills. In this context, the process to reach a consensus and to elaborate response strategies necessarily involves a process of decision making with multiples objectives that take into account the preferences of the decision agents so that social, economic and environmental factors are considered (Khroling, 2011). It is also important to highlight that many crises can be prevented -- or at least coped with more effectively -- through early detection. The real challenge of response is not just to recognize crises, but to identify them in a timely fashion and with a will to address the issues they represent. A crisis consists of four different phases: prodromal (early symptoms), acute, chronic, and resolution. Recognizing these phases, and dealing with them effectively, gives oil companies and the agencies an important edge in addressing issues of great importance to the oil industry (Darling, 1994).

The Ministry of Environment is the national authority in case of incidents in marine and continental waters. The national authority is advised by a steering committee composed by the Ministries of National Integration -- responsible for the Brazilian Civil Defense --, Mines and Energy, and Transportation, and ANP. The committee is in charge of annual full-scale exercises and detailing operational procedures. The framework is completed by a committee composed by several other governmental organizations aiming to ensure the necessary human and material resources needed by emergency groups integrated by an operational coordinator and a representative of the company responsible for the oil spill assuming the supersivion of response actions (Jablonski, 2011).

In case of incidents with oil spill, the sequence of events to be followed is:
Incident communication

– Sectoral coordination informed
– National significance?
Yes – National Contingency Plan activation
No – Actions restricted to the installation Emergency Plan (PEI) and to the Area Plan
The response action sufficient
Yes – Actions restricted to the PEI and Area Plan
– Sectoral Coordination follows actions
No – Facilitate and amplify the polluter response capacity: Mobilization of the National Plan structure; Gather the Support Committee
– The actions adopted sufficient?
Yes – Sectoral Coordination follows actions
No – The Operational Coordinator assumes the responsibility for response actions
– The Unified Area Command adopts the necessary actions. (Jablonski, 2011)

From the operational point of view, the plan does not identify the possible origin of resources for the “mobilization of additional equipments”. Neither clearly defines the role of states facing the pre-salt area and the main local stakeholders in an event of oil spill. Brazil does not have either a specific fund, like the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund in the United States to gather financing resources to cope with large incidents or even liability associations as The Offshore Pollution Liability Association (OPOL) in the United Kingdom. A bill under discussion in the Congress, proposed immediately after the Gulf incident, compels concessionaires of exploratory blocks to pay a minimum of 2% of their income aiming the “constitution of a special reserve to cover environmental and socioeconomic damage caused by oil spill…”, but the discussions have not evolved so far. On practical grounds, Brazil has not gotten yet a formal arrangement connecting Ministries and other institutions potentially involved in strategies to deal with large incidents. As the preparedness, mobilization, monitoring and response strategies were conceived as a part of the plan itself, there was not either a progress on these matters (Jablonski, 2011).

In the absence of a National Contingency Plan, the public defender of Rio’s state, André Ordacgy, affirmed that he will file two public civil actions -- one against Chevron for causing environmental damage and another against the Ministry of Environment, in case a National Contingency Plan is not ready within ninety days after the oil spill in November 2011 based on administrative impropriety (Itamaraty, 2011). After BP oil spill in April 2010, José Sérgio Gabrielli, Petrobras’ president, said: “Here in Brazil laws are stricter than in the United States” and “the plan continues to be strongly oriented toward accident prevention” (Millard, 2011).

4. Chevron Oil Spill

The Brazilian Federal Police on November 10, 2011 began investigating an oil spill in an offshore field operated by Chevron. Fábio Scliar, head of the federal police department's environmental affairs division, told government news service that his division began to look into the causes and extent of the spill. A national website quoted Scliar as saying that technicians he sent to the offshore field came back with information that conflicted with that provided by Chevron. He said they only saw one ship being used in the cleanup while Chevron has said there were eighteen being used on a rotating basis. Without going into details he said there was also conflicting information regarding the size of the leak. Chevron has said that the oil spill was between 400 and 650 barrels of oil, but that the company had contained the leak. The company said in a statement that "cementing operations are taking place as part of ... well plugging activities." Chevron said the oil on the ocean surface had "substantially dissipated" and that the slick was down to "less than 65 barrels." Ana Carolina Oliveira, a spokeswoman for ANP, said an estimated 1,000 barrels had leaked to the surface and that it was still unclear if the leak was contained. "We should know by Friday -- November 18th --," she said. SkyTruth, a nonprofit group that uses satellite imagery to detect environmental problems, said on its website the oil spill extended 2,379 square kilometers and that the spill rate was up to at least 3,738 barrels per day. Chevron said in its statement that it "continues to fully inform and work with Brazilian government agencies and industry partners on all aspects of this matter." "If Chevron is not doing what it should -- to contain the spill -- it will be severely punished," Mines and Energy Minister Edison Lobão said. Curt Trennepohl, the president of IBAMA, said in a statement that Chevron has not omitted any information and has implemented all emergency procedures required. In an indication that the oil spill has not been completely stanched he said, "The company will be fined when the spill is contained because the value of the fine is proportional to the environmental damage caused." The well is part of the Chevron-operated Frade project, located 1,200 meters underwater, 370 kilometers off the northeastern coast of Rio de Janeiro state (Lehman, 2011).

Brazilian officials were sharpening their criticism against Chevron and suggesting the company could lose its license to drill in the country's deepest waters. Magda Chambriard, ANP’s director, said during a press conference that Chevron "acted in complete violation of its concession contract and Brazilian law." Officials said the company was unprepared to respond to the spill and accused it of editing video images of the oil seeping from the ocean floor, which Chevron denies doing. Haroldo Lima, ANP’s president, said of the company's recent request to drill another well in the same field, "the result may not be what the company expected previously." Chevron admitted making a critical error that it believes led to the spill. The well has been plugged, the company said, and the oil seepage through cracks in the ocean floor was declining. Chevron said it had believed it was operating within the terms of its concession and was able to stanch the source of the seep within four days. "We have not received any official notice from the appropriate governmental authority" regarding the company's ability to drill onshore or offshore, a spokesman said in a statement. The company faced as much as $139 million in fines; Brazil's leading environmental regulator had already announced a $28 million penalty. Analysts played down the impact of the fines on Chevron, which has $14 billion cash in hand, and the prospect that the second-largest U.S. oil producer could lose it license to operate in Brazil. "I find it hard to believe that they would have to completely walk away and recoup none of their investments," said Blake Fernandez, an analyst at Howard Weil. "That would not set a very good precedent for Brazil to attract other companies to do business" (Fick, 2011).

Federal investigators were threatening potential prison terms for Chevron’s officials if they were found guilty of violating environmental contamination laws. Marina Silva, a former environment minister and presidential candidate, said in a telephone interview that the spill served as a warning as Brazil moved ahead with exceedingly complex projects to produce oil from its “pre-salt” discoveries, beneath waters almost 10,000 feet deep and thick layers of salt, sand and rock. “This event is a three-dimensional alert to the problems that may occur,” Ms. Silva said. “This certainly does not smell good.” Despite Chevron’s assertions that the problem was contained, it faced mounting criticism from various other quarters in Brazil. Legislators said they would summon Chevron officials to appear for questioning. Brazilian President, Dilma Roussef, ordered a fast investigation to identify the exact causes of the incident and the enactment of punishment to culprits (Cruz, 2011).

Chevron plans to continue its expansion in Brazil. As the oil giant tries to contain the political fallout of a spill off the South American nation's coast, auctions for oil concessions in Brazil are now suspended. Chevron was ordered to halt its drilling in Brazil pending investigations by the federal police and other authorities. The company had acknowledged it wrongly estimated pressure and rock strength in the reservoir it was targeting. Chevron is the majority stakeholder in the Frade concession with Brazil's state-run Petrobras and a Japanese consortium. Chevron's chief for Latin America and Africa, Ali Moshiri, described as premature the government's ban on its drilling activities. "We plan to continue participating in new auctions for oil exploration blocks in Brazil, if there is creation of value and benefits," Moshiri said in a press conference in Rio de Janeiro (Coimbra, 2011).

Conclusion

Chevron’s incident revealed internal political battles over the control of pre-salt oil in Brazil. This event has also exposed traditional political structures and drivers for decision making in the country. In addition, the oil spill gave room to nationalist measures and unveiled several contradictions between rhetoric and practice. Brazilian public agencies and civil society have the opportunity to tap into the immediate post-disaster period to set a foundation for broad communication, planning, and legal structures and debates over responsibilities, standards and procedures over emergency responses for national and international companies drilling deepwater horizon oil off the coast. Although crises can have devastating effects on the organization and its stakeholders, these events can also be resolved positively as long as the communication following a crisis plays an integral role in this success (Ulmer, 2011).

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Brazil in 60 Minutes

(Wrote the text below because I am an eyewitness, after living over 25 years in São Paulo and travelling throughout the country, that injustice is not an exception but a rule in the Brazilian society and because I do not agree with politicians and economists who claim that we, the civil society, first need to accumulate capital and then work towards social cooperation to overcome daunting public challenges)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=co1cwVXhHQc&feature=player_embedded

An American friend sent me today the link above and affirmed that after watching this video I would be proud of being Brazilian.

Indeed, I got really happy to see that my country has created many jobs and attracted billions of dollars to the economy over the last decade.

However, I wonder what positions have been opened, if the poorest are living better, if this international propaganda of economic growth derives from comprehensive public policies and legal enforcement.

Honestly, I am cynical about Brazil’s future. Injustice is everywhere.
To illustrate, I share three short stories I have read recently on Brazil’s largest online newspaper.

Marco Paulo dos Santos, an intern at the Superior Court of Justice, was fired by the head of this court, Ari Pargendler. The reason for being publicly humiliated was not following Pargendler's orders to keep distance while he was withdrawing money from ATM. Santos, a Black undergraduate law student, was standing in line like any other person waiting for his turn. Pargendler, Caucasian, is still ahead of the Superior Court.

Edson Néris da Silva was beat up to death by a group of young people downtown São Paulo. For these self-proclaimed Neo-Nazi adolescents, the crime of Edson was justified because he walked hand in hand with his male partner. The police arrested 20 suspects, two of them women, but all are free and back to the streets.

José Jesus da Silva is an Indian Pataxó shot dead in the back few months ago. His friends stated that this ambush was caused by a dispute over land against landowners. Pataxó Indians have outspoken that they have been waiting for 28 years to the Supreme Court invalidate irregular titles assigned to farmers. 23 Indians have died so far and none of the farmers as a result of this dispute.

What Marco, Edson, and José share in common is that they do not belong to Brazil’s mainstream social class. They are part of the minority and their voices are rarely heard by those in power. As Brazilian leaders historically and systematically turn blind eyes to obvious cases of the violation of justice, this continental country will continue fighting against the burdens of deep social inequality and being considered a rising star only for the few fortunate rich prisoners living behind high electric fences.