“Disaster Policy Implementation: Managing Programs under Shared Governance”, written by Peter J. May and Walter Williams in 1986, focuses on intergovernmental implementation of emergency management programs and how it plays out at the federal and state levels. “Shared governance” is the object of this book which collects opinions, data, and methodologies from an earlier study and official releases. The scope is the relationship between federal headquarters and regional staff, and between the federal staff working in regional offices with state and local officials. Conclusions are drawn from interviews conducted in the following emergency areas: floodplain regulation, dam safety, earthquake preparedness, and aspects of civil defense.
Chapter Five covers floodplain regulation. “State Floodplain Management Programs (1982)” provides figures for flood-prone communities, state program budget, FTE staff, and state regulation from eight states and compare this data with a national median. Arizona’s and Oregon’s officials present diametrical commitment to management programs. Arizona officials have been innovative in relocating flood-prone communities and in working to build local capacity whereas Oregon’s officials have decided that floodplain management is a local responsibility. The reasons for Arizona’s innovative approach are the timing of severe floods in the state, an entrepreneurial state director, a supportive governor, and an able state staff assigned to the relocation program; and the indifferent participation of Oregon officials is attributed to personnel stating that their understanding of floodplain aspects falls under federal programs, that responsibility for floodplain management is delegated to counties and localities, and the state’s historical position in turning down federal funds for programs they refuse to undertake themselves. The contrast of Arizona and Oregon raises the federal problem of deciding how to cope with widely divergent degrees of willingness on the part of states to act as intermediaries in the regulatory process of the flood insurance program. As officials admit there is little they can do to induce the state to become an intermediary, FEMA regional office personnel in Oregon end up being the “sales force” for the floodplain management aspects of the flood insurance program. In Arizona, the “sales” function is primarily handled by state-level personnel with support being provided by FEMA regional office staff.
Chapter Six deals with dam safety mobilization. The “Report on Review of State Non-Federal Safety Programs (1983)” indicates the number of dams, percentage of unsafe dams, dam safety budget, and FTE staff in eight states and compares this data with a national median. California presents the higher number of dams (1269 against 669 national median), the lowest percentage of unsafe dams (3.3 against 28.4 national median), the highest dam safety budget (3,300 against 97 national media), and the highest number of FTE staff (61 against 3 national median). California’s dam safety initiatives derive from a legislation that followed the failure of the St. Francis Dam in Los Angeles County in 1928. In addition, the awareness of seismic activities and the damage of the Lower San Fernando Dam during San Fernando earthquake in 1971 led to new activity and increased staffing within the state. In contrast to California’s initiatives, interviews have shown that states with little dam safety mobilization have limited their efforts due to lack of awareness, insufficient financing to repair dams, and belief that the federal government should be undertaking that responsibility. Dam inspection programs can potentially change this inertial situation by mobilizing state commitment and capacity programs through grant-in-aid programs (Minnesota), funding studies of environmental and economic impacts (Connecticut), and programs to enhance state’s technical capabilities in inspecting unsafe dams, according to reports from the Corps of Engineers (1982). However, interviewees revealed that the federal agency has limited resources to commit states to dam safety programs through capacity workshops, technical assistance, and seed funding.
Chapter Seven is about earthquake preparedness. Interviews were conducted in California, Illinois Massachusetts, and Washington since these states perceive this phenomenon as a major natural hazard. California has concentrated the attention of the federal government because of FEMA assessments indicating that a catastrophic earthquake will occur in the southern part of the state in the next thirty years. The Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project (SCEPP) coordinates the various initiatives . FEMA expects that SCEPP’s projects serve as a “prototypical plan” for the entire country. From SCEPP’s lessons, FEMA has allocated preliminary funding for vulnerability studies and workshops. Interviews with FEMA officials, however, have revealed that the lack of technical expertise at the federal regional-office and FEMA staff turnovers significantly limit a more substantive collaborative effort in a shared governance model.
Chapter Eight talks about crisis relocation planning (CRP). This plan was created based on a potential nuclear attack upon the United States and an immediate need to relocate the population. According to the Committee on Armed Services from U.S. House of Representatives in 1983, the planning concentrated on 400 risk areas with 3,000 local and 50 state plans being viewed as necessary for the relocation effort. States and localities had considerable latitude in developing plans but state-level interviewees had mixed reaction to the guidance, especially on the volume of “needless” details. In addition, this collaborative effort between federal and state levels was threatened by the diversion of state CRP planners to other activities, the problem of obtaining state and local commitment to federal goals when the goals themselves are undergoing redefinition, and FEMA’s tepid behavior in the face of strong political opposition.
Part II
Chapter Four “Case Study Design” explains how the database for this study was created and the reasons for it. Unstructured interviews were conducted with selected 150 federal and state officials because of their knowledge and role in implementing the programs under study. Also, many lessons were drawn from a previous book written by one of the authors who had previously designed research questions related to the management responsibilities of the federal government and the operation responsibilities of subnational agencies.
Structured interviews would have expanded the database as well as and the accuracy of analysis. More professionals involved in disaster management at the federal and state levels could have been reached if a structure questionnaire with categorized answers were distributed. The increased number of interviews by a random selection process would have improved the accuracy of personnel perceptions by analyzing inputs based on statistical consolidation and comparison. The authors argued, though, that an unstructured selective interview matched with the objective of gathering qualitative data only from the ones in position of implementing executive decisions. In doing so, the study reproduced opinions of a selected few in power position and deliberately left out the concerns and suggestions of many who have long been involved with disaster management but – because of the restrictive scope of the present study - were deliberately ignored.
The present study draws most of its lessons from another book. “Government by agency: Lessons of the social programs grant-in-aid experience (1980)” from one of the authors, Walter Williams, served as the platform for the designing of the research questions of the present book. Even though it is made clear that the current study is a continuation – or a complement – of a previous edition, it should have established a dialogue with authors who agree and disagree with the positions brought up by the authors along the chapters. By not engaging in a dialectic process, conclusions and recommendations greatly diminished in impact and persuasiveness.
Other questions regarding the construction of database and methodology are: Why these four areas of disaster management? Why not others? Why not more? Why eight states? Why not others? Why not more? Who was interviewed? When and how were they interviewed? What questions were asked and how they were framed? Why not more interviewees? Why only a book served as the basis for this study?
Part III
The main contribution of this study consists in analyzing the political and implementation dilemmas of federal disaster policy in preparedness and mitigation. The political dilemma deals with the disjunctive nature of federal disaster policy-making and the implementation dilemma points out the challenge of shared governance of disaster policy among different layers of government.
Political dilemma is divided into before disaster (normal politics) and after disaster (emergency politics). In normal politics, there is a low interest in disaster policy and amendments are stuck in legislature procedures and contradictory agency activities. However, once a disaster strikes, emergency politics gains high political salience, attracts enormous media attention, and changes on disaster policy are enacted. The problem of policy-making after disasters is that this process tends to be defined in terms of most recent extreme events, in addition to becoming costly as the government approves more federal outlays -- through grants and loans -- but doing little to control longer-run growth of disaster losses.
The implementation dilemma confronts the roles of the federal government with subnational governments and individuals directly affected by disasters. On the one hand, federal officials have a strong stake in promoting hazard mitigation and preparedness but little direct control over the effectiveness of such efforts. On the other hand, local agencies and individuals owing a property in hazardous areas directly control the effectiveness of disaster policies but for the most part actions consistent with such policies are low on their list of priorities because of indifferent attitudes before disasters and because many assume they have little control over such events. This dilemma explains why many favor post-disaster relief and structural mitigation over nonstructural mitigation and compulsory insurance.
The authors propose that shared governance addresses these dilemmas. The federal government, by building subnational response capabilities and managing funding responsibilities, and subnational agencies, by being responsible for mandating and encouraging nonstructural mitigation efforts, strengthen the intergovernmental partnership by sharing management and financial responsibilities and improving communication and coordination during nonstructural disaster policy-making process.
Reference:
May, Peter J. “Disaster policy implementation.” New York: Plenum Press, 1986.
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