Policy problems are defined by symbolic representations. Narratives are stories of decline offering despair. Based on recitation of facts, narrative proposes steps to avoid crisis. A variant of declined stories is revisionism. Revisionists affirm that things are not worse -- or better -- as thought by showing evidence to prove otherwise. Narratives are also mechanisms of control since they advocate liberty restraint to change individuals and improve society. The assumption is that there is hope as long as control is enacted. Policymakers use narratives to represent the world in a way that make their skills necessary. Synecdoques are used as “typical cases” to define an entire problem and frame a policy response based on a particular event. The problem of this figure of speech is that it evokes a sense of urgency confining policy response and suspending critical thinking by reducing the scope of problems in order to make them more manageable. The solution is adopting larger discussions. Metaphor is another type of political narrative. The logic is that “if a is like b, then the way to solve a is to do what you would do with b.” This constitutes a persuasive rationale since it labels prescriptions. An effective way to address metaphor is questioning assumptions. Ambiguity is the most important of all symbols. It enables the transformation of individual intentions and actions into collective results and purposes. Without ambiguity, compromise would be more difficult to reach. The problem of ambiguous language, though, is that it masks internal conflicts that will become evident as a movement seeks concrete policies.
Measurement shapes solutions. Numbers are the most common approach to define a policy problem. Although figures enjoy scientific status, measuring is only one way to describe problems. Measuring issues are related to purpose definition, possibilities, problem presentation, categorization (include and exclude), selection (privilege and discrimination), and important characteristics (value judgements and hierarchy). Measuring, however, provides clear rules and establishes thresholds. Policymakers use numbers to give an air of finality to each side’s opinions but no number is innocent, that is, every number is an assertion about similarities and differences. As for “problem presentation”, planners must be aware that the way a story is counted is always “counting as”, which means that numbers work like metaphors by selecting one feature to assert likeness by ignoring other aspects. Another problem of measuring is that it implies a need for effective and productive actions. This is a double-edge sword because, even though it is important to know how many people are sick, it is morally wrong that a physician treats patients as pieces standing on assembly lines. Numbers are usually used for explicit stories of decline. It only counts events that are worthwhile disregarding unexpected events; however, if it starts counting unexpected events it may assume that a rare event became common, regular, and expected. Another issue is counting events with no clear boundaries. Counting also creates communities by demonstrating common interests and leading to political mobilization but disregards how artificial and diverse this community may be at first place. Numbers are used to manipulate assumptions by judging incommensurables. Numbers also assert percentages to actions which are a gesture of authoritarianism because are symbols of precision, accuracy, and objectivity leading to mechanical selection and forgetting that counting is primarily an object of discretion. Measuring in the polis is especially complex because it is subjected to manipulation. Measuring explicitly evaluates how people and organizations will be treated in its performance and needs. This creates a “reactive behavior” which is caused by the need to influence and interpret an event according one’s convenience. Measurement, finally, is also a selection from a vast range of possibilities.
Not only numbers define problems. Natural and social interpretations of causal stories help planners define a problem as being originated by a natural determinant or as a result of will. Politics use causal stories to link action and consequences. Mechanical cause is the story in which its effects are intended but actions are caused indirectly -- “people are acting out of their own will or carrying out the will of others”. Accidental cause is devoid of purpose and action course. It is a natural disaster, for example. Intentional cause is an action and effect previously defined like conspiracy stories. Inadvertent causes are usually good actions but whose effects can be harmful -- “side effects of well-intentioned policy”. This type of cause is usually used to blame the victim -- “although people know they should save money, they spend it and continue poor”. The assumption of inadvertent causes is that if people changed behavior, the problem would not exist. All these causal stories have problems since they are fairly reductionist by analyzing one action and one effect. The solution for this simplicity is adopting complex models to understand how large entities frame problems. The models that help understand this complexity are “complex systems”, which claims that social systems are necessary to solve model problems but interactive systems are too complex, so failure is inevitable; “institutional”, which affirms that social problems are created by ingrained patterns of behavior of long-standing organization; and “historical”, which states that social patterns tend to reproduce status quo due lack of political change. The problem of complex models is that they are types of accidental stories. Hence, actions have no control over results, which leads to no responsibility and purpose in the context of the possibility of control and assignment of responsibility.
Planners assume different roles in defining problems. Planners must fight for, defend, and sustain their positions. It is crucial to stick to a belief since there is always someone telling a competing story. The successful story then becomes the dominant belief guiding assumptions for policymakers. Visibility, access to media, and prominent position help planners make their case. These items help causal stories become a political success. The strategies of successful stories are deeply attachment to cultural values, response to national mood, and implicit prescription entailing no radical redistribution of power and wealth. Law and science are also powerful social institutions in determining causes and legitimizing claims about harms. Successful causal stories can challenge and protect existing social order, assign responsibility to particular political actors, compensate victims, legitimize and empower particular actors as fixers of the problem, and create new political alliances for victims’ relationships. Planners have to identify moral responsibility and real economic costs on a chain of possible causes since this location is dictated by differences of political strength of different groups rather than by statistics and logic. By doing so, planners shift location of responsibility and redistribute alliances by mobilizing people who share a risk factor but have no previous association. Planners also identify objective interests of policies and how they would serve people best. Planners do so by identifying essential human needs. Other theories that planners deal with are “rationality under freedom” -- people enjoy all alternatives and information -- so people have relevant experience to make the right decision, and a Marxist tradition, which simplifies problems by seeing them as belonging to a common group rather than an individual and complex issue. Planners then should identify what is morally equal and politically unequal since legitimate and virtuous interests are in the hands of the strong ones. The problem is that good interest does not emerge naturally. Planners need to protect the weak to legitimize their interests against stronger but less virtuous groups. The strategy is bringing outside help and transforming narrow interests into broad ones.
Behavior shapes policy. Inducements like incentives and deterrence shape behavior bringing about change. If incentives are understood as a rewarding and an easy way for people to do something, deterrence is interpreted as making actions costlier by limiting choices for decision making. The coordination between reward and penalty seems the best solution to shape behavior. Inducements are important since they bring individual motives into line with community goals. The assumption of this theory is that people are conscious goal-setting and based on penalties or rewards they change their calculus. The opposite forces of adaptability are loyalty and tradition. Rules also shape behavior. Standards and rules are essential to establish social coordination by mandating behavior and commanding entities to act in certain ways, conferring power, and specifying actions. The problem of designing rules is that it creates tension between precision and flexibility. The arguments for precision is that it assures that similar cases will be treated alike, insulate individual from moods of officials, and provide predictability. The arguments against precision are that different cases will be treated alike -- since it is not sensitive to individual and contextual differences --, stifle creative responses to new situations, and does not give room for discretion. Facts also shape behavior. Facts can be use positively if derives from a rational process based on information and knowledge leading to voluntary behavior change. However, facts are also distorted and hidden in order to indoctrinate and intentionally manipulate the capacity of thinking independently.
Planners should consider legal systems and aspects of decision making. Legal rights are a long-standing impulse in American politics. In a political context, right means what people want or could possibly get when they invoke the rule of law. Therefore, rules describe what planners must do to bring a right into existence by enforcing mechanism and reminding the government of its responsibility to abide by the rules and to monitor behavior. Decision making is also a source of power. Planners must be aware of its structure and process. Membership, group size, locus, and private and public preferences shift the power structure. These features define who makes decisions by empowering different sets of people. Planners, finally, must be aware of “reasoning by calculation”. Politicians estimate consequence of actions by attaching values to consequences and calculating which action yield best results.
Stone, D. "Policy Paradox", 1997
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